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Collaboration between firms in order to coordinate supply chain operations can lead to
both strategic and operational benefits. Many advanced forms of collaboration arran -
gements between firms exist with the aim to coordinate supply chain decisions and to
reap these benefits. This dissertation contributes to the understanding of the conditions
that are necessary for collaboration in such arrangements and the benefits that can be
realized of such collaboration arrangements. This dissertation focuses on the vendor-buyer
dyad in the supply chain. We identify and categorize collaboration arrangements that
exist in practice, based on a review of the literature and combine this with formal analy -
tical models in the literature. An important factor in the benefits of collaboration is the
benefit of reduced costs of transport, by realization of economies of scale in the context of
capacity-constrained trucks. As a contribution to the understanding of the dependence of
transport costs on the volume transported, we demonstrate how transport tariffs for
orders of less-than-a-truckload in size on a single link can be deduced from a basic model.
The success of a collaboration arrangement depends on agreement about the distribution
of decision authority and collaboration-benefits. We study a collaboration arrangement in
which the vendor takes responsibility for managing the buyer's inventory and makes it
economically attractive to the buyer by offering a financial incentive, dependent on the
maximum level the buyer permits to be stocked. This dissertation demonstrates that this
incentive alignment leads to considerable cost savings and near-optimal supply chain
decisions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Firms collaborate in order to provide products and services to their customers
in a competitive manner. The form of collaboration between firms varies from
transaction-based loose collaboration to very tight partnerships. Collaboration can
take place in joint research and development projects, risk management, joint mar-
keting efforts and supply chain management, to name a few examples. In this
thesis, we focus on collaboration in supply chains. The effects of supply chain
collaboration on the performance and competitiveness of the business can be sig-
nificant. Optimizing the form of collaboration to an ever-changing supply chain
environment can be a great advantage to businesses. The central focus of this dis-
sertation is the analysis of the drivers and mechanisms behind advanced collabora-
tion arrangements. This dissertation contributes to improving the knowledge and
understanding behind selecting optimal supply chain collaboration arrangements.
This chapter is organized as follows. A generic introduction to supply chain
management and supply chain collaboration is presented in Section 1.1. After that,
we provide the motivation for our research in Section 1.2. In Section 1.3, we discuss
the objectives of the research, the research questions around which the dissertation
is organized, and the methodologies used. Finally, we present the outline of the
dissertation in Section 1.5.
1.1 General Introduction Supply Chain Management
Various definitions of a supply chain and supply chain management have been
suggested in the literature. Based on a combination of a number of these defini-
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tions, Lummus and Vokurka (1999) propose a classical definition for a supply chain
as: ‘all the activities involved in delivering a product from raw material through to
the customer including sourcing raw materials and parts, manufacturing and as-
sembly, warehousing and inventory tracking, order entry and order management,
distribution across all channels, delivery to the customer, and the information sys-
tems necessary to monitor all of these activities’. According to their definition,
supply chain management ‘coordinates and integrates all of these activities into a
seamless process’. This definition focuses on physical goods as products. Recently,
the scope of supply chain management has become more broadly understood, and
services and information as products are included in the scope. This is why we
prefer the more generic definition of Cooper et al. (1997), who define supply chain
management to be ‘the integration of business processes from end user through
original suppliers that provides products, services and information that add value
for customers’. This makes a supply chain a vertical collaborative management
effort with the aim to deliver a product to a customer.
Collaboration with different parties can improve the efficiency of accomplishing
tasks, and can even make certain outcomes possible that would have been impos-
sible to realize without collaboration. Firms collaborate both internally and exter-
nally. Internal collaboration takes place between colleagues or departments in a
firm in order to realize the firm’s common goals and objectives. External collabora-
tion takes place with every party a firm transacts externally with, such as suppliers
and customers. Businesses are intertwined and tied together via a multitude of
collaboration arrangements. A firm that supplies a product to a buyer might have
a number of suppliers of its own, each of which can have several suppliers them-
selves. The focus of this dissertation is the collaboration between different firms
in the field of managing the supply chain. Collaboration in supply chains is gain-
ing importance, as illustrated by Lambert and Cooper (2000), who state: ‘One of
the most significant paradigm shifts of modern business management is that indi-
vidual businesses no longer compete as solely autonomous entities, but rather as
supply chains’. This implies that parties have to collaborate in order to compete as
a supply chain.
Strong enablers for creating a supply chain in which multiple firms collab-
orate are the visibility and accuracy of information that is exchanged and the
ease of exercising control over the supply chain. Historically, closely collaborat-
ing firms are often located in close proximity to each other to avoid difficulties
in information exchange and control. An example of this is the concentration of
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car-manufacturing industries in ‘Motor City’ Detroit. Recent developments in in-
formation technology allow firms to collaborate using advanced arrangements in
which the control-responsibilities and flow of information between firms are ar-
ranged more efficiently. Consequently, geographical proximity between firms be-
comes less important.
Collaboration arrangements between different parties range from collaboration
via a spot-market, with minimal interaction, to intimate collaboration, where par-
ties mutually align and make relevant decisions together. We consider collabora-
tion to range from loose collaboration with minimal, and transaction-based inter-
action, to the tightest form of collaboration where decisions are made by a single
decision-making authority for all parties.
1.2 Motivation
The entire spectrum of collaboration —from loose collaboration that is transaction-
based to tight collaboration via integrated control— can be observed in prac-
tice. Tight collaboration is not necessarily beneficial for every party in every en-
vironment. Two opposing forces —one favoring tighter and one favoring looser
collaboration— are driven by the effects of and conditions for the collaboration ar-
rangement. The push for tighter collaboration results from, among other reasons,
the cost benefits that result from collaboration. A counter-force results from, for
example, the costs of the investments required to collaborate closely, as well as the
efforts needed to maintain a minimum necessary level of flexibility and decision
power or autonomy. For certain effects of collaboration, such as strategic changes
for a firm, the impact is not always clear in advance. The impact may depend on
the short and long-term benefits that a firm expects to derive from it. However, the
form of collaboration can severely affect the performance of the supply chain and
the competitiveness of the business. In practice, firms aim to strike a balance be-
tween the opposing forces in determining the form of collaboration they use. The
‘invisible hand’ of Adam Smith implies that the forms of collaboration realized in
practice are a reasonable compromise between these collaboration forces.
The landscape of benefits, conditions, and consequences of collaboration is per-
manently changing. Developments in information technology are an important
factor in this changing landscape. Modern information technology mitigates diffi-
culties and inefficiencies in collaboration between members of a supply chain. It
reduces the cost of exchanging information, enabling frequent and efficient infor-
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mation exchange. Consequently, control of the supply chain that is virtually in-
dependent of geographical location becomes possible. Other factors present in the
changing landscape of collaboration are developments such as expanding the phys-
ical infrastructure of highways and railroads, the containerization of transported
goods, the European single market, satellite navigation, and omnipresent commu-
nication possibilities. The underlying economics of the various collaboration forms
change as a result of the changing landscape. This calls for a redesign of the divi-
sion of control, responsibilities, and information exchange between members of a
supply chain. Significant gains in supply chain performance can be realized when
firms optimize their supply chain partnering to best fit the new environment by
striking a new balance between the forces of collaboration. In this research, we aim
to study and to understand the mechanisms that define the success of advanced
supply chain collaboration arrangements.
1.3 Research Objective and Research Questions
In this thesis, we deal with the fit between supply chain collaboration arrange-
ments and the supply chain environment. In supply chain literature, a vast body
of knowledge exists on the benefits of centrally coordinated supply chains (see for
instance Clark and Scarf (1960), Eppen and Schrage (1981) and Federgruen and
Zipkin (1984a)). A main assumption made when analyzing centrally coordinated
supply chains is that a single party has access to all relevant information and has
full authority to make decisions affecting the supply chain. One can view a cen-
trally coordinated supply chain as the ultimate form of collaboration. In practice,
arrangements between supply chain partners are less collaborative than the ideal
of the centrally coordinated version. Nevertheless, substantial benefits derived
from advanced collaboration forms have been observed. Advanced collaboration
arrangements aim to capture the potential benefits of the centrally coordinated —
theoretically optimal— supply chain. These collaboration forms are characterized
by frequent and intensive exchange of information and agreement on responsibil-
ities. Resources with finite capacity put constraints on the operational decisions
that are practically possible in supply chains. This moderates the potential benefits
from economies of scale using coordinated decision making. A growing body of
literature is developing on such arrangements.
This dissertation has both practical and an analytical objectives. This disserta-
tion will contribute to
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• the exploration of the conditions for and the consequences of advanced col-
laboration arrangements in practice,
• and the understanding of the mechanisms behind the constraints and conse-
quences of collaboration arrangements in the context of economies of scale
with capacitated resources.
This research is organized around four research questions. In order to ensure
a link between this research and problems that actually occur in practice, we will
start by analyzing reported actual collaboration arrangements.
RQ1: What are the conditions for and the benefits of collaboration arrangements in prac-
tice?
In answering this question, we explore the practice of supply chain collaboration
via reports in the literature. The next step, after identifying associative relations
describing supply chain collaboration in practice, is to understand the mechanisms
behind collaboration. We are particularly interested in benefits resulting from
economies of scale for operations that are constrained by finite capacity, such as
transport by trucks. This leads to the second research question.
RQ2: In a supply chain collaboration arrangement, what are the mechanisms that translate
the conditions for and the form of such arrangement into benefits? In particular, how
does this translation happen in situations where economies of scale and capacitated
resources are manifest?
Much of the potential cost benefits resulting from the coordination of supply
chain decisions are realized in optimizing the transportation of goods between
firms. The analysis of potential cost savings in the area of transport is complex. The
analytical literature often focuses on savings resulting from optimizing the ship-
ping frequency and quantity for the supply chain. Third-party logistics providers
can also realize potential savings on transport by optimizing shipment quantities,
by offering transport tariffs for shipments that are less-than-a-truckload in size.
This leads to the third research question.
RQ3: How can tariffs for transportation of less-than-a-truckload quantity quantities be
modeled to coordinate the usage of trucks efficiently?
Instead of changing the decision responsibility in advanced collaboration ar-
rangements, coordination between partners can also be realized via the alignment
of incentives. We contribute to the body of knowledge on incentive alignment
between vendor and buyer by researching the following question.
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RQ4: How can supply chain decisions be coordinated with a simple incentive scheme be-
tween vendor and buyer in the case of transport by capacity-constrained trucks?
1.4 Methodology
Research in the field of Operations Research generally follows the rational knowl-
edge generation approach (Meredith, 1989). Quantitative models are used to ex-
plain part of the behavior of real-life operational processes (Bertrand and Fransoo,
2002), under the assumption that these models objectively capture the decision-
making problems that managers face. Models to describe reality are necessarily an
abstraction of reality. In such idealized models, the aim is to model the smallest
set of variables necessary to understand the mechanisms behind the real-life op-
erational processes that are researched. As Bertrand and Fransoo (2002) note, an
‘important shortcoming of idealized problems is that the effect of the human factor
on the performance of the operational process is largely neglected’. Despite this
shortcoming, the generic understanding and knowledge that can be derived from
an idealized model may lead to valuable insights into the solution of operational
problems.
Bertrand and Fransoo (2002) distinguish between two main types of research:
empirical and axiomatic research. Empirical research is usually descriptive rather
than normative. Empirical data that is obtained surveys, interviews, or case stud-
ies, among other methods, translates into models to describe reality. The relations
in the model are associative, via correlations, or causal when the mechanism be-
hind a relation is understood. Axiomatic research is research that is driven by an
idealized model. Axiomatic research is generally normative (Meredith, 1989), with
the aim to understand and develop operational policies or strategies for new or
existing problems. The results of the developed policy can be assessed by compar-
ing it to results known in the literature or to known upper or lower bounds of the
problem.
The research in this PhD thesis follows multiple methodologies to mitigate the
shortcomings of quantitative model-based research. We use a combination of em-
pirical research and axiomatic normative research, driven by idealized models to
answer the four research questions in this thesis. To this end, we start answering
the first research question by analyzing empirical research via recent literature on
practical observations of supply chain collaboration in the form of surveys, inter-
views, and case studies. The result is an associative model for collaboration.
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The second research question is answered by literature research on axiomatic
normative research on idealized quantitative models. Therefore, we review and
structure recent analytical literature on advanced collaboration arrangement. This
results in a generalized conceptual model for collaboration. Based on the results of
the first two research questions, we synthesize an overall model for supply chain
collaboration.
The third and fourth research questions that arise as a result of the first two
follow an analytical quantitative model-building approach. This is axiomatic nor-
mative research, following idealized models of reality. Research question three is
answered by modeling the basic interaction between a shipper and a carrier in
order to derive transport tariffs. Numerical results to answer the third research
question are obtained by Monte-Carlo simulation. In the research to answer the
fourth and last research question, we build a quantitative analytical model to de-
rive an optimal policy under given demand and truck capacity. From this, we
analyze the effects of incentive schemes on supply chain collaboration.
1.5 Outline
This dissertation consists of six chapters. In Chapter 2, we present an overview of
collaboration arrangements between vendor and buyer as they are found in prac-
tice. Results from surveys, case studies, and interviews in the literature studying
collaboration in practice are used to develop an associative model revealing the
conditions for collaboration arrangements and the benefits associated with col-
laboration. In Chapter 3, we focus on a normative model to study collaboration
arrangements between firms. Benefits from coordinated decision making are often
seen in realizing economies of scale in operations such as physical transport of
goods between two firms. Chapter 4 deals with the pricing of transport services
in situations of less-than-truckload transport, by determining the value of empty
space in transport. The resulting transport tariffs function to coordinate the usage
of the trucks efficiently. A condition for firms to engage in advanced collaboration
arrangements is that joining such arrangement has to be economically rational for
each firm. In the next chapter, Chapter 5, we research a supply chain collaboration
arrangement where coordination is realized via an incentive alignment between a
vendor and a buyer. The alignment system enables a vendor to influence the mini-
mum and maximum stock levels within which the vendor controls the buyer’s in-
ventory level. The bandwidth-dependent financial incentive that the vendor offers
8 Chapter 1. Introduction
to the buyer is determined via the model. The resulting supply chain coordination
and supply costs are analyzed. Finally, in Chapter 6 we summarize the findings,
draw conclusions, and point out avenues for future research.
Chapter 2
Drivers for Supply Chain
Collaboration in Practice
Campbell Soup’s introduction of a novel way to collaborate with its suppliers led to
efficiency improvements throughout Campbell Soup’s chain (Clark and Hammond,
1997, Cachon and Fisher, 1997). The case of Campbell Soup is but one among many
accounts of improvements through supply chain collaboration (see, e.g., Stank and
Daugherty (1997), Cottrill (1997), Vergin and Barr (1999), Peck and Juttner (2000),
Kuk (2004)). In this chapter, we review collaboration arrangements that exist in
practice and investigate the drivers for advanced collaboration arrangements.
In Section 2.1, we review reported forms of collaboration arrangements in prac-
tice, based on information collected in interviews, surveys and case study research
among firms in the field, published in academic and trade journals. The second
part, Section 2.2, discusses drivers for collaboration. Benefits of collaboration are
the ultimate driver for collaboration. These benefits might apply to all supply chain
parties, or only to a subset of the parties involved. Further, benefits tend to apply
to a larger or lesser extent, depending on certain conditions. In this section, we
describe the conditions necessary for collaboration, applicable to one or all parties
involved in the arrangement. The third part, Section 2.3, presents the resulting
associative model with the benefits and conditions as drivers for collaboration in
practice. We discuss the validation of the associations in the model. Observations
that are based on the model may be subjected to statistical tests. We conclude, in
section 2.4, with a discussion of the results and propose directions for the model to
be further validated in future research.
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2.1 Forms of Collaboration in Practice
In practice, different forms of collaboration arrangements are used to meet supply
chain requirements. Each form of collaboration arrangement has its own charac-
teristic elements. To begin with, one is what we call the conventional supply chain
arrangement between a vendor and a buyer. In a conventional arrangement be-
tween buyer and vendor, the buyer is responsible for managing its inventory and
determines the quantity and timing of replenishments received from the vendor.
The buyer informs the vendor of the requirements via the issued purchase orders.
The vendor, upon receiving these orders, manages its operations in such a way that
the buyer receives the replenishment within the contracted service agreements. The
vendor is responsible for the goods until delivery. This responsibility extends to
the vendor’s internal operations, the vendor’s finished goods inventory, and trans-
portation of the goods to the buyer. The buyer is responsible for managing its own
inventory and for on-time triggering the vendor for replenishments via purchase
orders.
Towards the end of the twentieth century, awareness arose that this conven-
tional arrangement for the goods and information exchange between a buyer and a
vendor did not make adequate use of the newly available information technology.
New agreements were proposed to supplement, and at times replace conventional
buyer-vendor arrangements. For example, in the mid 90’s Efficient Consumer Re-
sponse (ECR) arose as a program to improve supply chain and marketing perfor-
mance in the grocery supply chain (see report ECR Europe (1996)). The supply
chain management program within ECR was labeled Efficient Replenishment (ER).
ER offered a range of ideas and suggestions for supply chain improvement using
techniques as Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), and Activity Based Costing. Ex-
changing data under EDI means that a buyer places electronic orders to a vendor
(see Swatman et al. (1994)). Continuous Replenishment Programs (CRP) were then
introduced, which went further than information exchange via EDI. Under CRP,
instead of replenishments based on orders, a vendor can decide on the timing and
sizing of replenishments, based on daily sales data or inventory data that is shared
by the retailer as a buyer. Orders from the buyer to the vendor are essentially elim-
inated (Clark and Hammond, 1997). In essence, CRP is a program that has later
become known as Vendor Managed Inventories (VMI).
A VMI arrangement is a supply chain arrangement between a vendor and a
buyer in which the vendor is given the authority to manage the inventory of the
buyer. This provides the vendor with the latitude to schedule its own production
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and then decide upon the timing and sizing of replenishments to the buyer as
long as agreed customer service levels for the buyer are met (following Claassen
et al. (2008)). Even though the vendor manages the buyer’s inventory, the buyer
remains financially liable for the inventory in a true VMI arrangement. In practice,
parties often choose to deviate from this by placing inventory at the buyer under
consignment. This is discussed in the sequel of this section.
CRP is a form of a VMI arrangement in which no specific orders from buyer to
vendor are needed (Clark and Hammond, 1997). CRP is, however, ill defined. The
literature on CRP often refer to exactly the same replenishment arrangement as
VMI. In contrast to this, Sabath et al. (2001) make a sharp distinction between VMI
and CRP based on the responsibility of the replenishment decision. In their defi-
nition of the CRP arrangement, the buyer remains responsible for inventory man-
agement and replenishment decisions. Cachon and Fisher (1997) take the position
that CRP is a VMI arrangement, where, in addition to shifting the responsibility
to the vendor for the timing and sizing of replenishments, two other features are
explicitly incorporated. First, EDI linkages are used to electronically transfer data
of inventory positions and withdrawals in distribution centers. Second, an Every
Day Low Pricing strategy is assumed between producer and retailer. Under an Ev-
ery Day Low Pricing scheme, no promotions or price-discounts disrupt the supply
chain operations. Automated transfer of inventory information via EDI and condi-
tions for stable and predictable demand, undisturbed by price-promotions enable
the vendor to manage the retailer’s inventory levels efficiently. This dissertation
follows the definition of CRP as essentially a VMI arrangement without orders or
any sharing of forecasts.
Sometimes the name Supplier Managed Inventory (SMI) is used as another
name for VMI (Curtis, 2000, Sabath et al., 2001, Ray and Swanson, 1996, Pohlen
and Goldsby, 2003). Sabath et al. indicate that VMI, SMI and Distributor-managed
inventory (DMI) (Bjork, 2006) are comparable approaches since the vendor instead
of the buyer initiates the replenishments. Pohlen and Goldsby, on the other hand,
distinguish between VMI and SMI. They argue that the term VMI is to be used
in the relationship between a manufacturer and a retailer whereas SMI is to be
used in the transactions between a supplier and manufacturer. The main differ-
ence in the two situations is the type of data that is exchanged. In addition to
inventory data, actual sales data is shared in a VMI arrangement, while in SMI ar-
rangements the production plans are exchanged. Still, in the case described by Ray
and Swanson (1996) as a SMI program between Motorola and 2000 suppliers, the
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only information that is exchanged is on available inventory, goods receipts and
desired minimum and maximum inventory levels. In the cited ECR framework on
supply chain arrangement, a distinction is made between a manufacturer trading
with retailers and a manufacturer trading with its suppliers.
From a conceptual point of view, a distinction between collaboration arrange-
ments based on the position of a vendor or buyer as a manufacturer, supplier, or
retailer, is not necessary. Instead, one may simply consider a supply chain arrange-
ment between a selling party, the vendor, and a buying party, the buyer. The vendor
could be a manufacturer with expensive operations and production planning or a
simple re-seller whose operations encompass little more than purchasing products
and selling and distributing these to its customers. We realize that the specific po-
sition or function of a vendor or buyer directly relates to the cost-impact of supply
chain collaboration. However, we consider VMI to be defined as a collaboration
arrangement between two generic supply chain partners, a vendor and a buyer,
where the vendor has the authority to manage the buyer’s inventory under mutu-
ally agreed-upon conditions. The conditions could be a minimum service level at
the buyer (as in Claassen et al. (2008)), or a minimum and maximum within which
the inventory has to be kept (as in Fry et al. (2001)).
A vendor might offer to maintain the buyer’s stock in consignment. The ven-
dor in that case retains ownership of the goods until these are actually used by
the buyer later in the process. Examples of consignment stock arrangements can
be found in the automotive industry (Corbett et al., 1999), the high-tech industry
(Hung et al., 1995), and industries responsible for medical supplies for hospitals,
building materials, spare parts and base chemicals (Cottrill, 1997). Under a con-
ventional arrangement, the buyer pays the vendor at a certain point in time after
receiving the goods, as specified in the terms of payment. The title to the goods,
and therefore the economic risk, is assumed by the buyer the moment the goods
are received and accepted. Economic risk can arise in the form of risk of obso-
lescence, product deterioration, or demand plunge. Instead, under consignment
stock, the transfer of the title to the goods is postponed until the buyer withdraws
the goods from its inventories. Only once the buyer withdraws the goods from its
stocks does the vendor tender for payment. When the vendor and buyer are in a
VMI arrangement and the vendor owns the buyer’s inventory (consignment stock),
this is called Vendor-Owned Inventory (VOI). Apart from consignment under VMI,
it is possible to have consignment stock in a conventional arrangement, which we
call a conventional-plus arrangement.
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A VOI-arrangement keeps the vendor from placing large amounts of inventory
at the buyer’s warehouse. Additionally, a vendor under VOI may share part of the
cost savings that he gains from implementing VMI by assuming the buyer’s inven-
tory holding costs. The actual choice for VMI or VOI depends on customs in the
industry and the power situation in the supply chain. Buyers usually favor con-
signment stocks since no cash reservations are needed for holding inventory and
inventory risks for the buyer are limited. Consignment stock arrangements may in-
troduce imbalance between the vendor and buyer. Buyers may feel little incentive
to act economically with stock and the vendor might be pushed towards maintain-
ing abundant stocks, of which the financial burden fully falls to the vendor. See
Corbett et al. (1999) for a description of a case in which this initially happened.
In some industries, it holds that the vendor has no option but to offer consign-
ment stock arrangements in order to stay in business. In the publishing indus-
try, offering consignment stock in retail outlets may be the only viable distribution
strategy as Harrington (1996) indicates. Andel (1996) describes a case where a pub-
lisher has taken the challenge and is supplying 2,000 Walmart locations through a
consignment program for its Golden Books line. Harrington mentions comparable
strategies for seasonal products such as fertilizers and sunscreen. In these exam-
ples, the buyer never takes the ownership of the goods sold. Taken to the extreme,
the role of the buyer could become confined to assortment and category manage-
ment, as Peck and Juttner (2000) argue. In other industries, such as in the base
chemical industry, the vendor made the first move by proposing a consignment
agreement instead of a buyer pushing for consignment stock. The vendor regards
the increase in stock that occurs as a result of consignment stock as an investment
in service to the buyer instrumental in strengthening buyer loyalty (Vergin and
Barr, 1999).
Consignment stock policies, per se, are cash flow constructions that encourage
the buyer to optimize his cash flow and minimize his risk of holding inventory.
Often, holding the buyer’s inventory in consignment is used as a simple method
to share the benefits of the vendor with the buyer. Therefore, this dissertation does
designate consignment as a separate characteristic that affects the success of VMI.
Instead, consignment is part of the overall incentive scheme between vendor and
buyer leading to the operational implementation of the VMI collaboration arrange-
ment.
Yet another type of arrangement between vendor and buyer in a supply chain
in which the authority for making cost-affecting decisions differs from the con-
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ventional arrangement, is Factory Gate Pricing (FGP) (Le Blanc et al., 2006). The
distinctive feature of FGP is that the buyer is responsible for triggering replenish-
ments and for collecting the goods from the vendor. The information flow between
buyer and vendor is not strictly defined in a FGP-context, so it could be as minimal
as only a purchase-order. The buyer, having detailed information on its inventory
and sales and responsible for arranging transport, can optimize his inventory level
as well as the use of transport resources, possibly by collecting replenishments
from multiple vendors in one transportation route. The vendor, on the other hand,
has to keep sufficient inventory of finished goods in order to guarantee availability
of supply to the buyer. The title to the goods is transferred from vendor to buyer
upon accepting the goods, in this case at the factory gate.
Collaborative Planning Forecasting and Replenishment (CPFR) is another col-
laboration program. It was introduced in the late nineties as an approach to reduce
costs and improve service levels in the grocery supply chain, see Stank et al. (1999),
Barratt and Oliveira (2001). Although CPFR is positioned as the next step in sup-
ply chain integration, no direct link between VMI and CPFR exists. Regarding
replenishment decision-making, the major difference between CPFR and VMI is
that in CPFR the replenishment is based on a jointly established order forecast and
order release pattern. Just as in the conventional arrangement between buyer and
vendor, the buyer holds responsibility for triggering replenishments. CPFR should
not be regarded as a sibling of VMI but rather as a different approach, focusing on
jointly established demand forecasts and order forecasts.
The supply chain arrangements discussed above, conventional, CRP, QR/ECR,
VMI, VOI, FGP and CPFR, differ in the division of authority to trigger replenish-
ments. This is visualized in Figure 2.1.
The forms of supply chain collaboration discussed above are listed in Table 2.1.
We derive four basic forms of collaboration from this table. First, the conventional
form, under which the buyer is responsible for managing the incoming inventory
and for triggering replenishments, while the vendor is responsible for the availabil-
ity of supply. Second, FGP, where the difference with the conventional form is that
transport of the goods from vendor to buyer is arranged by the buyer instead of
the vendor. FGP will be the preferred choice when the opportunities for improving
transport efficiency by the buyer are better than the vendor’s opportunities to econ-
omize transport. For instance, this is the case when a buyer can collect goods from
multiple vendors in close proximity to each other in one transportation route. The
third form of collaboration is the group of VMI arrangements (CRP, SMI, DMI and
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Figure 2.1: Overview of distribution of authority in a dyad between vendor and
buyer for different collaboration arrangements.
VMI), in which the vendor assumes the responsibility for managing the buyer’s
inventory level. The fourth form is CPFR, where vendor and buyer jointly manage
the supply chain, including the buyer’s inventory level.
Table 2.1: Collaboration arrangements
Collaboration Replenishment Responsible
Arrangement Trigger Buyer inventory Remark
Conv buyer buyer order-based communication
ECR buyer buyer intensive communication, EDI
FGP buyer buyer buyer responsible for transport
CRP vendor/buyer vendor EDI and EDLP, no orders
SMI vendor vendor supplier to manufacturer
DMI vendor vendor distributor to retailer
VMI vendor vendor generic vendor to buyer
CPFR vendor, buyer vendor, buyer generic vendor and buyer
The responsibilities for triggering replenishments, organizing transport, and
managing inventory levels under a collaboration arrangement are rearranged, un-
der the assumption that the rearranged responsibilities lead to organization of the
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activities in a more efficient manner. The next section deals with what drives col-
laboration arrangements: the benefits, as claimed in practice, and the conditions
necessary to realize successful collaboration.
2.2 Drivers for Collaboration in Practice
Two types of drivers for collaboration are distinguished: benefits that are realized as
a result of collaboration and conditions that are necessary to realize collaboration.
The observation that benefits of collaboration promote the initiation of collabora-
tion is evident. Clearly, when significant benefits are identified in an arrangement,
this will raise strong support for that arrangement. Benefits are considered a result
(‘ex-post’) of an arrangement. Conditions, on the other hand, are enablers that
may exist ‘ex-ante’ to an arrangement. The benefits and conditions as drivers for
collaboration are further differentiated by the dimension of operational and strate-
gic drivers. Operational benefits may result from effects of collaboration on the
efficiency of the processes in the supply chain. Collaboration can lead to efficiency
improvements of the vendor’s internal processes, the vendor’s inventory manage-
ment, transportation activities, the buyer’s inventory management, and the buyer’s
internal process. The resulting effects of collaboration on the buyer’s internal pro-
cess are usually measured by the buyer’s service levels. Benefits of collaboration
at a strategic level are positive effects related to the long-term competitive position
of a firm in relation to rivals and other firms in the supply network. These latter
benefits are categorized as strategic effects of collaboration. Conditions for collab-
oration in the operational dimension are related to day-to-day activities necessary
to collaborate effectively, such as data exchange. Strategic conditions are related to
the firm’s positioning in the supply chain network and the product’s demand and
market characteristics.
Peck and Juttner (2000) argue that collaborative arrangements in the form of
network organizations can provide a more effective means to satisfy customer
needs. The profits realized by collaborating exceed the profits realized by the single
firms. Strategists have strongly pushed for system integration. Issues like activity
coordination, product movement and information transmission used to be coor-
dinated by the market, but ‘failure of markets to control product supply’ leads
to integrated activities, which span company boundaries. The analysis of the in-
terface between relationships, strategy and supply chain management is far from
complete, according to Peck and Juttner (2000).
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2.2.1 Operational benefits of Collaboration
Reports from practice show that collaboration pays off. At Guinness, a vendor,
the introduction of an arrangement in which the vendor and buyer jointly align on
forecasts and production and replenishment planning, stock levels were reduced by
30% in the first year and by 10% in following year, while keeping customer service
levels constant (Peck and Juttner, 2000). Benefits are often realized as a result of
better forecasting and planning systems for transport and production. Proctor &
Gamble Co are reported to have saved over $65 million in 18 months through more
efficient logistics, under the heading of ‘efficient consumer response’, as researched
in a case study (Cottrill, 1997). Detailed sales and demand data is exchanged to
plan and implement product replenishments and sales strategies. The vendors
benefit from more efficient production and logistics, but at the same time bear
most of the implementation costs. The ultimate goal, according to this study, is
to forge an integrated supply chain, with VMI being one strategy to achieve this.
VMI goes beyond automating and reassigning responsibility for replenishments.
Instead, supply chains will compete as a close-collaborating supply chain against
other integrated supply chains, looking to create economic value across the whole
chain and measuring performance using overall chain metrics.
In the Cachon and Fisher (1997) article on the case study at Campbell soup, the
vendor assumes the responsibility for managing the buyer’s inventory levels via a
continuous replenishment program. Information on inventory levels is exchanged
between buyer and vendor via EDI. On average, inventory levels decreased by 66%,
while maintaining the same or even higher fill rates. This resulted in a reduction of
cost of goods sold by 1.2%, which is significant in the grocery industry with its low
margins. Interestingly, the authors find no evidence that the savings are related to
the vendor managing the buyer’s inventory. Instead, they attribute the savings to
improvements in information exchange.
Kulp et al. (2004) conclude from a survey of 54 firms in the food and consumer
packaged goods industry that sharing information is associated with an increase
in manufacturer performance only up to a certain level. Beyond that, collaboration
in replenishment planning in the form of a VMI arrangement affects the vendor’s
margins positively and results in lower stock-outs for the buyer. From a survey in
the Taiwanese grocery industry, Tyan and Wee (2003) conclude that implementa-
tion of vendor-owned inventory (VMI plus consignment) leads to a service level
increase, from 92% to 98%, at the distribution center of the buyer. The holding of
inventory is reduced from 26 days to 13 or 16 days. A problem in the VOI arrange-
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ment is that the system is manually overruled in case of promotions, new product
introductions and when basic data is inaccurate.
Supply chain integration affects operational performance and the degree of in-
tegration influences the cost and efficiency (Bagchi et al., 2005). More than half
(57%) of respondents in a explorative survey among 149 European companies con-
firmed reductions in logistics costs as a result of supply chain integration with
partners. Production flexibility improved for 43% of the firms and the inventory
turn ratio increased for 57% of the firms after supply chain integration.
The predominant focus in the above studies is on inventory usage and resulting
service levels. The focus in the following studies is on the total supply chain costs,
including transportation. Supply chain costs in the chemical industry can represent
60% to 80% of the manufacturing costs. A reduction of 10% of supply chain costs
through collaboration significantly improves margins (Cottrill, 1997). Over 90%
of chemical firms are planning and working on supply chain initiatives for closer
partnerships.
As discussed in the previous section, CRP is basically a form of VMI where
the vendor continuously manages the buyer’s inventory. The name Continuous
Replenishment evokes the image of very frequent deliveries with small drop sizes.
This is perhaps the reason that also VMI sometimes is associated with an increase
in delivery frequency. However, as Kaipia et al. (2002) note, a VMI arrangement
itself does not require a greater frequency of deliveries. The effect of VMI on the
delivery frequency can go both ways. A routing schedule in which the vendor uses
flexibility to replenish multiple buyers on an efficient route in smaller quantities
than in the conventional arrangement increases the delivery frequency. The fre-
quency might increase also when buyers provide limited storage capacity for the
vendor to place VMI inventory into, then it is sufficient to meet demand only for a
limited amount of time. On the other hand, the delivery frequency may decrease
when VMI is used to improve the efficiency of transportation to a customer by
delivering full trucks, full pallets, or full pallet layers instead of multiple fractional
deliveries.
Based on three cases in grocery supply chains, Kaipia et al. (2002) measure the
benefits of VMI in time benefits. With many items in assortment, retailers have
difficulty managing the ordering process. Under VMI, the vendor assumes author-
ity over and responsibility for the replenishment process, using the availability or
stock-out level and inventory turnover-rate as performance measures. The vendor
knows information on stock levels much earlier compared to in the conventional
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case, allowing the vendor time to react. The vendor’s safety stock levels can be
reduced for a wide range of stock keeping units as a result. The frequency of
deliveries does not necessarily increase.
Operational planning of the vendor can be improved compared to just-in-time
arrangements. In line with Lee et al. (1997), and Disney and Towill (2003a), Kaipia
et al. (2002) conclude that VMI levels peak demand, thus smoothing requirements
on the vendor’s processes. This leads to cost benefits as it makes a higher average
utilization rate possible, allows the vendor to avoid paying overtime to complete
fluctuating requirements or avoids last-minute expensive orders for raw materials.
VMI leads to the largest benefits for manufacturers with little excess capacity. The
reason for this is that the vendor’s advantage caused by receiving information
earlier disappears when a vendor has sufficient production capacity to produce
within the requested lead-time. To illustrate this, imagine an extreme situation
where a vendor has infinite production capacity. Any large-sized order from its
buyers can be produced instantaneously. In this extreme case, early information
on the buyer’s needs do not result in efficiency gains in production and therefore
has no value.
To sum up, operational benefits resulting from advanced collaboration arrange-
ments such as VMI are realized through efficient use of inventories, efficiency gains
in production, and efficiency gains in transportation. An important operational
outcome of collaboration is the service level, as this is directly linked to revenues
by avoiding lost sales. Service levels at the buyer remain at the same level or even
increase. Inventories are used efficiently, effectuated by reduced average inventory
levels, especially the inventory at the buyer’s facility. The increased visibility and
timeliness of information that vendors receive under VMI grants the vendor more
time to prepare for demand. As a result, demand fluctuations can be mitigated,
improving the supply chain efficiency at production and transportation stages and
enabling the vendor to maintain similar or better service levels for the buyer with
lower average inventories. Logistics costs for transport are further reduced as a
result of additional opportunities for the vendor to plan transport more efficiently
than in the conventional supply chain arrangement.
2.2.2 Strategic benefits of Collaboration
VMI not only functions as stepping-stone to a seamlessly integrated supply chain,
but is also a powerful tool for strategic advantage for a vendor in three ways. First,
VMI positions vendors closer to the buyers, which can be a strategic advantage.
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The intensity of the contact and interaction with buyers under VMI increases. Au-
tomated information exchange and order handling make it harder for a buyer to
change suppliers (Vergin and Barr, 1999) than in a conventional setting. Second,
the vendor can use detailed information on the customer sales for improved mar-
keting knowledge. Detailed information on actual inventory levels or even sales
data is a prerequisite for VMI. The third strategic advantage of VMI for vendors
is that vendors can offer to take inventory problems off the buyer’s hands, thus
relieving the buyer of the administrative efforts required to schedule and order re-
plenishments (Claassen et al., 2008). In this way, the vendor can forge stronger ties
with the buyer.
Establishing a VMI arrangement makes sense only when both the account man-
agement strategy of the vendor and sourcing policy of the buyer favor the devel-
opment of a partnership. Business processes and ICT- infrastructure have to be
aligned, so the investments to build and maintain the partnership enlarge the costs
of switching to another partner. Implementing a VMI arrangement increases cus-
tomer contact and customer retention, as reported by chemical companies as BP
Amoco, Dow and BASF, all of whom have offered VMI to customers (Challener
(2000), see also Corbett et al. (1999). In a small-scale survey of leading Dutch sup-
pliers within the chemical industry, improving customer relations was mentioned
as the most important benefit of applying VMI, above efficiency improvements
(Hobma (2001)). This is supported by a conclusion based on ten case studies (Ver-
gin and Barr, 1999). They conclude that when a vendor has stock dedicated and
consigned to a buyer, a lock-in situation for this buyer to stay with a vendor is cre-
ated. This results from the increased investment threshold for the buyer to switch
suppliers.
Standardized methods and protocols to exchange information and to setup VMI
arrangements between vendors and buyers might counter the buyer lock-in effect.
Some buying firms set up VMI arrangements with two competing firms, where
both firms supply a percentage of the total volume. Apart from reducing the risks
of non-supply if one company has delivery issues, having two supplying firms lim-
its the vendor’s power over the buyer. On the other hand, a VMI arrangement can
be part of the criteria used by the buyer to select suppliers when a main element in
the sourcing strategy of the buyer is to establish strong partnerships with preferred
suppliers, as it is for ladder manufacturer Green Bull (Lamb, 1997)).
The amount of information exchanged between vendor and buyer in a collabo-
ration arrangement exceeds the amount exchanged in the conventional setting. The
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vendor has access to more detailed and more precise information, often including
actual sales information. Wal-Mart reasoned that the vendors often have the best
knowledge of a product’s demand rate. Wal-Mart shares point-of-sales data, which
is collected at the counter in the supermarket with barcode scanners, with Proctor
& Gamble. Proctor & Gamble knows the flow of Pampers best, which is why the
vendor in this case, manages the replenishment of Wal-Mart’s stock levels under
a VMI arrangement (Vergin and Barr, 1999). Such detailed data on customer sales
is valuable information to the marketing departments. Lipton actually uses VMI
in order to gain access to the point-of-sales data for marketing purposes (Collins,
1997). This detailed information on sales that is transferred from buyer to vendor
under a VMI arrangement is the second strategic advantage that stems from VMI.
In summary, there are three strategic advantages of collaboration for a vendor.
First, collaboration can improve the vendor’s strategic position in the vendor-buyer
dyad as a result of close contact with the buyer and increased customer intimacy.
This increases the threshold for buyers to switch suppliers and buyers might be
‘locked-in’ a VMI arrangement with the vendor. Second, the detailed and rich infor-
mation flow from the buyer to the vendor leads to increased marketing knowledge
on actual consumption and purchases of the products produced. Third, a vendor
can use the advanced collaboration arrangement to offer to reduce the workload
involved in the buyer’s administrative process of order management thus reducing
overhead.
2.2.3 Operational Conditions for Collaboration
In order to make decisions to assure availability of inventory in a supply chain,
inventory management needs to know the state of the inventory at the current point
in time, and develop some expectation of future requirements as well as know the
capabilities of the supply system. Under VMI, the purchase order is abandoned
and replaced by an exchange of data without directly necessitating the scheduling
of replenishments. Not surprisingly, one of the main pillars of the vendor-managed
inventory arrangement is the content of the information exchanged between the
vendor and buyer and the handling of this information. This section deals with the
contents and the quality of information exchange between supply chain partners
as a condition for supply chain collaboration. The first condition is the information
that is exchanged. This refers to the type of information and the content and
richness of information that needs to be exchanged for supply chain collaboration.
A second condition is the quality of information that is exchanged.
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The most fundamental information that a vendor needs for managing the in-
ventory of a buyer is the buyer’s inventory level. This basic data has to be trans-
ferred accurately and in a timely manner to the vendor. When the buyer updates
inventory records periodically (for example every 24 hours), data on actual with-
drawals from the buyer’s inventory can be used in between inventory data updates
to derive an estimate of the current inventory level. Withdrawals can reflect actual
sales if the buyer is a retail outlet, or warehouse shipments if the buyer acts as
distribution center, or inventory consumption if the buyer is a manufacturer. Com-
pared to sales data, inventory level data is more accurate in that it also accounts
for inventory depletion through loss of goods caused by, for example, shrinkage,
obsolescence and breakage (Harrington, 1996).
Note that it is by no means trivial to achieve cost savings by more information
exchange: Clark and Hammond (1997) report that few firms in the retail industry
have actually experienced significant savings from using EDI to improve the in-
formation exchange. Sabath et al. (2001) conclude from data gathered through a
survey that no major differences in the capability of information systems exist be-
tween centrally organized companies versus decentrally organized firms: both are
able to manage and control automated replenishment programs. Daugherty et al.
(1999) finds a positive relationship between information systems and automated
replenishment programs, based on survey data. Although automated replenish-
ment programs are difficult to manage and consume a great deal of resources, they
are worth it to a firm because a positive relationship exists between automated
replenishment programs and the performance of a firm. The communication pro-
tocol between vendor and buyer is important for successful VMI. A standardized
platform could be used to establish VMI arrangements (Dong and Xu, 2002).
It is not sufficient to have information sharing alone. The linkages of electronic
data exchange (EDI) in the US grocery industry as a means to share information
have been investigated by Clark and Hammond (1997). They find that supply
chain channel transformation involving EDI in combination with a redesign of the
replenishment processes enables performance improvements that are more than an
order of magnitude greater than the performance increase achieved with the imple-
mentation of EDI alone. Implementation of only EDI without CRP fails to realize
significant benefits, while implementing a new replenishment process with EDI
leads to 50-100% higher inventory turns for products in a continuous replenish-
ment program (Clark and Hammond, 1997). The same conclusion is reached in the
earlier mentioned research by Kulp et al. (2004) that improved information sharing
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between vendor and buyer without changes in responsibilities in the vendor-buyer
dyad leads to improved performance only up to a certain level.
The benefits of a VMI arrangement increase with increasing information pre-
cision and information reliability (Kulp, 2002). Information precision reflects the
level of detail of information the buyer shares with the vendor. Information reliabil-
ity relates to the vendor’s information linkages (using EDI, content of information
shared, quality of information transfer). Kulp analyzes supply chain profits under
both conventional and VMI arrangements, depending on the buyer’s willingness
to share internal (sales and inventory) information and the reliability of data trans-
fer (information precision and information reliability). In the conventional case,
the vendor has access to accurate order data from the buyer. However, the buyer’s
order-size is not optimized for overall supply chain costs. Under VMI, the reliabil-
ity and precision of information is assumed to be lower, but the vendor is able to
optimize replenishments for cost efficiency. Kulp proves analytically that informa-
tion reliability and precision increases the benefits of VMI. Data from a survey of 53
manufacturer divisions in the consumer packaged food industry corroborates the
prediction that vendors are more likely to use VMI when retailers provide accurate
and precise data. In partial contrast to the findings of Kulp (2002), the perceived
performance improvement from the perspective of a buyer is impacted by the qual-
ity of the relationship between buyer and vendor, the quality of the IT-system and
the intensity of information sharing, but not by the actual quality of the information
shared (Claassen et al., 2008). The buyer-perceived performance impact of VMI in
this survey is measured in costs, customer service levels, and supply chain control.
All participants of a qualitative preparatory exploration exercise mentioned the im-
portance of trust between vendor and buyer. Only one buyer reported a reduction
in administrative costs as a result of VMI.
The logistics system of the buyer may have more than one facility for stocking
inventory. For example, the buyer may employ a central distribution center with
field warehouses or outlets. Then decisions have to be made on what is meant by
’withdrawal data and the inventory level’. Cohen et al. (2003) label the options for
deciding the information content according to information precision. Information
precision is a condition related to the success of a VMI arrangement. For exam-
ple, a buyer with a retail organization that owns a central warehouse from which
deliveries to retail outlets are made can choose to share information with a ven-
dor at the warehouse level or data at the outlet level. In the first case, warehouse
withdrawals for replenishment of the outlets are communicated to the vendor. The
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world’s largest retailer, Wal-Mart, as one of the early adopters of the VMI con-
cept in the Fast Moving Consumer Goods supply chain, started by communicating
warehouse withdrawals to their VMI-partners (Vergin and Barr, 1999). Later, Point-
of-Sale (POS) data on outlet sales, outlet inventory, and eventually forecasts were
shared. However, only the replenishment of the warehouse stocks remained as the
part of the VMI arrangement that is to be upheld by the vendors.
POS-data differ from warehouse data in the level of detail, the definition of
the item involved (trading units, such as boxes, crates and cases versus consumer
units) and the absence of batching effects due to outlet delivery. Peck and Juttner
(2000) argue that in most cases warehouse data is communicated because forecast
data at the warehouse level is more accurate than at the outlet level. In addition,
practical reasons with regard to data retrieval from information systems favor the
communication of warehouse withdrawals. In contrast to a widespread belief,
POS-data is not a prerequisite for VMI. However, vendors value POS-data highly
because of the market intelligence it comprises. In addition, POS-data can be an
enabler for advanced supply chain optimization using cross-docking.
Next to the inventory level, the vendor needs to have some assumption on
future withdrawals. To incorporate the buyer’s future plans, the vendor can par-
ticipate actively in the generation of forecasts of future withdrawals. Achabal et al.
(2000) describe the development and testing of a VMI decision support system for
a retail supply chain that includes the exchange of forecast data. As a result of im-
plementing this VMI system, customer service levels improved dramatically, often
coupled with a significant improvement in inventory turnover. Especially in retail
supply chains, sales promotions with great temporal impact can have significant
impact on sales volumes. In such environments, forecast data including promo-
tional campaigns are to be exchanged between buyer and vendor. Benefits of such
joint forecasting are, evidently, not unique to VMI and can be reaped also when
some other, more conventional arrangement, is made. In a business-to-business
supply chain where the vendor supplies a manufacturer, the expected withdrawals
of inventory of raw material from the buyer may be expressed by the production
plan instead of by the forecasts of end-customer demand. In these supply chains,
the exchange of production plans is common (see for instance Lamb (1997), Corbett
et al. (1999), Nolan (1997)).
In summary, operational conditions for successful collaboration are related to
the transfer and processing of information to reach operational decisions. The
richness of information exchanged, the openness and transparency of information
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exchange between the partners, including the level of detail of the information,
such as forecasts, production plans or POS-data is described within the category
‘information richness’. The reliability of information exchange due to the system
setup and the communication structure is captured by the category ‘information
quality’. Both information richness and information quality are positively associ-
ated with the success of collaboration. An advanced ICT infrastructure to deal with
the information exchange is also positively associated with the success of advanced
collaboration. This falls under strategic conditions for collaboration, as we discuss
in the next section.
2.2.4 Strategic Conditions for Collaboration
Despite the successes of VMI implementations in practice described above, VMI is
not the ultimate solution for a supply chain between a vendor and a buyer (Goffin
et al., 2006, de Leeuw and Fransoo, 2009). A grocery chain, Spartan Stores, is an
example of a firm that decided to terminate its VMI arrangements. The reasons are
problems with inefficient coordination of promotions, inadequate forecasting abili-
ties by the vendors and higher frequency replenishments (Dong et al., 2007). It does
not always pay off to optimize by giving the authority for managing inventory and
stock levels to another organization. Cooke (1998) describes a number of firms that
have abandoned VMI. Only a few studies have focused on factors that influence
collaboration (Oh and Rhee, 2008, de Leeuw and Fransoo, 2009). In this section,
we distinguish between three strategic conditions for collaboration: the ability of
a firm to join advanced collaboration arrangements, the strategic fit between both
firms, and the product fit between the market and product characteristics and col-
laboration arrangement.
One can imagine that factors such as the size of the companies involved, the
volume of business to be transacted with VMI arrangements or experience with
VMI arrangements mitigate the success of VMI. Vergin and Barr (1999) performed
a study on 10 companies in the business of grocery manufacturing with two to
seven years of experience with VMI. VMI collaboration arrangements were formed
with large volume buyers representing 10 to 40% of business volume. Only one
out of the ten vendors —the manufacturers, in this case— claimed a reduction
of their own inventories. No statistically significant relevant relationship between
the duration of experience with VMI and the number of VMI partners was found.
However, a significant positive correlation was found between duration of VMI and
the percentage of sales that went through VMI arrangements. Based on anecdotal
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evidence, Andel (1996) suggests that until VMI volume reaches at least 30%, the
volume in VMI is too small to benefit forecasting and production.
Vergin and Barr (1999) further claim that the main benefits of VMI are enjoyed
by the buyer. All manufacturers in this research state that the buyers achieved
lower inventories and improved their service levels. Next to the lower inventories
at the buyers, reductions in stock-outs ranged from 40 to 90%. Still, all manu-
facturers experienced direct benefits of VMI, such as increased sales or smoother
inventory flow. Half of the manufacturing firms view offering VMI as a potential
competitive advantage. The main reason to implement VMI was to retain a cus-
tomer demanding to be delivered in a VMI arrangement. This leads to the second
condition for collaboration: the strategic position of both firms.
Relationships between vendors and buyers that are encountered in practice
range from one-time transactional relationships to long-term strategic partnerships.
Joint product development is a typical example of long-term strategic partnering
(see for instance Mentzer and Zacharia. (2000)). Establishing a collaboration ar-
rangement such as VMI requires a shift from a transactional relationship based on
purchase orders, goods receipt checking and delivery time monitoring towards a
trust-based partnership. In this partnership, inventory control is outsourced and
information exchanged is reinforced and integrated with back-office systems. De-
veloping such a relationship consumes time and resources. As Gadde and Snehota
(2000) indicate, a cost-benefit analysis should be used to determine the type of
vendor-buyer relationship that should be developed. Typically, each firm will end
up with a set of relationships differing in the mutual involvement.
The account management strategy and sourcing strategy are typically defined
at a tactical or even strategic level in organizations. The decision to start a VMI
arrangement heavily depends on the strategies of both potential partners. The
benefits of such partnership at a tactical level may exceed the benefits at an oper-
ational level. Cox (2001) identifies the need to analyze and to take into account
the power-position of a firm in a supply chain or the position a firm aims to have.
Instead of assuming that companies strive to enhance the total performance of the
supply chain, firms look at the strategic consequences of decisions on their posi-
tion in a supply chain: How will they control and manage the primary supply
chain and where should they position themselves in this chain? A buyer’s goal to
create a lean and mean supply chain that competes with other supply chains often
is impossible to achieve in practice. Integrated supply chain management or full
supply chain coordination is only possible when the focal company is either in a
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position of structural dominance over suppliers or when there is interdependence
within an extended network of suppliers, where both sides willingly share power
(Cox, 2001).
Companies can be successful if they possess power over something or someone.
Suppliers aiming for above-average returns need to close the market to competi-
tors or operate in opaque supply markets. Otherwise, the buyer might force the
supplier to accept low margins and pass value on to the buyer. Buyers aiming for
best supplier performance tend to push suppliers into such position. To counter
this, suppliers strive for market closure through mergers and acquisitions. Collab-
oration arrangements between a buyer and a vendor may or may not change the
strategic position one has in the supply chain. A vendor who is implementing a
VMI arrangement with a buyer might be willing to sacrifice financial benefits in
the short-term because of long-term improvements in the strategic position with
VMI. The vendor has more control over supply and replenishments. VMI might
make the buyer more dependent on the vendor. With VMI, the buyer faces higher
switching costs when switching to another supplier than when within a conven-
tional supply arrangement.
From sixty interviews among leading-edge firms about partnerships, Lambert
et al. (1999) derive a model to guide managers’ decisions regarding partnership
development and implementation. Three major elements are found: Drivers, Fa-
cilitators and Management components. Drivers such as cost benefits or strategic
benefits are compelling reasons to partner. Facilitators provide a supportive envi-
ronment for growth, such as corporate compatibility and mutuality between the
firms. Management components include planning, information sharing, joint op-
erating controls, risk- and reward sharing and trust and commitment. Apart from
agreements on who decides what (dominance) and what information is shared,
additional conditions are a minimum level of trust, compatibility, and infrastruc-
ture for joint operating controls. Compatibility of infrastructure is partially covered
under the operational conditions for information exchange. The minimum level of
trust between vendor and buyer is the third strategic condition for collaboration.
In line with this, looking from the viewpoint of supply chain management,
change management, marketing and logistics, Corbett et al. (1999) describe poten-
tial pitfalls and practical guidelines for forming and managing supply-chain part-
nerships based on a case study at a chemical company. The first key component in
their framework for successful implementation is trust between both firms. They
further note that other important conditions are: agreement on standards, agree-
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ment on the benefit-sharing principle and involvement of all relevant functions,
especially IT involvement (Corbett et al., 1999).
Trust between the firms setting up a form of collaboration is essential to the
success of the effort. Confidential information regarding, among others, production
plans and new product introductions is essential to collaboration arrangements
(Nolan, 1997). In an overview of cases of supply chain collaboration with a focus
on incentive alignment, Narayanan and Raman (2004) distinguish three steps to
realize coordination in the supply chain. After companies realize and accept that
collaboration and incentive alignment is indeed important, the firms have first to
rewrite the contracts. This affects the strategic position of both firms, as the priority
in the decision-making changes. Incentives are put in place in order to align the
decisions of one firm to the requirements of the other. Second, for this new mode
of operation to work, it is important that the firms share all relevant information,
including hidden information. This is information that a company prefers to keep
private because it is either sensitive or of strategic importance to the firm. Third,
a high level of trust needs to exist between both firms so that sharing of such
information is possible.
The fourth strategic condition for the success of advanced collaboration ar-
rangements is portfolio matching between the two firms. The type of supply chain
arrangement between a vendor and a buyer can be studied from the point of view
of the buyer or from the viewpoint of the vendor. Different research approaches
are used in the industrial marketing literature and the purchasing literature to
study buyer-vendor relationships (see e.g. Olsen and Ellram (1997b)). A popular
technique from both the selling and the buying perspective is the portfolio ap-
proach (see Olsen and Ellram (1997a)). From the buying perspective, the matrix
that Kraljic (1983) developed is the best-known portfolio approach for determining
an appropriate supplier relationship. This is represented by a two-by-two matrix
with on one axis low and high supply risk and on the other axis the value of the
goods involved, low and high. This results in four distinct blocks. It is argued
that a strategic partnership only should be developed for purchase items with a
high risk of continuity of supply. A cost-efficient supply chain is important es-
pecially for routine items of relatively low value (commodity goods). For such
items, an operational, cost-saving partnership such as VMI can be established. For
the so-called leverage goods with a high purchase value but a low supply risk the
sourcing strategy will typically be aimed at reducing direct procurement costs by
exploiting competition between different suppliers instead of building long-term
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partnerships. From a selling perspective a comparable portfolio analysis can be
executed favoring accounts that are relatively easy to manage and of strategic im-
portance, to prioritize for building long-term partnerships (Fiocca, 1982). Based
on results of a survey on determinants of adapting VMI, (Dong et al., 2007) indicate
that the VMI adoption rate is positively associated with competitiveness of the ven-
dor’s market, as the competitiveness drives vendors to use efficient collaboration
arrangements. Uncertainty in the buyer’s operational process is negatively linked
to VMI adoption rate. No support was found for the hypothesis —in line with
Waller et al. (1999)— that demand uncertainty leads to higher VMI adoption rates.
Fluctuations in the buyer’s demand could also fall under the header of portfo-
lio matching. Clark and Hammond (1997) state that VMI is most appropriate for
products with stable demand. When the buyer’s demand is stable, replenishments
can be coordinated and production and replenishments can be planned precisely
and efficiently. On the other hand, the potential benefits that might be derived
from advanced collaboration arrangements such as VMI are much higher for prod-
ucts with fluctuating buyer’s demand. Then, the additional leverage of the buyer,
combined with earlier and more precise information under VMI provides oppor-
tunities to improve compared to the conventional case. In previous studies, no
significant proof is found for the hypothesis that demand uncertainty is associated
with higher adoption levels of VMI (Dong et al., 2007).
Previous studies have not been conclusive on the relation between demand un-
certainty and supply chain collaboration. van der Vaart and van Donk (2008) claim
that uncertainty is a driver for close collaboration, in line with a case study re-
search at Philips (de Kok et al., 2005). Empirical proof however is mixed: Dong
et al. (2007) find no significant correlation between demand uncertainty and col-
laboration. Contrary to this, Holweg et al. (2005) conclude that stable demand is a
condition for close collaboration. It might be that a moderating variable needs to
be taken into account to understand the correlation between demand fluctuations
and collaboration.
To summarize, we distinguish three strategic conditions affecting the success of
collaboration. The first condition is a firm’s ability to deal with advanced collab-
oration arrangements such as VMI. This is related to the size of a firm, the ICT
infrastructure of a firm and the experience a firm has with advanced collaboration
arrangements. The second condition for collaboration is the strategic fit between
both firms. The strategic fit between firms consists of three elements. A.) Strategic
argument: a powerful firm in a supply chain network can require the other party to
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accept a close collaboration arrangement. In that case, the non-dominant firm will
make a strategic analysis whether or not to accept the proposed collaboration and
continue as close partners. B.) Strategic position improvement: a firm can strive for
a close collaboration arrangement in order to alter the strategic position of a firm in
the supply network. C.) Trust: trust between both parties is an essential condition
for advanced collaboration arrangements such as VMI. We aggregate these three
elements under the term strategic fit. The third strategic condition we distinguish
is the product fit between both firms. This relates to the matching of the type of
product and the volatility and risks associated with demand and supply of the
product.
2.3 Model for Collaboration in Practice
2.3.1 Associative Model for Collaboration in Practice
In the previous sections, we have identified drivers that are associated with collab-
oration in the empirical literature. These relations are based on empirical research
ranging from surveys to case-studies and interviews. In this section, we categorize
and structure the drivers to form an associative model for collaboration in practice.
Then, we discuss the statistical support for these relations.
Conditions associated with Collaboration
The conditions for VMI adoption derived in Section 2.2.3 and Section 2.2.4 are
grouped and listed in Table 2.3.1.
Two operational conditions are identified. The richness and the quality of in-
formation are positively associated with collaboration. Increasing information rich-
ness, such as by including production planning data or POS data, provides further
inputs for the vendor to use to optimize operations. However, extra information is
of value to the vendor only when he is able to act upon the information. Hence,
the additional value of extra information decreases when more information is ex-
changed. Other factors, such as the flexibility a vendor has in production capacity,
affect the value of information. The information quality is related to the systems
and reliability of information transfer.
Three strategic conditions can be identified: a firm’s ability to manage advanced
collaboration arrangements, the strategic fit between both firms, and the product fit
for the items that are exchanged under VMI. To implement advanced collaboration,
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Table 2.2: Conditions that are positively associated with collaboration in practice
Condition Description References
info richness information richness Corbett et al. (1999)
Lamb (1997)
Nolan (1997)
information precision Kulp (2002)
intensity of information sharing Claassen et al. (2008)
info quality timely, accurate information Harrington (1996)
EDI with VMI Clark and Hammond (1997)
standardized messaging Dong and Xu (2002)
information reliability Kulp (2002)
ability ICT infrastructure advanced Kaipia et al. (2002)
Corbett et al. (1999)
Daugherty et al. (1999)
Claassen et al. (2008)
volume VMI experience Vergin and Barr (1999)
Andel (1996)
duration VMI experience Peck and Juttner (2000)
Vergin and Barr (1999)
company size Vergin and Barr (1999)
strategic fit trust Corbett et al. (1999)
Nolan (1997)
Lambert et al. (1999)
Narayanan and Raman (2004)
prospect of long-term partnering Fiocca (1982)
power position favorable Cox (2001)
partner characteristics de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009)
product fit market conditions Bensaou (1999)
Olsen and Ellram (1997a)
supplier’s market competitiveness Dong et al. (2007)
market and product characteristics de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009)
demand low volume, infrequent Kaipia et al. (2002)
demand stable Holweg et al. (2005)
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it is necessary that both firms have the ability to deal with this. This is related to
experience with VMI and company size. The strategic fit between both firms is
a variable to describe how collaboration fits in the strategic goals of both firms.
Factors such as trust, desire to collaborate to improve the strategic position, or
consenting to the dominant party’s desire to collaborate fall under this condition.
The product fit is the third condition for collaboration. The case for collaboration is
different for a cheap and easy to procure commodity product compared to a high-
value product that is difficult to source. The stability or fluctuation of demand
rates also fall under the condition for product fit.
Benefits associated with Collaboration
Companies report benefits that derive from VMI in practice. We structure and
summarize the benefits identified in Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.2.2 in Table 2.3.1.
Operational benefits of VMI are efficiency improvements, mainly associated
with the increased responsibility of the vendor to plan and optimize the timing
and sizing of replenishments. Fluctuating demand can be leveled, resulting in
more efficient use of the production capacity. Contrasting views exist in the lit-
erature on whether the transport frequency increases or decreases with VMI, but
consensus exists on the fact that VMI correlates with increasing efficiency of trans-
port. Inventory levels in the dyad are lower with VMI. Decreasing inventory levels
on the side of the buyer, the vendor or both have been reported to result from VMI.
The buyer’s service level increases with VMI or remains at least at the same level.
Strategic benefits of VMI are an improved strategic position, increased market-
ing knowledge, or reduced overhead. Collaboration arrangements like VMI might
improve the position of a firm in the supply chain network. A vendor can use
advanced collaboration arrangements to encourage a tight link between the ven-
dor and the buyer, thus increasing the threshold to change suppliers. Marketing
information that is derived from the additional information on actual sales un-
der a collaboration arrangement can be used to improve the performance of the
vendor-buyer dyad in the supply chain. A final strategic benefit is that the overall
overhead for administration and ordering reduces when the vendor has complete
control over inventories in a VMI arrangement.
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Table 2.3: Benefits that are positively associated with VMI in practice
Benefit Description Reference
production efficiency reduced demand amplification Kaipia et al. (2002)
Lee et al. (1997)
Disney and Towill (2003a)
increased production flexibility Bagchi et al. (2005)
Tyan and Wee (2003)
transport efficiency increased transport eff., higher freq Vergin and Barr (1999)
increased transport eff., lower freq Kaipia et al. (2002)
Cottrill (1997)
increased transport efficiency Peck and Juttner (2000)
increased logistics efficiency Bagchi et al. (2005)
increased logistics eff., COGS -1.2% Cachon and Fisher (1997)
inventory efficiency reduced inventory vendor and buyer Kaipia et al. (2002)
reduced inventory buyer Vergin and Barr (1999)
reduced inventory buyer 66% Cachon and Fisher (1997)
reduced inventory buyer 30% Peck and Juttner (2000)
reduced inventory buyer 26 to 13
wks
Tyan and Wee (2003)
increased inventory turns Bagchi et al. (2005)
service level constant or increased service level Peck and Juttner (2000)
increased service level Vergin and Barr (1999)
constant service level Cachon and Fisher (1997)
increased service level non-VMI cust. Kaipia et al. (2002)
increased service level 92% to 98% Tyan and Wee (2003)
strategic position increased buyer intimacy Hobma (2001)
Challener (2000)
Corbett et al. (1999)
strategic fit, close link Lamb (1997)
lock-in effect for vendor Vergin and Barr (1999)
de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009)
marketing knowledge improved marketing knowledge Collins (1997)
Vergin and Barr (1999)
overhead reduced administrative effort Aichlymayr (2000)
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Drivers for collaboration
We structure the conditions and benefits that are drivers for advanced collabora-
tion arrangements such as VMI, based based on the results from the literature of
empirical research of supply chain collaboration. The research methodologies that
are used in the empirical research ranges from surveys to case studies and inter-
views. The resulting associative model for collaboration in practice is visualized
in Figure 2.2. On the left, the conditions that affect the closeness of collaboration
are shown: two operational conditions on information richness and information
quality, and three strategic conditions on a firm’s ability to implement VMI, the
strategic fit between firms and the product fit with the collaboration arrangement.
The benefits that are associated with collaboration are on the right of Figure2.2.
Operational benefits on increased efficiency of production, transport, inventory,
and service levels and strategic benefits on the strategic position of a firm in the
supply chain network, marketing knowledge and reduction of overhead.
collaboration
arrangement
info richness
info quality
strategic fit
ability
product fit
production eff
transport eff
inventory eff
service level
overhead reduction
strategic position
marketing knowledge
Figure 2.2: Model of conditions and benefits that are associated with collaboration
arrangements
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2.3.2 Empirical Statistical Support for the Model
The associative relations in the model of Figure 2.2 are based on results from em-
pirical research in the literature. The research methodology behind the relations
ranges from surveys to case-studies and interviews. Statistical support for the as-
sociative relations in the model of Figure 2.2 can result from survey research. A
number of questions can be used to form a construct with which the model-variable
is measured. We analyze the constructs that are used in the reviewed literature to
measure the variables in the model.
van der Vaart and van Donk (2008) analyzed over 30 surveys on performance
impact from supply chain integration. The authors note little consistency in basic
definitions and constructs that are used to measure impact and integration. Au-
thors in the literature have failed to build sufficiently upon the research of their pre-
decessors. The overview shows excessive variation in the way supply chain perfor-
mance is measured, as researchers often develop a new model with new measure-
ment scales. A result of the lack of definitions and scales to measure supply-chain
performance and supply chain collaboration is that conclusions from previous re-
search are rarely confirmed by other researchers and progress slows since previous
results are not built upon. To measure performance, objective or subjective scales
can be used. Objective performance measurements are usually quantitative and
comparable and often include financial measures. A problem of when using fi-
nancial data is that financial benefits resulting from collaboration are difficult to
be allocated to a specific collaboration arrangement. Furthermore, non-financial
benefits of collaboration cannot be captured in this manner. Therefore, scales used
to survey collaboration arrangements are often based on subjective measures of
performance (Sodhi and Son, 2009). Perceptual measures are acceptable in large-
sample studies, provided that rigorous validity checks are performed (Ketokivi and
Schroeder, 2004). The low average response rate found in the overview of survey
studies raises doubts that this condition is fulfilled.
The unit of analysis in many studies is the focal firm and its relations to one
level upstream or downstream. To study this, the focus ranges from the relation-
ship between the focal firm and the main supply chain partner, between the focal
firm and the key supply chain partners or between the focal firm and all supply
chain partners. van der Vaart and van Donk (2008) conclude that clear definitions
and instructions are necessary to be able to compare results between different stud-
ies. A survey (Sodhi and Son, 2009) on paired data of 74 supplier-retailer dyads has
a clearly defined focus on both parties in the dyad and describes the methodology
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used to realize this. Supply chain managers, purchasing managers and merchan-
disers on the side of the retailer are used to gather contact details of each part-
nership for key suppliers. Using this data, the suppliers and retailers receive the
survey, consisting of a supplier-side and a retailer-side questionnaire.
The focus in the associative model of Figure 2.2 is on the collaboration arrange-
ment and thus involves the vendor and the buyer. For the validation of this model,
we propose to build on existing literature by using validated and tested scales and
measures where possible. Next, we discuss the constructs that are used in the re-
viewed literature in relation to the variables in the model in detail. Note that no
constructs in the reviewed literature are found to measure the variables for strategic
position and marketing knowledge.
Li et al. (2005) develop constructs for the operational conditions for VMI, in-
formation sharing and information quality. Information sharing is defined as the
extent to which critical and proprietary information is communicated to one’s sup-
ply chain partner and translates to information richness in our model. Information
quality includes aspects such as accuracy, timeliness and credibility of information
exchanged. The scales are validated and serve as a parsimonious instrument in
further studies of supply chain practices. These scales for information are further
validated and used in other survey studies (Claassen et al., 2008). Kulp (2002) mea-
sures similar constructs: information precision as measure of information richness
and information reliability as measure of information quality. However, informa-
tion precision is narrowly defined and the focus of information reliability is limited
to the use of EDI. Therefore, we prefer the two scales developed by Li et al. (2005).
Information Richness
Reference Description Items
Kulp (2002) info precision information exchange on % volume store
inventory, warehouse inventory, ware-
house withdrawals, point-of-sales data
Li et al. (2005),
Claassen et al. (2008)
info sharing information exchange is timely, accurate,
complete, adequate, reliable
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Information Quality
Reference Description Items
Kulp (2002) info reliability information link includes EDI, purchase
orders, invoice, warehouse inventory, pro-
duction schedules
Li et al. (2005),
Claassen et al. (2008)
info quality we share proprietary information with
partners, partners share proprietary in-
formation, inform in advance of chang-
ing needs, keeps informed about issues
affecting our business, share business
knowledge of core processes, we exchange
information for business planning, we
keep each other informed about events or
changes that may affect the other partners
The ability of a firm to deal with VMI is measured through a number of vari-
ables. Vergin and Barr (1999) measure the experience a firm has with VMI by
asking how long VMI arrangements have existed, how much volume is traded
with VMI and how many VMI dyads a firm maintains. The ICT infrastructure can
be measured using the scales of Rai et al. (2006).
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Ability
Reference Description Items
Claassen et al. (2008) quality of ICT system VMI communication compatible with ex-
isting IT systems, IT systems compatible
with supplier’s systems, our information
can readily be entered in the supplier’s
systems, communication system is easy
to use, satisfied with our communication
system, system is up-to-date
Vergin and Barr
(1999)
experience number of years experience, number of
live partners, % volume of business
Rai et al. (2006) IT infrastructure Automatic data capture systems , com-
mon definitions of key data elements (e.g.,
customer, order, part number), data con-
sistent in different databases across the
supply chain. Supply chain planning ap-
plications, supply chain transaction appli-
cations, internal applications of our or-
ganization, customer relationship applica-
tions function real-time.
Kuk (2004) size number of staff
Vergin and Barr
(1999)
size revenues, number of staff
The strategic fit between vendor and buyer is determined using the measures
for trust and relationship specific assets of Sodhi and Son (2009). Here, the percep-
tion of trust in the relationship is measured as well as the primary basis for the rela-
tionship’s governance structure: trust or the buyer’s power position. Relationship-
specific assets are assets in ICT or other areas that are specific to setup or that
maintain the relationship.
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Strategic Fit
Reference Description Items
Dong et al. (2007) supplier buyer coopera-
tion
To what extent do you and this supplier
have the following agreements and pro-
grams? Supplier involvement in your
product/system design, Multi-functional
teams with this supplier, Sharing joint cost
savings with this supplier
The product fit is measured using the scale defined in a survey to research the
conditions for VMI adoption Dong et al. (2007). The authors develop and validate
scales to measure the competitiveness of the vendor’s and buyer’s markets as well
as the product uncertainty and operational uncertainty. The maturity of a product,
measured via the product-life-cycle scale of Kulp (2002), is another relevant factor
to determine product fit.
Product Fit
Reference Description Items
Kulp (2002) lifecycle stage % products in introduction and growth
stage
Dong et al. (2007) buyer’s market compet-
itiveness
On Likert scale of agreement: many firms
compete directly with you, your industry
has several dominant firms
Dong et al. (2007) supplier’s market com-
petitiveness
On Likert scale of agreement: this sup-
plier has many competitors, there are a
few big firms in this supplier’s industry
Dong et al. (2007) product demand uncer-
tainty
On Likert scale of stability for your ma-
jor product(s): product demand, demand
forecast, patterns of market price changes
Dong et al. (2007) operational uncertainty On Likert scale of stability: lead times for
inbound deliveries, purchase order cycle
times, incoming product inspection pro-
cesses, materials and/or service quality
Ambiguity exists in how to measure the operational performance of VMI. Here,
we propose to use the perception of both parties on the changes in costs of produc-
tion, transport and inventory usage as a result of implementing VMI.
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The scale that Dong et al. (2007) introduce for the VMI adoption rate can be
used to measure the collaboration adoption rate in the associative model, asking a
series of questions about the form of the collaboration arrangement. This avoids
problems of different definitions that might occur when a single question is used
to rate the percentage of sale with VMI (as in Kulp (2002)).
Collaboration
Reference Description Items
Kulp (2002) percentage VMI sales percentage VMI sales on Likert scale
Dong et al. (2007) VMI adoption rate to what extent do you and this vendor
have the following logistics agreements
and programs: inventory system man-
aged by the vendor, information sharing
with the vendor, timely communication,
the same goals?
2.4 Conclusions
Drivers for collaboration in practice are structured and categorized based on re-
ported empirical evidence in literature. Two types of drivers are distinguished:
benefits that can be derived from collaboration and conditions that moderate the
success of collaboration. The benefits that the vendor or the buyer realize func-
tion as a driver of advanced collaboration arrangements. However, collaboration is
more or less successful depending on specific conditions. Therefore, conditions that
moderate the benefits of collaboration are the second driver. Drivers are further di-
vided into operational and strategic drivers. Operational and strategic benefits can
be realized by the vendor-buyer dyad and both operational and strategic conditions
moderate the success of collaborating. These conditions and benefits are elaborated
upon, resulting in a conceptual associative model for drivers of collaboration.
Operational conditions for supply chain collaboration relate to information
transfer, namely information richness and information quality. Strategic conditions
include the ability of the firms to implement and manage advanced collaboration
arrangements, the strategic position and strategic fit between both firms in relation
to the arrangement and the fit of product characteristics such as supply risk with
the type of collaboration. Operational benefits include greater efficiency than the
conventional case for the vendor in production and transport and more efficient use
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of inventory. Generally, these effects result in reduced costs. As an outcome, service
levels remain constant or increase. Strategic benefits are in terms of the strategic
position firms can realize with the arrangement, increased marketing knowledge
and reduced administrative work.
Basic agreement on definitions and constructs to be used in survey-based re-
search in supply chain integration is needed in order to improve the consistency
and comparability of results and conclusions from survey-based research. This
allows researchers to validate and strengthen previous conclusions and to build
further on these. We conclude, based on the literature of empirical research, with a
structured associative model for drivers of collaboration in supply chains. In order
to statistically test and validate the relations in the model, we have provided an
overview of the constructs that are used and validated in the literature. This forms
a solid basis for future research to the strengthen the support for the relations in
the model and for further improvements of the model.
Limitations of the model are that the relations in the model are based on con-
clusions from research of reports on the benefits and conditions in practice. The
consistency of basic definitions and variables to measure in the reviewed litera-
ture is limited. Employees in firms knowledgeable or responsible for supply chain
management are questioned via methods of survey research, case-study research
or interviews. Perceptive rather than absolute measures are gathered. Percep-
tive measures are difficult to validate and can be unreliable projections of reality
(Ketokivi and Schroeder, 2004). Distinguishing the consequences of collaboration
arrangements from extrinsic business fluctuations is difficult. Allocation of such
benefits to specific collaboration dyads is ambiguous, as benefits often result in
transactions with scale economies for multiple buyers.
In future research, this model should be tested and developed further by im-
proving the constructs used to measure the relations between the drivers and col-
laboration and by further refining the model. A major difficulty in this line of
research is that regular market volatility often dominates any effect that is realized
by changes in supply chain collaboration. This makes it difficult to draw conclu-
sions on significant correlations. An extreme example of an event that annuls any
measurement of collaboration drivers is the economic crisis of 2008–2009, where
sales for many firms dropped below 50% of normal levels (Peels et al., 2009). On
top of this, conclusions from survey research are based on correlations only, which
might lead to inspiration for causal relations. Analytical models help to under-
stand the causes of benefits and the causal conditions for collaboration. We discuss
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analytical models for collaboration from the literature in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
Analyzing Collaboration in
Supply Chains
The associative model for collaboration drivers as developed in Chapter 2 is based
on practical and empirical literature on collaboration arrangements in supply chains.
The links between conditions for collaboration and the benefits that can be derived
from collaboration are based on data provided by practitioners. The links in the
model are purely associative. Analytical models provide further insight and under-
standing of the mechanisms as to how collaboration arrangements lead to benefits.
This chapter analyzes the processes at the boundary between firms in a supply
chain by application of formal models. The objective of this chapter is to enhance
the understanding of mechanisms of supply chain coordination at the interface be-
tween supply chain members. First, reasons behind the existence of boundaries
between firms are discussed in Section 3.1. The background of the trend of focus-
ing on the core competencies of a firm and outsourcing activities not belonging to
the core is provided. Section 3.2 introduces the control of supply chains and the
costs to operate a supply chain. Then, Section 3.3, addresses how issues arising at
the interface between firms affect the performance of the supply chain. A central
supply chain coordinator authorized to make decisions that affect the total sup-
ply chain performance can realize the optimal performance of the supply chain.
Organizing a supply chain centrally seems in contrast with the trend of focusing
on a firm’s core. However, as explained in Section 3.4, firms can remain inde-
pendent while coordinating supply chain decisions by collaborating with supply
chain partners. Conditions necessary to achieve collaboration are discussed. Sec-
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tion 3.5 presents collaboration arrangements to coordinate supply chain decisions.
Specific characteristics and properties that define the essence of collaboration ar-
rangements are uncovered, combined with the benefits that result from coordinated
decision-making. In Section 3.6 we conclude with a normative model describing
the mechanisms, conditions and outcomes of coordinating supply chains through
collaboration. After that, we draw conclusions on collaboration and VMI specifi-
cally. We discuss differences between findings from collaboration in practice and
analytical models for collaboration and highlight interesting gaps in the covered
literature.
3.1 Focus on the Strategic Core
Over the last decades, successful companies have focused increasingly on their
core business by outsourcing activities that do not belong to this core (Prahalad
and Hamel, 1990, Holcomb and Hitt, 2007, Hätönen and Eriksson, 2009). A firm
uses assets and resources to make transactions. Some assets are of generic use
to the firm. Other assets and resources are invested in for specific transactions.
‘Asset specificity’ determines the extent to which assets are linked specifically to
certain transactions. Transaction-specific assets are non-redeployable physical and
human investments that are specialized and unique to a task (Williamson, 1979).
Reve (1990) argues that a firm should focus on and maintain these assets within
the boundaries of the firm, as internal governance of such assets enables maximum
control and organizational incentive alignment. Assets of high specificity, which
are necessary to attain the firm’s strategic goals, represent the strategic core of a
firm.
A firm expands until the point at which the costs it incurs in order to organize
an additional transaction within the firm is equal to the costs of carrying out that
same transaction on the market or within some other firm, as Coase (1937) states in
the seminal paper ‘Nature of the firm’ : "I said in ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (and I have
not changed my mind) that the expansion of a firm will halt at the point at which the costs
which it has to incur to organize an additional transaction within the firm become equal to
the costs of carrying out that same transaction on the market or to the costs of organizing it
within some other firm". Markets can effectively govern transactions when transac-
tions occur frequently and asset specificity and uncertainty are low. On the other
hand, increased asset specificity and uncertainty lead to difficulties using markets
and promotes internalization of transactions in the firm. Factors that contribute
3.1. Focus on the Strategic Core 45
to difficulties associated with market transactions include cognitive and percep-
tional limitations of the persons involved (bounded rationality), opportunism of
the parties involved, and asymmetrical distribution of information among the par-
ties (information impactedness) (Williamson, 1979, Reve, 1990). Transactional costs
increase when specific investments are made to accomplish a transaction. Ambi-
guity in the definition and performance of a transaction or transactions that occur
infrequently result in increased transactional costs as well. The main question
around whether to internalize an activity or not is if bringing an extra exchange
transaction under the organizing firm’s authority is beneficial to this firm. At the
margin, the costs of organizing such a transaction inside or outside the firm are the
same. A dynamic equilibrium is the result, as businesses constantly experiment in
controlling more or fewer transactions internally, thus determining the boundary
of the firm (Coase, 1937).
Williamson (2008) systematizes transactions between firms based on the asset
specificity. At the lowest level, no specific assets are involved and simple generic
transactions take place. Competition on the market ensures governance combined
with, in the event of disputes, court awarded damages. Next in Williamson’s sys-
tem are transactions for which some dedicated investments have to be made. Both
transacting parties have incentives to promote continuity of the relationship. To
safeguard these investments, interfirm contracts are provided to secure bilateral
dependencies. Contracts can include penalties, information disclosure and spe-
cialized dispute resolution (such as arbitration). Finally, when costly problems in
management and realization of transactions continue despite best bilateral efforts,
the transaction may be taken out of the market and organized under unified own-
ership (vertical integration) instead. Because added bureaucratic costs accrue upon
taking a transaction out of the market and organizing it internally, internal orga-
nization is thought of as the organizational form of last resort: try markets, try
hybrids and have recourse to the firm only when all else fails (Williamson, 2008).
Assets or parts of the organization that are not transaction-specific to attaining
the firm’s goals do not have to be organized within the firm’s boundary. These ac-
tivities might be externalized and outsourced to an external firm. To this external
firm however, the activity might be of high specificity and necessary to attain this
firm’s strategic goals. By organizing the activity through outsourcing, the outsourc-
ing firm might achieve efficiency gains above and beyond what could be realized
as part of the firm.
Three phases of outsourcing can be distinguished: ‘traditional outsourcing’
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with a focus on sweating assets harder: ‘strategic outsourcing’ with the aim to
acquire access to capabilities that the firm lacks; and ‘transformational outsourc-
ing’ as a tool for transforming firms towards flexible organizational forms, whereby
the role of tightly integrated hierarchy is supplanted by loosely coupled networks
of organizational actors (Hätönen and Eriksson, 2009). Today’s view of outsourcing
has evolved to a stage where firms achieve operational flexibility, without incurring
the costs associated with bureaucracy.
An example of activities that are non-core to many companies are transporta-
tion, logistics and warehousing (Hätönen and Eriksson, 2009). Historically, firms
organized the logistics around their factories and warehouses internally. Increas-
ingly, these activities are outsourced to third-party logistics providers. Approxi-
mately 60% of Fortune 500 companies uses this arrangement to some extent (Lam-
bert et al., 1999). Aside from the inherent scale that such a third-party might re-
alize, the volumes could be used to reduce logistics costs of all participants by
engineering innovative transportation solutions such as the coordination of trans-
port volumes for several companies (Sheffi, 1990). A result of the trend for firms
to focus and reorganize around core competencies and core products is a breakup
of the vertical value chain. Instead of organizing a large part of the vertical value
chain within a single company, it is organized among a number of interlinked
companies, each interfacing with one or more other companies in the value chain.
Advancements in technology change the nature and associated costs of certain
transactions. Advancing technology enable new products to be packed with more
capabilities that might provide productivity gains. An example of productivity
gains from technology is that economic growth is positively affected by access to
communication by mobile phones for large parts of the world’s population (Röller
and Waverman, 2001). Technology can make distribution logistics more efficient.
RFID tags, for example, enable better control, identification and increased effi-
ciency in the logistics chain (Lee and Özer, 2007, de Kok et al., 2008). Further, an
improved infrastructure increases the efficiency of transport logistics. This entails
not only traditional infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports and sea-ports and
the containerization of freight transport, but also the electronic infrastructure. Pro-
cesses can be prepared and executed faster and more effectively with various sorts
of electronic data-exchange. For example, advance freight-notices to authorities
can make customs-clearing more efficient. Real-time traffic information to mini-
mize delays due to heavy traffic and blocked roads is another example of reduced
transaction costs resulting from technological advances.
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Progress in information technology has made exchanging data and informa-
tion easier, faster and more reliable, and all of this at lower cost than ever before
(McAfee and Brynjolfsson, 2008). As a result, the transaction costs for exchang-
ing data have come down dramatically (Garicano and Kaplan, 2001). Coase (1937)
argued that the inventions that were gaining acceptance at the first half of the twen-
tieth century, such as the telephone and telegraph, tended to increase the size of
the firm by bringing factors of production nearer together. This argument applies
equally to recent innovations, specifically to the internet with the ubiquitous infor-
mation exchange at negligible costs. Impediments due to geographical distance are
alleviated by omnipresent information and efficient distribution logistics. The de-
crease in transaction costs and increased span of control implies growth of the core
of a firm. In contrast to this, one can argue that advances in information technology
increase the possibilities to outsource transactions because it alleviates the difficul-
ties involved in exchanging information, controlling and managing the other party.
Following Williamson’s argument that a firm should internalize transactions as a
last resort only, we conclude that progress in information systems leads to a main-
tained focus on core competencies, while at the same time the span of control of a
firm widens.
The boundaries between firms, the roles and responsibilities of firms and the
number of partners to transact with in a supply chain may change as a result of the
focus on core competencies and the increasing possibilities to manage and control
this. This can potentially lead to a breakup of the vertical value chain into separate
firms, resulting in multiple interfaces between supplying and buying firms for
goods or services. Firms have to collaborate in some form in order to control
supply chain operations over the boundaries. When the supply chain is controlled
by separate firms, this may introduce inefficiencies in supply chain operations.
In the next section, we discuss the control of supply chain operations for supply
chains controlled by separate firms and for supply chains controlled by a central
supply chain manager.
3.2 Operational Control in Supply Chains
In a supply chain, three flows can be distinguished: product flows, information
flows and financial flows (Apte and Viswanathan, 2002). The product, as referred to
here, may also be a service, such as the product of transportation service. The prod-
uct flow is in the direction of the end-customer. Information predominantly flows
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from end-customer upstream the supply chain, in the form of order-information
and consumption or production plans. Information on supply delivery issues or
new product improvements flows downstream from the vendor to the buyer. The
financial flow usually streams in the opposite direction from the product flow.
The costs for the buyer and vendor to sustain to the product flow in the supply
chain include the costs for physical goods-flow activities such as order picking,
transportation, holding inventory, and management and administration. To deter-
mine an operational replenishment policy, such costs can be split into two main
parts: unit variable costs, and fixed setup costs (Silver et al., 1998). Unit variable
costs are costs incurred proportional to the quantity that is replenished or pro-
duced, such as the costs for holding inventory at the buyer or vendor or the unit
price paid by the buyer to procure the items. Setup costs or fixed order costs are
costs that increase proportionally with the number of orders or setups, such trans-
port costs and fixed production setup costs. Remaining costs, such as the costs
of administration and order picking are related to personnel costs and do not di-
rectly vary with the number of shipments or number of items that are transacted.
So, these latter costs are not relevant in determining operational policy once these
resources have been established.
Transport costs can represent a significant proportion of the product costs, con-
tributing up to 50% of the costs (van Norden and van de Velde, 2005). Transport
costs often depend greatly on the number of shipments, especially for the case
where transport services are purchased on a spot-market. Many models of supply
chains assume fixed costs per delivery as a proxy for transport costs. Minimization
of only this portion of supply chain costs leads to a minimum number of deliveries.
In turn, this leads to orders of maximum order-size. The maximum order-size is
constrained by limitations in available storage facilities or limitations in the capac-
ity of the transport means, such as the capacity limitation of trucks. Optimization
of transportation costs together with inventory holding costs leads to the economic
order quantity. The origin of the familiar square-root formula to calculate the opti-
mal economic order quantity in simple inventory models dates back to 1913, to an
article by Harris (1913) (reprinted as Harris (1990)), as found by Erlenkotter (1989).
In this calculation, the fixed costs per order are balanced with the holding costs that
increase with order quantity. In the most basic form, the economic order quantity
derives the optimal quantity to transact under deterministic constant demand and
without any capacity constraints on production capacity, transport means or inven-
tory storage space. As long as neither storage capacity nor transport capacity are
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Vendor
V-process
transport
Buyer
B-process
Figure 3.1: Schematic of a vendor-buyer dyad. After the vendor’s internal process,
the vendor keeps inventory. Transport is organized from the vendor’s inventory to
replenish the buyer’s inventory to serve the buyer’s business.
constrained, total transportation costs under optimization are of the same order of
magnitude as the as the inventory holding costs.
In any situation where inventory is replenished to maintain a desired level of
availability, a policy is necessary concerning the information-basis and forecast on
which the need for replenishment is decided. The parties have to agree on the au-
thority for triggering the replenishment and on the authorization needed to execute
the replenishment. Making an agreement on this point is far from trivial, as the
replenishment policy has financial consequences for multiple parties in the supply
chain. The supplying firm, the vendor, needs to manage internal operations and
inventories in order to ensure reliable delivery to the buyers. Firms in supply chain
networks are typically involved in multiple vendor-buyer dyads. The operational
efficiency for a vendor or buyer is a result of the outcomes of all relevant dyads.
Consider a dyad of a vendor and a buyer in a supply chain, as depicted in Fig-
ure 3.1. The inventory level of incoming goods at the buyer determines the service
level downstream from the buyer, or of the end-customer if the buying firm is a
retailer. The physical flow of products from vendor to buyer links the finished
product inventory level at the supplying firm to the incoming product inventory
level of the receiving firm. The physical goods from the supplying firm to the re-
ceiving firm drain the vendor’s inventory level, while the vendor’s inventory level
increases with the vendor’s internal replenishment or production. The information
and financial flows, combined with agreements on who has authority to decide
on replenishments, drive the physical goods flow. The inventory levels in both
firms, the production rate, transport efficiency and service levels in the receiving
firm result to a large extent from the physical goods flows. Therefore, organizing
the contents and frequency of information exchange, financial incentives and the
authority to trigger replenishments may lead to decisions that are better fit to the
combined interest of both firms.
Information about the buyer’s incoming product inventory levels and external
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demand from the buyer is available at the buying firm in the vendor-buyer dyad of
Figure 3.1. The authority to trigger replenishments in a conventional arrangement
lies with the buyer. Based on the information available to the buyer, the buyer de-
termines the size and timing for replenishment and sends an order to the vendor.
The vendor schedules transport from vendor to buyer and goods are moved from
the vendor’s finished goods inventory to the buyer’s incoming product inventory
facility. The vendor’s inventory is used as a buffer to feed the buyer’s demand.
Products that are drawn from the vendor’s inventory are replenished through in-
ternal operations at the vendor. The operational decisions that are made in the
dyad to manage the supply chain affect the vendor’s process, the vendor’s inven-
tory levels, transport and the buyer’s inventory level. The replenishment requests
from the buyer are considered by the vendor as a given and used to determine the
vendor’s operational decisions. In this way, the buyer triggers the replenishments
and determines the operational decisions in the dyad. Consequently, the buyer
affects the dyad’s performance to a considerable extent.
3.3 Centrally Controlled Supply Chains
Operational decisions by firms in a supply chain that are based on local optimiza-
tion by the supply chain partners might lead to results that are inefficient from a
supply chain perspective (Whang, 1995). The conventional supply chain arrange-
ment where the buyer determines when and what quantities of goods are required
to be delivered is sub-optimal. The buyer drives the operational decisions in the
dyad without a guarantee of alignment with the vendor’s situation. The vendor
complies with the buyer’s requests to deliver within an agreed time-frame and
optimizes its operations based on these requests. Compliance with the buyer’s
requests potentially causes the vendor to face inefficiencies in costs, as has been
described by Goyal (1976), Monahan (1984), Lee and Rosenblatt (1986). In absence
of central supply chain coordination, each of the firms makes decisions indepen-
dently, based on its own —local— optimization. The information that is available
and the financial structure that applies to the firm making the decisions both are
the inputs for making this decision. Decision-making also involves identifying op-
portunities for realizing revenue as well as reducing exposure to risks. Even if both
firms aim to optimize for minimal costs, differences in cost functions might result
in incompatible solutions: the optimal solution for the buyer might induce higher
costs for the vendor.
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One stream of research finds the solution to the vendor-buyer coordination
problem in centralization of decision-making. Actually, the majority of litera-
ture on multi-echelon inventory problems assumes central control (see for instance
Clark and Scarf (1960), Eppen and Schrage (1981), Federgruen and Zipkin (1984b),
Rosling (1989)). Cachon (1999) remarks that most literature on supply chain inven-
tory management assumes that policies are set by a central decision-maker tasked
to optimize total supply chain performance for the part of the supply chain that is
in scope. A central supply chain decision-maker is assumed to have access to all
relevant information at no cost and furthermore has the means and authority to
decide on production and transportation schedules, replenishment quantities and
stock levels for both the vendor and buyer. This approach, with an omnipotent sup-
ply chain coordinator, can achieve a solution that is optimal for the entire supply
chain. The objective in the optimization may vary: the decision-maker may opti-
mize for minimum costs, or maximum profits, maximum revenues or maximum
market-share.
In practice, however, it might not be desirable or feasible to coordinate a supply
chain in a centralized manner (Cachon, 1999). A supply-chain optimal solution
may not be optimal for an individual firm, as the total supply chain costs need to
be shared in some manner among the firms. A sharing scheme that is perceived
to be fair by the involved parties can be difficult to identify. The central decision
problem encompasses the decision problems faced by a vendor and buyers. From
a supply chain perspective, the optimal solution of a centrally controlled supply
chain that is realized by an omnipotent supply chain coordinator dominates the
combined optimal solution to the two decentralized problems. Therefore, there is
often potential to improve decentrally controlled supply chain systems by coordi-
nating the vendor’s and buyers’ operational decisions (see among others Lee and
Rosenblatt (1986), Monahan (1984), Toptal and Cetinkaya (2008).)
3.4 Collaboration to Coordinate the Supply Chain
The fully decentralized dyad can be inefficient, as we have argued above. There-
fore, to survive in an environment of disintegration of the vertical value chain,
intensifying competition, shortening of the business-cycle and globalizing scope
for sourcing and marketing of products, it is necessary to compete as a value chain
with rival value chains (Cox, 2001, Lee, 2004). The organization and location of
boundaries between firms are the leading mechanism behind the potential diver-
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gence and subsequent inefficiencies of the supply chain. Competing as a value
chain requires some form of coordination along that chain. Supply chain manage-
ment deals with managing the vertical value chain across multiple functions and
firms. Rather than optimizing for local performance, a supply chain should be co-
ordinated in such a way that value for end-consumers is created in a manner that is
competitive to other vendors of the same product (Lambert et al., 1998, Chen et al.,
2001). Coordination of decisions in supply chains can be achieved through a form
of collaboration between the supply chain partners.
Coordination of the supply chain is realized through three main factors: coordi-
nation on order quantity, coordination on order timing and coordination on match-
ing inventory requirements through information sharing (Li and Wang, 2007). In
an overview of models of supply chain contracts (Tsay et al., 1999) remark that
despite advances in information technology and a trend to share information, in-
formation asymmetry between supply chain partners still abounds in real supply
chain relationships. Next to problems in organizing the sharing of information
to coordinate inventory requirements, additional problems exist in finding ways
to organize for coordination on order quantity and timing. Ways to resolve the
latter organizational difficulties are sought in a redistribution of the authority to
decide on orders and replenishments. Usually, such redistribution needs to be
supplemented by redesigned financial flows and incentives. Otherwise, parties in
the chain acting as economically rational parties may be unwilling to accept the
redistribution of authority due to implied cost increases.
Even when there are no uncertainties in a dyad concerning demand and supply,
and sharing of information updates is of lesser concern, the relationship between
the coordination factors of order quantities and timings can be intricate. Indeed,
our paper, van der Vlist et al. (2007), discusses this relationship in some detail
on the basis of a simple model for a supplier-buyer dyad. Juxtaposition of the
discussion in van der Vlist et al. (2007) and Yao et al. (2007b) reveals that alternative
decisions on the timing of orders may reverse conclusions on the trend of the
change in inventory costs for parties in the dyad when making the transition from
a non-VMI to a VMI arrangement. So, the strategy used for timing orders has a
substantial impact on the distribution of VMI benefits and costs. The discussion in
the papers Yao et al. (2007a), Abdul-Jalbar et al. (2008), Huang and Ye (2010), and
Wang et al. (2010), ensuing Yao et al. (2007b) and van der Vlist et al. (2007) provides
further evidence that the distribution of costs and benefits towards the supplier
and buyer depends not only on the adoption of VMI as such. The discussion
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shows that it also depends on the way parties exploit the new arrangement by
operational decisions, for example through the order timings, allowed within the
changed division of authority and responsibility, and information sharing among
the parties involved.
3.4.1 Role of Information in Collaboration Arrangements
Collaboration helps to close the gap between the outcome of the decentralized
problems and the central problem by providing access to the right information to
the decision-makers in the supply chain. With more information than in the con-
ventional supply chain arrangement, a vendor has more insight into the urgency
of the buyer’s request, thus allowing the vendor to operate more efficiently by pri-
oritizing or de-prioritizing this order in relation to other orders. Dissemination of
accurate information is critical for the supply chain to operate effectively (Cachon
and Lariviere, 2001). Forrester showed in 1958 the importance of information ex-
change along a supply chain using system dynamics (Forrester, 1958). In absence
of the right information, information distortion and information delay leads to
great amplification of demand fluctuations, called the Forrester effect or the bull-
whip effect. This leads to costly swings in amounts ordered and elevated levels of
inventory. The bullwhip effect is explored further in a paper by Lee et al. (1997),
where possible causes of the effect and solutions to avoid the effect are suggested.
This research was followed by a large amount of research to study the bullwhip
effect and to investigate remedies to reduce it (among others Disney and Towill
(2003a,b), Geary et al. (2006), Chen and Samroengraja (2004)). The general consen-
sus of these papers is that demand fluctuations in a supply chain can be mitigated
and costs saved when firms in a supply chain exchange information more exten-
sively and more frequently than in the conventional case. A reduction of swings
in demand-rates —possibly a result of financial incentives— saves costs. Members
of supply chains need to collaborate in order to achieve this. Interestingly, Cachon
et al. (2007) investigate the strength of the bullwhip effect in industry-level U.S.
data and concludes that the bullwhip effect occurs in wholesale industry, but gen-
erally not in retail industries. They conclude that the less seasonal an industry’s
demand is, the more likely the bullwhip effect will occur.
When a conventional transaction-based relationship exists between the vendor
and the buyer, as is the case in Forrester’s study, the vendor can base expectations
on future requirements on some form of extrapolation of past orders of the buyer.
Such purchase orders come from inventory withdrawals at the buyer, but may
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factor in more considerations, such as convenience of ordering, order batching, or
changes in inventory policy, and therefore are only proxies for the downstream
consumption. Increasing the accuracy of the forecasts by improving the accuracy
of the information that is exchanged leads to costs savings (Kulp, 2002)
Apart from information on the buyer’s inventory level, the vendor needs to be
able to make some assumptions regarding future withdrawals. Significant savings
can be achieved in the case of a diverging supply chain of many buyers and a
single vendor under stationary stochastic demand and full information exchange
(Cachon and Fisher, 2000). Information about demand on the side of the buyer is
most valuable to the vendor when the buyer’s inventory approaches a level where
a replenishment order is triggered. This is when the retailer tends to submit an
order. The authors find that on average, sharing information leads to a 3.4% cost
savings in the case of full information transparency, compared to a conventional
supply chain in which each buyer reorders based on a reorder point policy.
Information becomes even more powerful in combination with a shift in the
authority to trigger replenishments. Not only does the vendor see inventory reduc-
tions resulting from improved forecasting, the vendor can also use the acquired au-
thority to determine operational decisions (Lee et al., 2000, Raghunathan and Yeh,
2001) and thus improve supply chain coordination. Waller et al. (1999) investigate
the role of information via simulation studies for a conventional and VMI arrange-
ment. Orders in a conventional arrangement are assumed to be infrequent and
of large quantity. The increased review frequency under VMI, where the vendor
decides when to deliver replenishments, mitigates uncertainties in demand, and
enables better resource utilization for the vendor. Waller et al. conclude that buffer
stocks for the manufacturer are reduced when capacity is scarce . Under VMI,
the vendor’s leverage of delivery timing and sizing leads to improved operational
matching between production and transport. Service levels go up as non-critical
deliveries can be delayed to favor a critical delivery. As a result of this, the benefits
that are realized with VMI are positively correlated to the extent of its adoption
by the vendor’s buyers. As an interesting side effect of having earlier information
from VMI customers, Waller et al. note that the delivery service improves also for
non-VMI customers. This results from the vendor’s increased visibility on near
future demand in combination with the vendor’s increased flexibility, provided by
the VMI arrangements.
Gavirneni et al. (1999) compare the value of information in a partial and full
information sharing situation to the conventional arrangement. In the partial shar-
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ing arrangement, the vendor knows the demand distribution of the buyer and that
the buyer orders according to an (s, S)-policy. In an (s, S)-policy, the buyer orders
up to inventory level S whenever the inventory drops to or below s. The vendor
knows the development over time of the probability with which the buyer’s inven-
tory drops to or below s and a replenishment is due. With full information sharing,
the vendor receives the actual inventory level in each period. This information is
used to constantly update the development of the probability that a replenishment
is due. Gavirneni et al. conclude that information is always beneficial. The value
of information increases when the capacity grows significantly above the average
demand, as the vendor can decide to save setup costs and produce less frequently.
In line with this, when the difference between S and s is large compared to the
production capacity, the value of information decreases. This happens because in
this case the vendor has to start building inventory in anticipation of a large order.
The value of information is also low at the other extreme, when the difference be-
tween S and s is small compared to average demand. The reason for this lies in
the fact that regular demand triggers replenishments so frequently that additional
information becomes worthless.
Lee et al. (2000) analyze the benefits of information sharing for a two-level sup-
ply chain between a manufacturer and a buyer. Demand is a simple autocorrelated
AR(1) process: the i.i.d. (independent and identically-distributed) perturbation in
demand fades asymptotically over time. Lee et al. (2000) show that inventory levels
decrease with information sharing. The benefits increase for highly correlated de-
mand because current information on demand in that case is a good predictor for
future demand, leading to inventory reduction. The value of information increases
further with increasing variance of the demand perturbation. Information holds
no additional value to the manufacturer in the extreme case of constant demand.
Raghunathan and Yeh (2001) build further on this model. Instead of one retailer
with autocorrelated demand, a number of retailers are considered of which some
share data with the vendors in a VMI arrangement. Demand that occurs at the
retailers can be positively cross-correlated within a demand period. An example
of where cross-correlation of demand happens is in ice-cream sales: demand will
be higher or lower at all retailers in the same period depending on the weather
conditions. A result of cross-correlated demand is that the information accuracy
rises and production can be planned in relation to transportation in a more efficient
manner. The inventories of both the manufacturer and the retailers decreases.
To summarize, exchanging information can lead to a reduction of the bullwhip
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effect and can make the vendor’s forecast on future order sizing and timing more
accurate. As a result, inventory is managed more effectively, resulting in lower
inventory levels on average while service levels can improve. Improved insight
in future demand can lead to reduced setup costs for production or transport,
as the vendor knows when a setup can be delayed to instead have a larger —
more efficient— volume. It might be that the buyer can adjust the order policy
such that the buyer’s costs remain largely unaffected, while the total supply chain
costs decrease. Assuming that the ex-ante policy for a buyer is buyer-optimal —
as the buyer has the authority to decide on replenishments in the conventional
arrangement— any change in order-policy for the buyer means that the costs in-
crease for the buyer. A decrease of the total supply chain costs then implies that
the vendor’s costs decrease. A form of compensation to the buyer might be neces-
sary in order to align the incentives of the buyer with the vendor’s incentives. The
compensation then makes joining the arrangement rational for the buyer from an
economic perspective.
3.4.2 Role of Authority in Collaboration Arrangements
Initiatives to coordinate the supply chain between vendor and buyer range from
simple agreements to share information to collaboration arrangements between
vendor and buyer that concern not only the flow and content of exchanged in-
formation but also the division of responsibilities for deciding on replenishment
policies and triggering of replenishments.
When the authority to trigger replenishments and drive operational decisions
in a dyad lies with the buyer, operational decisions from the vendor are not neces-
sarily synchronized with the requirements of the buyer. As a result, the costs for
transport, production and the costs for maintaining inventory can be reduced by
coordinating operational decisions. It is evident that decisions can be optimized
for the entire supply chain by using centralized control. The gap in supply chain
performance between a conventionally controlled supply chain and a centrally con-
trolled supply chain can be partially closed by redistributing the decision authority
between supply chain partners. In practice, such a change from an existing —
conventional— supply chain arrangement to a collaboration arrangement where
the decision authority is differently distributed between both parties requires that
this change is individually rational for both parties from an economic perspective.
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3.4.3 Individual Rationality of Collaboration Arrangements
Even though overall supply chain effects of collaboration arrangements are posi-
tive, it is far from trivial to get both parties to collaborate through participating in
such an initiative. Changing the content and frequency of information exchange,
combined with a change in decision authority for operational decisions in a supply
chain has effects on the costs and risks for the firms involved. In order to join, the
supply chain initiative has to be economically rational for each individual firm.
In Section 2.2.4, we discussed that a dominant firm in a supply chain has a
position different than other supply chain partners in that the other firms largely
depend on the dominant firm’s business. When such a dominant party sees bene-
fits in a new distribution of responsibilities under a new supply chain arrangement,
the dominant firm may make the new supply chain arrangement individually ra-
tional for a partnering firm by threatening to sever business with this firm if it
does not accept the new arrangement. Another method to realize cooperation with
shifted authority is to establish some mechanism to make the arrangement individ-
ually rational for all partners involved, by sharing the benefits between the vendor
and buyer. An economic motive to cooperate exists as long as both parties are bet-
ter (or at very least, not worse) off within the coordination arrangement compared
with the conventional arrangement. The sharing of the cost savings can be done by
means of quantity discounts, rebates, refunds, fixed-payment contracts between the
parties or any combination of these. In an overview of supply chain coordination
with contracts, Cachon (2003) study the set of transfer payments to align the objec-
tives of each firm with the supply chain goal. Single period —news-vendor type
models— and multi-period models are reviewed. They conclude that failure of
coordination is common as incentive conflicts arise in a wide range of operational
situations. Managing supply chain coordination can lead to Pareto improvements,
a ‘win-win’ situation. In many situations, multiple types of contracts exist that can
achieve coordination.
Incentive alignment arrangements involve a flow of financial compensation to
change how certain decisions affect the costs to parties (Narayanan and Raman,
2004). The challenge is to (re-)design incentives such that the supply chain part-
ners are induced to behave in ways that maximize supply chain profits. Compared
to a conventional supply chain arrangement, where the buyer authorizes replen-
ishments, an incentive program setup by a vendor can induce the buyer to change
its order policy. Such arrangement might result in equal or better performance
for both parties. An example of this in a bilateral monopoly are two-part con-
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tracts, under which the vendor sells products at marginal costs and charges a fixed
side-payment to coordinate the supply channel. Simple wholesale pricing contracts
would face the problem of double marginalization, meaning that the vendor’s mar-
gin increases the costs for the buyer such that with the buyer’s margin taken into
account, the overall profitability of the chain is below the optimal level.
Coordination with incentive schemes in a situation where information is pro-
vided in an asymmetrical way has been compared to incentive schemes with full
information transparency (Corbett and de Groote, 2000). The setup costs of the ven-
dor in a conventional EOQ-type setting are assumed to be greater than the setup
costs of the buyer. The order size is determined by the buyer. Since the vendor
benefits from economies of scale by shipping larger order quantities, he offers the
buyer quantity discounts in order to entice the buyer into increasing its order quan-
tity. Two cases are considered: quantity discounts under full information sharing,
where the vendor knows the buyer’s costs drivers, and quantity discounts under
asymmetric information sharing, where the vendor does not know the buyer’s cost
drivers, specifically the inventory holding costs. In the latter case, the vendor of-
fers a menu of contracts to the buyer to choose from. Depending on the buyer’s
holding costs, the vendor needs to offer a smaller or larger discount to entice the
buyer to accept deliveries of a larger order size. It turns out that in the case of full
information, the vendor can make the buyer pay the maximum price. The overall
supply chain result is that of a fully coordinated supply chain. The vendor has to
offer more to the buyer when the buyer holds private information. Nevertheless,
Corbett and de Groote conclude that the total supply chain costs are still lower
than when no coordination takes place.
Two-part contracts are proposed to coordinate the supply chain. Two-part con-
tracts avoid the double marginalization problem (Lerner, 1934). Under a two-part
contract, the vendor sells products to the buyer at marginal costs, but charges an
additional fixed side payment to coordinate the supply chain. Corbett et al. (2004)
conclude that two-part contracts under information asymmetry between vendor
and buyer with linear side payments can coordinate the channel. Further, the value
of information increases with two-part contracts, while at the same time the value
of two-part contracts increases under full-information.
The optimal supply chain policy for replenishing a two-level supply chain has
been studied by many. Cachon and Zipkin (1999) conclude that it is possible
to achieve a supply-chain optimal, coordinated decision, but only when vendor
and buyer are willing to share the cost benefits through some cost re-alignment
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scheme. Tsay and Agrawal (2000) studied a supply chain system under determin-
istic demand, where two retailers were replenished by one vendor. In this case,
the retailers compete on price and service level. In the article, the authors study
and characterize a scheme for wholesale pricing to coordinate such supply chain
system.
The performance gap that exists between a centrally controlled supply chain
and a decentrally controlled—conventional— supply chain can be mitigated by
collaboration arrangements to coordinate operational decision-making in supply
chains with. Mutual agreement on two factors constitute a collaboration arrange-
ment: mutual agreement on information exchange and distribution of decision
authority. Resulting collaboration arrangements are discussed in the next section.
3.5 Collaboration Arrangements
Collaboration arrangements such as VMI, VOI, FGP, CPFR, ECR have been intro-
duced in Chapter 2 as potential improvements over the conventional (conv) ar-
rangement. Figure 3.2 on the following page categorizes different collaboration
forms based on the level of information sharing for both vendor and buyer. The
buyer in the conventional arrangement shares nothing but sales orders, while the
vendor also keeps his stock and production information private. In the case of Ef-
ficient Consumer Response programs or Quick Response programs a much higher
density of information flows from buyer to vendor and vice versa. A buyer in VMI
or VOI arrangements needs to share information to enable the vendor to manage
its inventory. The vendor might share information on production plans. In FGP, the
vendor shares when replenishments are ready to collect and buyers share when a
pickup is scheduled. Under collaborative planning and forecasting (CPFR), vendor
and buyer are very open in information sharing. The ultimate in information shar-
ing is full coordination in the central solution. In this case, the omnipotent supply
chain coordinator has access to all information from both vendor and buyer. A shift
in authority between vendor and buyer changes the attitude towards information
privacy or information sharing for these collaboration arrangements compared to
the conventional setting.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the four main supply chain arrangements we distinguish
between. For each form of collaboration, the vendor is shown on the left side
of the figure. Products are transported from the vendor to the buyer positioned
on the right side of the figure. The flow of goods considered here starts with
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Figure 3.2: Schematic of information sharing on the vendor-buyer interface. In-
formation to buyer or vendor is private or shared depending on the collaboration
arrangement.
the process of the vendor making the products available. This can range from
procurement when the vendor is a distributor, to a manufacturing process when
the vendor is a manufacturer. The vendor can keep an inventory facility to store
the finished products. Next, products are transported to the buyer’s incoming
inventory facility. From there, the goods flow to the buyer’s process. The process
of the buyer might be a manufacturing operation when the buyer is a manufacturer
or the sales operation to customers when the buyer is a retailer. The dashed lines
in the graph indicate the reach of responsibility for the vendor and buyer, in line
with the responsibilities discussed in Section 2.1 and listed in Table 2.1.
3.5.1 Collaboration Analyzed
When the buyer decides if and how much to order, the routine information ex-
change between vendor and buyer is transaction based: the buyer notifies the ven-
dor that he needs a number of products. This information exchange occurs only
when the buyer decides to order goods and the information is limited as far as
actual and planned consumption by the buyer is concerned. The vendor does not
know the stock level of his buyer and hence, does not know the urgency of the de-
livery. Under a VMI arrangement, the vendor receives frequent updates about the
inventory level at the buyer. Since he now knows the inventory-level at the buyer,
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Figure 3.3: Overview of different vendor-buyer collaboration forms: Conventional,
FGP, VMI and CPFR
the vendor can determine the timing and quantity of goods to ship, and manage
the buyer’s inventory, while at the same time aiming to organize transport and his
own inventory efficiently.
In a true VMI setting, the vendor is given the freedom to plan his own produc-
tion and decide upon the replenishment schedule as long as the agreed customer
service levels are met (Claassen et al., 2008). VMI is often implemented with min-
imum and maximum limits set on the inventory levels of the buyer in order to
protect minimum availability for the buyer (Disney and Towill, 2003a). The tighter
the limits, the less leeway for vendors to optimize (Kaipia et al., 2002, Fry et al.,
2001).
Fry et al. (2001) find that many of the benefits proclaimed to be results of VMI
are in fact only the result of sharing information. They reach this conclusion from
analysis of a VMI arrangement with minimum (z) and maximum (Z) inventory
levels. The vendor pays the buyer when the inventory level of the buyer attains
values below z or above Z. In this way, the (z,Z) boundaries function as a mecha-
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nism to transfer payments between vendor and buyer and may be used to make the
VMI arrangement economically rational for the buyer. The side-payments resulting
from the (z,Z) boundaries align the incentives for the buyer and vendor, leading
to some form of supply chain coordination. In the study of Fry et al., the focus is
production in optimally sized production batches, while maintaining inventory at
the buyer.
In general, the central idea is that total channel costs for VMI-consignment in a
supply chain channel between a buyer and vendor decrease over both the short and
long term, but such a decrease may fall short of the centrally coordinated supply
chain (Dong and Xu, 2002). In the Dong and Xu study, VMI-consignment arrange-
ment is compared to a base case in which the buyer dominates and determines the
order quantities and a proposed transfer price according to local profit maximiza-
tion. The benefits of VMI increase with increasing difference between the vendor’s
and the buyer’s setup costs for a transaction —and thus their preferred order-sizes.
Evidently, implementation of VMI with consignment is always beneficial to the
buyer as the inventory holding costs are absorbed by the vendor. However, when
the transaction setup costs for the buyer and vendor are of the same magnitude,
it is possible that implementation of VMI-consignment leads to a decrease of the
vendor’s profits in the short term. In the long-term, however, reduction in overall
supply chain channel costs results in an competitive edge, leading to increasing
sales volumes, so the vendor’s profits could increase. A special assumption in the
Dong and Xu study is that the production costs increase convexly in quantity. Note
that other efficiency gains attributed to VMI —such as improved coordination and
forecasting, leading to reduced safety stocks and ’more degrees of freedom’ for
vendor to manufacture or deliver— have not been taken into account in this study.
Bernstein et al. (2006) introduce a concept called echelon operational autonomy
(EOA). EOA states that the costs incurred by a vendor for a given vector of sales
volumes depend only on operational decisions controlled by the vendor. Under
general cost and demand functions, this condition suffices to make perfect supply
chain coordination feasible. VMI is shown to create EOA, meaning that the vendor
in a VMI arrangement can realize supply chain coordination.
Cheung and Lee (2002) derive upper and lower bounds for the costs in a sup-
ply chain consisting of multiple retailers in close proximity of each other. In their
study, the vendor dominates the dyads and decides when and how much to replen-
ish. The buyers share information on their inventory levels with the vendor. Two
policies are compared to a conventional re-order policy. The first policy uses inven-
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tory information to optimize the use of economies of scale in transport. A second
policy focuses on rebalancing the inventory levels of the buyers during delivery
of replenishments. The costs of the conventional reorder policy are higher than
the costs of transport optimization. The lowest cost solution rebalances inventory
levels during replenishments.
Many studies start from a basic model introduced by Goyal (1976). The Goyal
model considers deterministic constant demand, linearly increasing holding and
fixed replenishment costs. Modeling capacity limitations involving the transport
source or the production capacity are both interesting extensions to the basic model.
Toptal and Cetinkaya (2008) model these extensions by including stepwise increas-
ing transportation costs. As a result, the identification of benefits of collaborating
becomes less intuitive. As an example, it is not always beneficial to a vendor to
increase the ordering batch size when this means costs increase by one step (Toptal
and Cetinkaya, 2008).
Çetinkaya and Lee (2000) analyze the cost savings that are achieved when a
vendor gains the flexibility to consolidate transport for replenishments in case of
a VMI arrangement. Here, a vendor serves a group of retailers that generate a
succession of random demands. The retailers are located in close proximity of each
other. The costs of transport are a fixed charge per replenishment. In a base case,
the vendor meets demand as it occurs and sends equal-sized shipments to each
retailer of the economically optimal size. When the vendor and retailers decide to
cooperate in a VMI arrangement, the vendor uses the flexibility in timing and sizing
of the shipments to consolidate shipments until a certain quantity has accumulated
or until a certain time has passed. In the latter strategy, consolidation until a
certain length of time has elapsed is referred to as time-based policy. The optimal
replenishment quantity and dispatch frequency are computed approximately.
Axsäter (2001) continues on the model of Çetinkaya and Lee (2000) and pro-
vides an exact optimization as well as a new heuristic. A problem in the analysis
is that the cost of transport is modeled as a fixed amount per truck. Consequently,
the analysis gives an upper value of the potential cost savings. The reason for this
is that when the calculated cost savings are large -meaning that the efficient or-
der quantity differs significantly from the truck’s capacity- it is very likely that the
shipper contracts a carrier who offers Less Than a Truckload Tariffs (LTL-tariffs)
instead of hiring full trucks. In case of LTL-transport, the carrier’s business lies in
achieving efficient use of the transport capacity by sourcing for additional freight.
As LTL-tariffs for the shipper reflect part of these cost savings, the savings in trans-
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port costs, according to Çetinkaya and Lee (2000), are an upper-bound.
A joint replenishment problem for a retailer facing stochastic demand is studied
by Cachon and Fisher (2000). Transport occurs in trucks of finite capacity. The
costs of transport are modeled as a fixed amount per truck. Three policies are
compared: a continuous review policy, a periodic review policy and an adjusted
periodic review policy where only full trucks are shipped. A lower bound for the
costs of the latter policy is derived by decomposing the problem to one where each
item is shipped in its own truck.
Piplani and Viswanathan (2003) study a system where a number of buyers col-
laborate in Vendor-Owned Inventory-arrangements, while others remain a con-
ventional arrangement with the vendor. When it is efficient, the vendor optimizes
transport and production by combining replenishments for a conventional cus-
tomer with VOI-customers. Therefore, the review period for VOI-customers is a
multiple of the review period for conventional customers. Assuming that only
reasonable review periods (such as days, weeks) are feasible, cost minimization is
achieved by full enumeration over 730 possible review periods (1 day to 2 yrs). The
findings are that the total supply chain costs never increase with VOI and that the
costs decrease is greater when the holding costs of the VOI-customers are lower.
Further, the savings increase when the share of VOI-demand increases. When the
ratio of setup costs for production to VOI delivery costs is low, supply chain costs
are reduced. The impact on the vendor’s costs suggest that there is an optimum
ratio between production and VOI replenishment costs, but it remains unclear why.
For many other parameter settings, the vendor’s costs increase with VOI.
Bertazzi and Speranza (2005) look at a problem where a producer distributes
one item to a set of retailers, facing deterministic demand. A fleet of vehicles
(limited capacity) is used for transport. Both production and distribution are opti-
mized. The production costs consist of setup costs plus variable costs plus holding
costs. The distribution costs are a fixed fee for every truck that is needed over the
time horizon plus costs of the distance traveled by a truck for each time period.
Retailers face holding costs. The inventory at retailers must be kept between lower
and upper limits. The problem to minimize total costs under constraints is shown
to be NP-hard. Two VMI policies are studied: and order-up-to level policy, where
each retailer receives products up to the order-up-to level in each period and a
fill-fill-dump policy. Under the latter policy, all but the last retailer is replenished
up to the inventory capacity they have made available. The last retailer receives
the minimum of remaining space in truck and up-to-level quantity. The fill-fill
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dump policy turns out to outperform the order-up-to policy due to a reduction of
distribution costs.
To summarize, analytical models show that vendor-buyer dyads can realize
significant benefits under well-formed collaboration arrangements. A limitation in
the analytical models is that reality must be simplified in order to make it tractable.
A specific example of this is that the cost function for transport in models where
capacity limitations for transport are taken into account is usually a simple fixed
amount per truck-ride, independent of the actual load in the truck. In practice, a
vendor who regularly ships loads that are less than a truckload will make use of a
third-party logistics provider offering discounted LTL-tariffs, possibly based on the
total annual volume. In this way, the third-party logistics provider realizes part of
the potential benefits that can be derived from a VMI arrangement between buyer
and vendor and passes some of these savings on to the vendor. Consequently, the
projected potential benefits of VMI from such analytical models overestimate the
cost savings. In Chapter 4, we will deal with transport tariffs in detail.
3.6 Conclusions
3.6.1 Normative Model for Collaboration
The conclusion emerging from the previous sections is that agreement on the divi-
sion of information exchange and on decision authority for operational decisions
constitutes a collaboration arrangement. The generic condition for economic ratio-
nality for each individual firm for changing a collaboration arrangement warrants
that a new arrangement is more efficient for the supply chain. Individual rational-
ity for the supply chain partners is realized via incentive schemes in which part of
the benefits realized from the new arrangement are transferred between the part-
ners or as a result of dependence on a dominant supply chain partner enforcing
the new collaboration arrangement.
Coordination of decisions can occur by an ‘entrepreneur’ when activities are
internalized, or via a price mechanism as a coordinating instrument in markets
(Coase, 1937). The trend of a firm to focus on core activities leads to an increased
need for coordination via the market. Coordination via pricing mechanisms in the
market as referred to by Coase, is generalized to coordination in the form of a
collaboration arrangement, where joining this arrangement is individually rational
to each firm concerned from an economic standpoint. Benefits of collaboration re-
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Figure 3.4: Normative Model of collaboration. Incentives and the position of dom-
inance may make an arrangement individually rational, fulfilling this condition for
collaboration. Agreement on authority and information exchange constitute col-
laboration, leading to operational benefits in production, transport or inventory
management.
sult from coordination of operational decisions between firms in the supply chain.
Part of the performance gap between a conventional arrangement and a centrally
controlled supply chain can be closed. Benefits are realized in the domains of
inventory holding costs, or setup costs such as transport and production.
Figure 3.4 summarizes the findings in a normative model. It depicts, in a con-
ceptual way, the factors that affect the type of arrangement between a vendor and
buyer and the effects of such arrangements. The type of collaboration arrange-
ment between a vendor and a buyer is a result of agreements on the content and
frequency of information sharing as well as agreement on authority in the dyad.
The latter refers to the priority and influence each party has on the operational
decisions that are the outcome of the arrangement.
We hasten to add that the model depicted in Figure 3.4 is generally insufficient
for detailed quantitative analysis and predictions. As we have argued on different
occasions, see e.g. the discussion at Page 52, the benefits and costs of a collabora-
tion arrangement, specifying the division of authority and sharing of information,
are much impacted by the way the arrangement is subsequently exploited by the
parties involved. Exploitation of the possibilities that arise from collaboration in-
volved optimization. So, the outcomes of a transition to an advanced collaboration
arrangement depends also on the effects, capabilities and strategies that the parties
put into the optimization of operations under the new arrangement. A further con-
volution, not shown in Figure 3.4 arises from the distinction of different authority
modes, as discussed in the next section.
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3.6.2 Conclusion on Authority Modes
The outcome of the processes across the interface in a dyad is a set of operational
decisions determining the replenishment timing and quantities of the buyer’s in-
ventory facility as well as the timing and quantities of the vendor’s internal replen-
ishment process. In this thesis, economic rationality is assumed to lead decision
making. Three modes of authority are distinguished that achieve operational de-
cisions. The first mode is the case where the vendor and buyer act as one. The
complete information of the vendor and buyer is centrally available to determine
the optimal policy for the combined vendor-buyer. The second mode is the con-
ventional case with the buyer dominating the dyad by triggering replenishment
decisions. The vendor subsequently uses this trigger and the information available
to optimize his operations. The third mode of authority is the vendor-dominated
case. In this case, the vendor uses all information available to optimize his opera-
tions, resulting in a schedule of when and what to ship to the buyer. The supply
chain costs for the vendor, buyer or the entire dyad is thus a result of the authority
mode and the information that is available to the decisions makers. Obviously, the
total costs of the vendor and buyer in the central solution are always less than or
equal to the costs of the vendor or buyer-dominated solution.
We denote operational decisions by σC for the central case, σB for the buyer’s
operational decisions and σV for the vendor’s operational decisions. The informa-
tion available to buyer or vendor are denoted by ıB, ıV respectively. The outcome
of the three forms of authority on operational decisions depends in different se-
quential dependence of decisions and information. We assume that the making
of operational decisions between vendor and buyer unfolds as a Stackelberg game
(Stackelberg, 1952). The three modes are shown analytically in Eq.(3.1).
σ←

σC(ıB, ıV) central
{σV(ıV , σB(ıB)), σB(ıB)} buyer dominant
{σV(ıV), σB(ıB, σV(ıV))} vendor dominant
(3.1)
The operational decisions in the first, centrally operated mode are based on
information from buyer and vendor. In the second, —buyer-dominated— mode,
σB is based on the buyer’s information. The vendor uses σB as input: σV is based
on the vendor’s information and σB. In the third —vendor-dominated— mode, the
vendor decides based on information available to the vendor, so σV is based on the
vendor’s information only. The buyer subsequently determines σB based on the
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vendor’s decisions, σV combined with the buyer’s information.
Note that the solution obtained in the three approaches in (3.1) vary. In fact,
upon studying an assembler-(multiple) suppliers supply chain the paper Wang
and Gerchak (2003) conclude that structurally different solutions obtain in a cen-
tral case, an assembler-dominant case and a supplier dominant when deciding on
capacity investments, compare Cachon (2004) and Lariviere and Porteus (2001).
Moreover the different approaches put different requirements on the way informa-
tion is shared: in the two Stackelberg approaches the leader needs to be able to
predict how the follower responds to its actions and for that it needs the follower’s
cost structure. It is not possible to identify one single approach as being the best in
explaining all of empiricism.
3.6.3 Conclusion on VMI
There are three main factors as to why VMI arrangements can be more efficient
than conventional vendor-buyer arrangements. First, more information is available
to the decision-maker, enabling better solutions and efficiency gains. Second, the
party with the authority to decide is the same party bearing the costs. Third, the
asymmetry of information between vendor and multiple buyers can be exploited
by the vendor to increase the transport efficiency by consolidating shipments. All
three factors are explained below.
Improved coordination of the supply chain under VMI is possible because the
vendor has more information available. Instead of only having order data, the ven-
dor under VMI has frequent access to knowledge of actual inventory levels of his
buyer. This presents the vendor with the possibility to schedule orders with flexi-
bility in timing and quantity: he can decide to send smaller or larger shipments or
he can send a shipment slightly earlier or later to accumulate orders in time and to
consolidate across destinations in order to increase the efficiency of transportation.
A second factor for potential coordination improvement under VMI comes from
a single party driving the supply chain performance and bearing the costs. Under
the conventional arrangement where the vendor assumes the cost of transportation
while the buyer decides when, and how much to order, the buyer’s timing and
sizing of orders may not induce efficient transportation. By assigning the authority
as well as the costs for ordering, shipping and inventory control to the vendor, this
party can align decisions with costs implications and achieve a better solution.
With the addition of a target inventory levels at the buyer, to reflect service level
requirements, the system may succeed in coordination of the supply chain.
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The third factor is asymmetry of information. This factor can be made clear by
first explaining the concept of symmetry of information. Under VMI, more infor-
mation is exchanged between vendor and buyer. Theoretically, once the buyer and
vendor share information and responsibilities, it becomes irrelevant who makes the
decisions, as the decision is based on the same inputs anyway. When a vendor has
multiple buyers, the vendor-buyer relationship is non-symmetric. Then symmetry
of information for each vendor-buyer link is impossible: the information that the
vendor shares with buyer A must remain separate from the information that is
shared between the vendor and buyer B. Therefore, each buyer can only posses a
limited amount of information, but on the other hand, all the information is available
to the vendor. This places the vendor in a central position. In particular, this opens
up opportunity to consolidate freight for several geographically near buyers in a
single shipment, thus increasing the efficiency of transportation.
In general, the party with most decision authority in the dyad is best off in terms
of costs. In a VMI arrangement, the vendor dominates the dyad. In order to entice
the buyer into accepting this change in authority the buyer must be guaranteed not
to be worse off. In practice therefore, the buyer sets the boundary conditions for
the vendor within which the VMI arrangement must be managed. Alternatively,
the buyer forces the vendor to manage the buyer’s stock point under consignment,
VOI, so that costs disappear for the buyer.
To overcome the problem of a buyer setting VMI-boundary conditions such
that the vendor cannot realize the maximum benefits, we study in Chapter 5 an
arrangement where the vendor creates contracts with the buyer aiming to influence
the buyer’s boundary conditions for a VMI arrangement.
As discussed above, a generic issue in the papers where the difference between
operational performance of a conventional dyad and a dyad under a collaboration
arrangement is compared is the calculation of the costs of transport. In the litera-
ture, the cost of transport are often taken as a fixed fee per truck-ride, independent
of the volume to be transported. Any arrangement in which the vendor can im-
prove control of shipment size and timing will therefore be (very) favorable to the
vendor. In practice however, a market for less-than-truckload (LTL) transport ex-
ists. The business of the LTL-carrier is to combine transport needs in the market.
As a result, attractive LTL transport rates can be offered. In Chapter 4 we present
a model to derive transport tariffs for LTL-transport in an environment of several
shippers with transport needs.
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3.6.4 Practice versus Theory
Analytical models make assumptions on reality. An underlying assumption in
theoretical models on information sharing is often that the quality of information
is perfect and that information becomes available simultaneously to both vendor
and the buyer. Supply chain partners in the dyad are thought to act economically
rationally. This implies that in theory a firm cooperates fully on any alternative col-
laboration arrangement as long as they are not worse off cost-wise. Rarely taken
into account are considerations of strategic nature or market dominance of a firm.
A firm that is dominant in a supply chain might force the other party into a col-
laboration arrangement by simply using its dominance. Near-term decisions on
how to collaborate in the supply chain will play a role on the strategic position of a
firm in the long term. Supply chains are typically assumed to compete, but in real-
ity competing supply chains join forces at times —for instance via standardization
bodies (e.g., CD, DVD standards, EDI, RFID).
Analytical models often focus on operations and neglect such considerations
even though these considerations play an important role in practice and have a
significant influence on the results or outcome of a collaboration arrangement. The
reason lies in the complexity involved in modeling such considerations and the
difficulty in determining reasonable parametric values to use in the models. In-
cluding practically-relevant considerations may make a model appear contrived.
For example, how does one model the economically irrational behavior of a firm?
Further, the introduction of additional complexity makes an optimization model
analytically intractable so that simulation must be used to get results. A problem
in this is the parametric value one assumes for such practical considerations such
as, e.g., imperfect information quality. When information in a model is assumed
to be delayed and not 100% perfectly transferred, the question arises as to how
imperfect it should be. The uncertainty on the parameters with which to model the
additional considerations often greatly affects the outcome of the model and raises
questions on the results.
When considering a supply chain with repeat business the accuracy and reli-
ability of the transfers of information updates that are shared as part of a collab-
oration arrangement, becomes vital. Information sharing places requirements on
information transfers that go beyond the issuing of orders. Such requirements are
rarely modeled as part of a theoretical optimization-based collaboration study. In
theoretical models, information transfers are normally modeled to be 100% correct
and accurate, see Chen (2003). Rare papers that do have discussion of these issues
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of information transfer are Chen and Samroengraja (2004) and Anand and Mendel-
son (1997). In practice, on the other hand, it is not easy to guarantee accurate and
reliable data transfers. The infrastructure of each firm has to be at a minimum
level and matched with the other party. This goes beyond the information tech-
nology infrastructure alone. Systems obviously need to be able to communicate to
share information, but also mutual agreements on standards, on standard ways of
ordering, measurement, data management and data maintenance are essential for
successful ongoing data transfer.
Further, strategic considerations are important to determine the type and suc-
cess of collaboration models. The reason for a firm to join a collaboration arrange-
ment ranges from being forced by the other party to individual economic rationally
based on financial or strategic benefits. The long-term view of how to develop one’s
position in the supply chain and network of buyers and vendors plays an impor-
tant role. Such considerations are hard to convincingly quantify. It must be realized
that neglect of such factors make the theoretical models an optimistic abstraction
of practice.
A specific example of these difficulties is observed in models where the ben-
efits of the introduction of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)-tags instead of
barcodes are analyzed. Basic RFID-tags hold data that is comparable to data in a
barcode (a multi-digit number), but the reading speed, reading distance and read-
accuracy by far surpasses that of barcodes. However, to quantify benefits, assump-
tions must be made on the costs of not being able to read so many tags at certain
distance. In a study to derive the benefits of RFID, a parameter to model the shelf
replenishment responsiveness is introduced (Gaukler et al., 2007). This parameter
depends on miscategorization, theft from the shelf, and other errors in the execu-
tion of shelf replenishment. The parameter is set to 100% responsiveness when
RFID is used and estimated to be 90% for a non-RFID case. Logically, the benefits
that are expected to be derived from introducing RFID depend on these values.
Similarly, de Kok et al. (2008) analyze the break-even point for implementing RFID
tags in theft-sensitive products.
In the next chapter, we go into a more detailed analysis of the benefits that can
be realized by coordinated decision-making in supply chain collaboration arrange-
ments. To enhance the understanding of the role of transport costs in determining
the benefits from coordination on transport, we study transport tariffs for the situ-
ation of LTL-transport.

Chapter 4
A Model for Transport Tariffs
for Single Orders on a Single
Link
The potential cost benefits from coordinated supply chain decision making often
result from optimization of operations by exploiting economies of scale. In practice
however, resources of finite capacity moderate the benefits from scale economies.
Transport of goods between firms is a main source of potential cost savings from
supply chain coordination, but the limited capacity of trucks makes the analysis of
such cost savings complex. The analytical literature often focuses on savings re-
sulting from optimizing the shipping frequency and quantity for the supply chain.
Third-party logistics providers can also realize potential savings on transport by
optimizing shipment quantities, by offering transport tariffs for shipments that are
less-than-a-truckload in size. To understand this further, we study in this chap-
ter our third research question: How can tariffs for transportation of less-than-a-
truckload quantities be modeled to coordinate the efficient usage of trucks?
Transport tariffs are used to determine a size-dependent rate that is charged for
the service of transporting goods from one to another location. The efficiency of
transportation may be improved by coordination of supply chain decisions. The
main mechanism to make transportation more economical is aggregation of goods,
resulting in fewer economically sized shipments. Third-party logistics providers
may offer transport tariffs for shipments of size less-than-a-truckload, in which
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part of the cost-savings that are realized by economizing transportation are passed
on to the shippers. In this chapter, we develop models to determine transport
tariffs. We consider tariffs that are based on cost-allocation and tariffs that are
based on profit-maximization. 1
This chapter is organized as follows. After introducing the problem in Sec-
tion 4.1, we present a review of literature addressing transport costs on a single
link in Section 4.3. Subsequently, in Section 4.4, we present the methodology by
which tariffs are derived. Two approaches for deriving tariffs are discussed: cost-
based and profit-based. In Section 4.5, the first method allocates costs according to
the cost impact of an order. The second logic, in Section 4.6 derives tariffs based on
profit maximization by the carrier. The influence of the arrival pattern and distri-
bution of demand is studied using simulation. Finally, we present our conclusions
with respect to the research performed in Section 4.7.
4.1 Transport between Firms in a Dyad
The costs and efficiency of physical distribution of goods between two firms in a
supply chain is a focal point in establishing advanced collaboration arrangements
between a buyer and a vendor. Transport tariffs specify as a function of order-size
the rate that is charged for the service of transporting the goods. The shape of
transport tariffs as a function of order-size affects both shipping decisions and the
efficiency and fill-rate of the means of transport.
In this chapter, we develop models to determine transport tariffs. The focus
is on a transport service by trucks on a single link for orders of size less than a
truckload (LTL). Shippers issue transport orders to a carrier who charges a tariff
for providing the transport service. Since multiple orders can be combined in
one truck-ride, the carrier can charge each order a tariff that is lower than that of
a full truckload. The problem now becomes setting rates for orders to promote
maximum economic benefit, like lowest transportation costs or maximum carrier’s
profit. The rate for an order will depend on many factors, notably on the order’s
size measured by volume or weight. A schedule that states the rate as a function
of order characteristics, in particular size, will be referred to as a tariff. How the
tariff looks like depends on several factors such as the underlying economics of
the transportation activity, the demand and market for transportation services and
the operating policy employed by the carrier. The complex interplay between these
1This chapter has been transformed in a paper, submitted for publication (Kuik and Verheijen, 2010)
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factors makes it hard to identify a tariff that realizes maximum economic benefit.
The problem is compounded, as transportation is often only one of the activities
in a supply chain that also includes production, inventory storage and warehous-
ing activities. When such supply chains are analyzed for the effects of different
shipping strategies, for example, Just-In-Time (JIT) and delivery or replenishment
under vendor managed inventory (VMI) control, one needs an understanding of
how such strategies affect transportation. Therefore, one needs to understand how
these strategies affect and are affected by transport tariffs.
The motivation for this research stems from the fact that many advanced col-
laboration arrangements such as JIT and VMI lead to increased flexibility in timing
and sizing of transport orders. The flexibility enhances opportunities to consolidate
orders and to increase transport efficiency. As a result, advanced collaboration ar-
rangements can lead to savings on logistics costs. The cost savings might be passed
on to the shipper in the form of a reduced tariff for the transport service. However,
in order to assess the shipper’s potential cost savings from an advanced collabo-
ration arrangement, it is essential to understand how transport tariffs are affected
by the transport cost structure. Therefore, we develop a model to derive an ana-
lytical tariff for LTL transportation services. Note that the rate brings an expense
for the shipper and revenue for the carrier, and these do not necessarily equate
to the costs incurred by the carrier. This study is limited to that of transporta-
tion services on a single transportation lane offered by a single common carrier
to multiple shippers. Both private and common carriage is examined. In the case
of common carriage, a semi-proportional cost allocation rule results in transport
tariffs that display properties such as economies of scale and sub-additivity. In the
case of private carriage, the frequency of order arrivals determines the extent to
which the carrier’s efficiency-gains are passed on to the shippers. Simulation is
used for numerical evaluation.
4.2 Transport Tariffs
An essential function of businesses is utility maximization by coordinating the us-
age of scarce resources. Often, these resources have limited capacity, which might
be shared among multiple users, making this the problem of coordinating the usage
of shared capacitated resources. An example of such a problem is transportation
of goods by trucks. Multiple orders of sizes that are less than a truckload (LTL)
may be combined to share the finite capacity of a truck. A similar problem is that
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of ships or airplanes in which orders for multiple customers can be combined. The
main difference with trucks is the granularity of the orders: in container ships,
the smallest increment is an extra container, while in LTL trucking, the smallest
increment is a fraction of what fits in a truck, such as a pallet-layer.
Two functions can be identified in the transportation business: the function of
a carrier and the function of a shipper. Carriers provide the transport service to
shippers. When both functions are combined under a single authority who makes
decision to release orders and dispatch trucks, the problem of coordination of truck
usage reduces to a problem to minimize the total costs subject to a set of capacity
and service constraints. However, when two or even more parties are involved,
such as one or more carriers and one or more shippers, the problem is one of
aligning the objectives and expectations of different parties.
A tariff is usually stated as a rate table. For purpose of analysis, an analytical
expression of rates as a function of order attributes has more potential for interpret-
ing results as such analytical expressions involve far fewer parameters than entries
in a tariff table. In case precision is important, such as when analyzing a practical
case for the purpose of consulting, an analytical expression for rates that applies
to the whole range of potential transportation orders may be too coarse. In these
cases a collection of functions may be used on different intervals limited by break
points that reflect the discrete nature of a tariff table. Such approach has been used
in e.g. Li et al. (2004) , Fleischmann (1993), and Tersine and Barman (1991). Still,
even with rates specified per interval, an expression is needed for providing the
rate on each of the intervals.
We consider transport for LTL-orders for which shippers and carriers deal on
a transactional basis and where commitment does not extend beyond a single or-
der. Demand for transport services originates from shippers who issue orders to a
carrier to transport a specified amount of goods. The carrier assumes the respon-
sibility for the organization of transport and bears the costs. As compensation for
transporting the orders, the carrier charges the shipper a fee for each order, based
on the transport tariff. These tariffs serve to coordinate the usage of the trucks.
Thus, the problem becomes how to impute, in the form of tariffs, the costs and
risks associated with transportation activities to orders issued by the shippers.
Two types of carriage can be distinguished: private and common carriage. A
vendor who owns a fleet of trucks combines the function of shipper and carrier.
This is often called ‘private carriage’ (Hall and Racer, 1995). Determination of the
total costs and profits does not require that costs be imputed to orders. However,
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tariffs can still be used for internal allocation of transport costs to orders. These
can function to optimize transport efficiency and thus minimize the total costs of
transport for the transport service. The opposite of private carriage is ‘common
carriage’. In this case, the shipper and carrier are independent entities. The carrier
assumes the costs and risks related to dispatching the trucks. In return, the carrier
can determine tariffs in such a way that his profits are maximized.
The costs incurred by trucks, which are dispatched on a specific route, are
largely independent of the set of orders that is carried by those trucks. This means
that the carrier’s costs on a specific route are expected to increase as a staircase-
function with the number of trucks dispatched. Therefore, in order to minimize
costs in relation to the service offered, the carrier aims to maximize the utilization
rate of the trucks.
In a non-deterministic setting, the carrier faces uncertainty in the time and size
of order arrivals, especially with independent shippers. When service standards
guarantee delivery of an order within a certain time period, the carrier might be
forced to dispatch partially filled trucks. This brings up the question of what tariffs
a carrier should charge for orders of a specific size in order to fulfill to require-
ments: charge a tariff low enough to entice the shipper to use the transport service
and to charge a tariff high enough to recover at least the costs of the transport-
operation.
When tariffs are imputed such that the carrier recovers his costs, some proper-
ties of the tariff function are expected. We denote by T(q) the tariff charged to an
order of size q, where q is the fraction that an order claims on the truck’s capacity
QF. In order for tariffs to recover the carrier’s costs, assumed to be cF per truck
dispatched, T(q) needs to satisfy T(q) ≥ cF q for at least some order-size q. We
assume that cF = 1 in the remainder of this chapter. A tariff meeting the above
inequality is one where each shipper pays for the costs the truck that is used for the
order, T+(q) = dqe (where dxe equals x rounded up to the next integer). An order
of size q is thus charged the costs for dispatching the number of trucks that fits
the order. Even when no consolidation takes place, the carrier recovers the costs
by charging such tariff. However, the carrier saves costs by consolidating multiple
orders in a truck, enabling him to charge a tariff lower than T+(q). Competitive
pressure from the market is a driving force to confer part of the cost savings from
consolidation on to the shippers.
Two contrasting scenarios for the market conditions for a carrier exist. In a
scenario in which orders arrive relatively infrequently, the probability that multiple
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orders can be combined is small. In the extreme, the costs of the transport activity
becomes independent of the order-size and approaches the function T+(q). On
the other hand, in a scenario where orders arrive frequently, a carrier has ample
opportunity to create efficient shipment quantities by combining multiple orders
in one truck. The cost-impact of an order of size q approaches a linear function
in order-size, when a carrier is so efficient that he realizes near 100% utilization.
This enables the carrier to charge tariffs approaching a tariff that is proportional
to the order-size, T(q) ≈ q. A tariff that covers the carrier’s costs but that is lower
than T(q) = q can only be charged if orders of such order-size are cross-subsidized
by orders of a different size. Opportunities to consolidate are contingent on the
transport service that is offered by the carrier and by the distribution of arrivals
and size of orders to transport.
The aim of this chapter is to find a tariff function T(q) for orders of size q for
a carrier. This tariff function is based on a demand pattern of order arrivals at the
carrier according to a stochastic process and the cost structure of the carrier.
4.3 Review of Transport Cost Literature on a Single
Link
The main decisions of importance with respect to consolidation for increasing
transport efficiency are when and how to dispatch orders (Jackson, 1981). The
tradeoff between dispatching large and efficient shipments and dispatching fre-
quently to curb inventory holding costs has led to studies in which both types of
costs are considered together. In these studies, the functions of the carrier and ship-
per are assumed to be combined, so that order-decisions and the related costs are
in a single hand. The decision strategy is a policy that aims to minimize total costs
by adjusting timing and sizing of shipments. Economies of scale in transportation
then lead to a lot-sizing problem to decide on the size of the orders.
In general, the costs involved with transportation depend not only on the quan-
tity that is transported, but also on the distance that is traveled. To sketch the con-
text of the transport problem on a single link between two points, it is also possible
to combine multiple orders on a delivery route. This ‘milk run’-type of consoli-
dation leads to vehicle routing problems. The complexity implied by the vehicle
routing problem is the reason why much research has focused on simplification of
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the full model by limiting the transportation strategy to direct deliveries. In this
chapter, we focus on understanding the relationship between order-consolidation
and transport tariffs instead of on the routing problem. Therefore, the problem
concentrated on consolidation by accumulating orders over time for transport over
a single origin-destination link.
For deterministic demand, the lot-sizing problem is often approached analyti-
cally by using EOQ-type studies. Hall (1987) presents strategies for consolidation
in inventory, vehicles or terminals. Inventory consolidation is defined as the pro-
cess where items remain in inventory in order to enable consolidation of orders at
dispatch. Blumenfeld et al. (1985) study this by grouping several products together
according to their demand rates in a virtual aggregated product. The economically
optimal quantity is calculated for this aggregated product in order to determine
the lot-size. The consolidation policy is quantity-based: once a certain amount has
accumulated, transport is organized.
Speranza and Ukovich (1994) consider a system where the costs of dispatching
trucks is proportional to the number of trucks that is used. Trucks are scheduled
to be dispatched according to a frequency schedule, which is an example of a
time-based consolidation policy. Clearly, a time-based policy is preferred over a
quantity-based policy when the shipper requires a reliable transportation lead-
time or a guaranteed service level. Only in the case of deterministic demand —as
in the above-mentioned examples— there is a simple relation between quantity-
based and time-based policies.
Çetinkaya et al. (2006) present results from optimal dispatch strategies for con-
solidation over time and quantity within the context of private carriage with stochas-
tic demand (see also Çetinkaya and Lee (2000) and Axsäter (2001)). Both the op-
timal quantity to accumulate before dispatch as well as the optimal dispatch fre-
quency is derived.
Higginson and Bookbinder (1994) use simulation to study the effect of ran-
domness in order arrivals on consolidation decisions. Freight-rate discounts are
used to determine the costs of transport. The costs of time-based, quantity-based
and time-quantity-based policies are compared with each other for several order
arrival processes. Bookbinder and Higginson (2002) build on this by employing
probabilistic modeling to choose the maximum holding time and optimal dispatch
quantity. Optimal time and quantity-policies are derived by Çetinkaya and Book-
binder (2003) for specific order arrival processes. Both private and common car-
riage is considered, where in the case of common carriage, freight-rate discounts
80 Chapter 4. A Model for Transport Tariffs for Single Orders on a Single Link
are used to determine tariffs.
Firms that ship goods regularly on a fixed origin-destination link often have
long-term transport contracts with a carrier. van Norden and van de Velde (2005)
analyze the problem of determining transport lot-sizes to meet demand, while
minimizing the total costs of transportation, inventory-holding costs and ordering
costs. The firm faces a fixed freight-rate to transport up-to a certain amount of
goods. If the quantity of goods that the shipper plans to transport exceeds the
contracted amount, the shipper has to purchase transport capacity at the spot mar-
ket at a higher rate. In this chapter, we do not focus on transport contracts for
fixed quantities, but instead we investigate transport tariffs in the spot-market for
LTL-orders.
A number of studies consider the problem of optimizing the total inventory
holding and transportation costs from the perspective of an independent shipper.
The shipper pays a tariff for each transport order, which he perceives as costs. Ac-
cumulation of orders leads to more efficient transport, but at the costs of increased
inventory holding costs and decreased service level. To study a shipper’s optimal
decision strategy, a relation that describes the shipper’s transport costs as a func-
tion of the order-size is required. Such a tariff function can be constructed from
empirical data or it can be based on theoretical assumptions.
Transport tariffs are often difficult to uncover in practice. Published tariffs of a
carrier often serve only as a starting point for negotiating the price of transporta-
tion services. Langley Jr. (1980) analyzed the effects of several theoretical functional
forms for transport tariffs on the lot-sizing problem. Tersine and Barman (1991)
consider the lot-sizing problem with consolidation opportunities, using detailed
actual tariffs. Fleischmann (1993) uses actual German freight-rates to study the
design of transport networks with economies of scale in transport. Swenseth and
Godfrey (2002) used actual freight-rates to find a fit for the transport costs func-
tion. These fitted tariff functions are used to derive the expected costs in order to
determine the optimal mode of shipment: full-truckload or Less-than-Truckload.
Smith et al. (2007) develop and test a statistical model of revenue from expedited
freight services by regressing revenue on weight and distance related variables.
The empirical data on which the regression has been developed were taken from
actual shipment data of a major North-American carrier. The proposed model for
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monthly revenue on a shipping lane (Model 1 in (Smith et al., 2007)) is
revenue ($) = β0 + β1 (total shipments) + β2 (total weight)
+ β3 (total weight squared) + β4 (total ton-miles)
+ β5 (square of total ton-miles) + β6 (lane distance × total ton-miles) (4.1)
with expectation, statistically accepted, that β1, β2, and β4 are positive and β3, β5,
and β6 are negative based on the observation that there are discounts for shipping
large volumes. The model was found to explain 89% of variance in revenue.
Note that abstracting from distance (miles) related variables reduces the revenue
model to one that is quadratic in weight shipped. The model of Smith et al. (2007)
shows how from weight-distance variables are used to predict aggregate revenue,
summed over shipments, for a particular shipping lane.
Swenseth and Godfrey (1996) analyzed actual transport tariffs from all over the
USA on 40 alternative routes for LTL and TL-transport. Specific functional forms
for transport tariffs were fit to this data. The best fit was found for a rate that in-
creases quadratically in order-size. In this case, the rate per unit freight (T(q)/q =
t(q) decreases proportionally in order-size and is given by
t(q) = a− bq, (4.2)
where a = cF − QFb, in which cF is the costs for a truckload and QF is the size of
a truckload. Constant b is the decrease in rate per unit as the order-size increases.
Swenseth and Godfrey label this tariff function T(q) = q(a− bq), the proportional
tariff function. A good fit with actual tariffs was found for rates per unit that
decrease inversely with the order-size: t(q) = c/q + d. It is called the adjusted
inverse function due to the inverse proportionally decreasing rate plus an offset.
Tariffs in this case are a linear function of order-size with an offset for size zero,
T(q) = c + dq with c, d constants. Both functions are illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Arcelus and Rowcroft (1991) analyzed actual freight-rates for small orders on
routes in Canada and fitted these to a power tariff function, T(q) = aqb, with a, b
suitable constants. Typically, they find b in the order 0.4. Fitting to the same power
tariff function, Tyworth and Zeng (1998) found a good fit for b = 0.67 for some
representative freight-rate data published by major trucking company in 1995. The
power function was also argued by Cheung et al. (2001) as making the best fit to
a tariff based on order-size. Cheung et al. concluded that the best fit was found
for a value b = 0.5, based on a case study of DHL in Hong Kong, where staff
were consulted to find the perceived impacts on the amounts of resources required
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Figure 4.1: Proportional, adjusted inverse and exponential tariff function
for different shipment-weights. Figure 4.1 illustrates the proportional, the adjusted
inverse and the power tariff functions.
A number of intuitively expected properties are common to the three tariff
functions. First, transport rates increase monotonically with increasing order-
size, which prevents shippers from over-declaring orders. Second, transport rates
per unit decrease monotonically as function of order-size, as expected due to
economies of scale. Further, the transport cost functions are expected to be sub-
additive, so that it is never economical for a shipper to split an order into multiple
orders of smaller size. Note that sub-additivity implies that the rate per unit de-
creases as a function of order-size. To summarize, the tariff T(q) that specifies the
rate a shipper pays to a carrier for transporting an order of size q should satisfy the
following properties:
1. Monotonicity of rates: q′ > q ⇒ T(q′) ≥ T(q). This property states that the
rate can be assumed to increase in the size of the order.
2. Monotonicity of rate per unit: q′ > q ⇒ t(q′) ≤ t(q). This property states
that the rate per unit can be assumed to decrease in the size of the order, as
expected by economies of scale.
3. Subadditivity: T(q + q′) ≤ T(q) + T(q′). This property states that for a ship-
per it does not make sense to declare an order of size q + q′ as two separate
orders, one of size q and one of size q′. In terms tariff per unit, subadditivity
states that t(q+ q′) ≤ qq+q′ t(q) + q
′
q+q′ t(q
′), implying that the second property
of decreasing rates per unit is satisfied.
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Figure 4.1 illustrates that tariffs for orders of small order-size for both the pro-
portional and the exponential tariff function are relatively high. This property is
expected in real tariffs, since an order of small order-size necessitates the use of a
truck, but the probability to use the remaining space in a truck with another order
is less than one. For orders above half the truck size, the proportional and expo-
nential tariff increase in a similar fashion, with tariffs below the tariff of the inverse
proportional function. The inverse proportional tariff displays a property that is
expected for orders which are close to the size of a truckload. In this case, the prob-
ability that the remaining space in the truck can be used to transport another order
decreases rapidly to zero. As a result, a tariff that is close to the tariff for full-truck
is expected to be rated for orders with order-size close to the truck’s capacity. In
conclusion, the exponential and proportional tariffs are expected to describe tariffs
well in markets where few small orders dominate, while the inverse proportional
might be better suited in markets of many orders, both small and larger.
The literature above shows that many researchers have ascertained the shape
and properties of transport tariffs based on actual tariffs in the market. However,
few researchers seem to have addressed the question from a theoretical perspective
as to what determines the structure and shape of the tariff function. The topic of
allocating the costs of transport to specific customers is gaining interest. The au-
thors of a working paper, Özener et al. (2010), argue that assessing the cost-to-serve
of customers is of value when setting prices, targeting prospective customers, pri-
oritizing deliveries, or revisiting routing/quantity decisions. The authors propose
several cost allocation methods to determine the cost-to-serve for customers and
show empirically that our proposed methods perform significantly better than the
proportional allocation schemes typically used in practice as these schemes ignore
the synergies among customers.
We distinguish tariffs in the case of private carriage and tariffs in the case of
common carriage. In the case of private carriage, we assume that there is a supply
chain coordinator who lacks the ability to fully control transport decisions, but who
has the capacity to determine transport tariffs. In Section 4.5, we discuss how these
tariffs are a result of allocating the shared costs for transport to individual orders.
In the case of common carriage, where carrier and shipper are independent, we
assume that the carrier sets the tariffs such that his expected profits are maximized.
This is discussed in Section 4.6. The generic framework for the carrier’s operations
of transporting and consolidating orders is described first.
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4.4 Model Framework and Assumptions
4.4.1 Introduction
We consider a carrier who does business with a shipper on a transactional basis.
The carrier transports LTL-orders from the shipper, for which the shipper pays a
tariff to the carrier. The carrier determines and publishes the tariffs for performing
transport services. The transport tariffs depend on the demand pattern for trans-
port orders and on the cost structure and organization of transport by the carrier.
The cost-impact of an order depends on the other orders with which the order can
be combined. Shippers however, have no information on the status of order-arrivals
at the carrier. We further assume that the demand pattern for transport and the
carrier’s cost structure do not depend on time.
4.4.2 Transportation Service
The transportation service considered is that of transportation on a single lane
from location A to location B. Service standards are assumed to guarantee delivery
of an order within a certain time after submission of the order. We assume that
the service guarantee is implemented through a timetable of dispatches published
by the carrier: each transportation order is promised to be carried out at the first
timetable’s dispatch time subsequent to the time of submission of the order. Such
a transportation policy is referred to by Bookbinder and Higginson (2002) as a
"time policy" or "scheduled shipping policy", in contrast with a "quantity policy"
which states that shipping occurs when the volume of orders accumulated exceeds
a certain threshold. Note that under a time policy a carrier may have to dispatch
lowly filled trucks to comply with the published schedule of dispatches.
To reflect the carrier’s uncertainty regarding transport orders, transport orders
are assumed to arrive according to a stochastic process at the carrier. At a dispatch
time, all orders that have accumulated are shipped: the system renews at each
dispatch event. Without loss of generality, we take the time interval between two
dispatch events to be 1 time unit. The problem that we consider is illustrated in
Figure 4.2. In between two dispatch epochs, orders accumulate into an order-pool
where they accumulate at the collection point of a carrier A. At a dispatch epoch
on a regular time schedule, the carrier initiates transport of all orders that have
accumulated in the order-pool. The orders are packed into the necessary number
of trucks and transported to the destination at point B. The carrier charges a rate
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the problem that is considered: orders from shippers
accumulate at the carrier in A. The carrier consolidates the orders that are available
in trucks and transports these to the destination B according to a regular time
schedule.
to shippers as compensation for the carrier’s risks.
The activity of collecting orders and consolidating these to dispatch trucks is the
business of the carrier. Trucks are packed efficiently, such that the smallest number
of trucks is used. There are sufficient trucks available to transport the entire order-
pool. All trucks are identical. The capacity is measured in units of order-size.
Therefore, the optimal packing of orders in trucks becomes a one-dimensional bin-
packing problem.
4.4.3 Cost structure Carrier
The costs that the carrier incurs for organizing transport is comprised of fixed costs
and costs related to the distance traveled and the load transported. The fixed costs
are costs for among others depreciation, salaries, administration and information
technology. These cannot be altered by the carrier’s operational decisions. There-
fore, we focus on the costs that are relevant to the carrier’s dispatch decisions. Such
costs are related to the trip, such as mileage, costs of fuel, wages, and wear and
tear of trucks. These costs depend only to a small extent on the actual load inside a
truck. Neglecting the effect of actual load and given that only transport on a single
link between origin and destination is considered, the costs of each truck that is
dispatched is a constant. For every dispatch, the resulting number of trucks that
is deployed for the dispatch determines the costs of the carrier. As a result, the
carrier’s costs becomes a step-wise increasing function, dependent on the number
of trucks deployed.
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The number of trucks that is needed at a dispatch epoch depends on all orders
in the order-pool, since orders may or may not fit in a truck, depending on the
complete set of orders. This implies that the carrier’s costs are a function of the
orders in the order-pool. These costs cannot be expressed as a linear combination
of costs per order. Our interest lies in the tariff that the carrier charges as a function
of order-size.
4.4.4 Determination of Tariffs
Tariffs are levied to coordinate the use of transport means. Tariffs reflect the cost-
impact of an order on the carrier. Therefore, to distinguish between orders of
different size that put larger or smaller claims on the transport capacity, the rate
this is charged is a function of order-size. The tariff-function depends on the cost
structure of the carrier, the organization of transport by the carrier and the order
arrival pattern or market for transport orders. Further, in determining tariffs, the
carrier can decide if the tariffs are merely reflecting the cost-impact, or if the tariffs
are such that the carrier’s profits are maximal. To facilitate comparing tariffs, all
tariffs are expressed in units of the carrier’s costs per truck-ride.
In the case of private carriage, tariffs can be used to optimize cost performance.
In such a setting, the carrier’s transport costs are allocated to individual orders.
We consider the expected additional costs of an extra order, the Shapley value of
orders and allocation by proportion of order-size to the order-pool.
In the case of common carriage, the carrier aims for profit maximization. Ship-
pers can decide to offer transport orders to the carrier or find an alternate carrier.
We assume that shippers are able to hire a full truck at a tariff equal to the car-
rier’s costs per truck-ride. This puts an upper bound on the tariff that a carrier can
charge. We determine the resulting tariffs for such a carrier.
Numerous shippers issue orders for transportation service. To model demand
risk, the number and size of the arriving orders in a dispatch period is taken
stochastic. Orders are assumed to arrive according to a compound Poisson pro-
cess with rate λ and Gamma distributed order-size. The Γ(α, β) distribution is
skewed to small orders by choosing a small α. Comparison to data from medium
sized package industry as well as to other real world data demonstrate that such
an order-arrival process and order-size distribution represents LTL-orders well (see
Higginson and Bookbinder (1994) and Bookbinder and Higginson (2002)).
The detailed models to determine tariffs proved too difficult to analyze analyt-
ically. Therefore, we resort to simulation by computer. The simulation proceeds as
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follows. Realizations of the order pool are generated in accordance with the spec-
ified probabilities. For each realization, a principle is applied to derive at the cost
impact of each order, in order arrive at a cost allocation or implied profit. Averages
are computed to arrive at the resulting tariff. In the case of profit maximization,
this is done after carrying out a maximization. Details of the simulation process
are discussed in Appendix A.
For the order arrivals, we consider 3× 2 = 6 scenarios consisting of three levels
for the arrival intensity and two choices for the order size distribution as specified
in Table 4.1. We use two Gamma distributed order-size distributions in the simu-
lation experiments: a distribution with predominantly small orders, (Γ(2, 1.2) with
average order-size 2.4) and one with medium-sized orders (Γ(2, 5), average order-
size 10). Both distributions are realistic to model LTL-transport for a truck of ca-
pacity QF = 20. The order-arrival rates is varied between λ = 1,λ = 2, and λ = 10.
As mentioned before, the order-size q is the fraction of the truck’s capacity that is
used (so q ∈ [1/QF, 2/QF, · · · , 1]) and the tariff is normalized to the tariff of a
full truck. For details on the simulation study and the derivation of the transport
tariffs, see Appendix A.
Table 4.1: Scenarios for order arrivals. Under each scenario the truck’s capacity is
QF = 20. Scenarios with Γ(2, 1, 2) are ‘small’ order size scenarios and those with
Γ(2, 5) are ‘medium’ order size scenarios.
arrival size average average
intensity distribution order size pool size
per dispatch period Γ(α, β) α β λ α β
1 Γ(2, 1.2) 2.4 2.4
1 Γ(2, 5) 10 10
2 Γ(2, 1.2) 2.4 4.8
2 Γ(2, 5) 10 20
10 Γ(2, 1.2) 2.4 24
10 Γ(2, 5) 10 100
The following two sections give the descriptions of the models and simulations
with additional, formal details supplied in Appendices A.1 and A.2.
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4.5 Tariffs by Cost Allocation
In this section, we determine transport tariffs by allocating the total costs of trans-
port to each order. The shipper and the carrier cooperate in a system with a supply
chain coordinator who knows the carrier’s cost structure and the demand patterns
for transport orders. This knowledge is used to derive the expected transport costs
and to set transport tariffs. The tariffs are determined by allocating the expected
costs to individual orders: the transportation costs are thus internalized by the
shipper function. The tariffs induce shippers to issue orders such that the usage of
the transport resources is economical.
The most common and logical method to allocate transport costs to orders is
based on the size of an order. The size of an order may be expressed in terms
of weight, volume, or a combination of both. However, the transport costs of a
carrier depend on the combination of all orders with their specific order-size that
arrive in the order pool. We can illustrate this by assessing the additional costs
of an order that just arrives at the carrier. No extra costs are incurred when the
order-size is such that it fits into the available space of one of the trucks that are
anyway planned for transporting the order-pool at dispatch-time. Alternatively,
if the size of the arrived order does not fit into the remaining space, it may be
that the order necessitates the use of an extra truck to transport all orders. In that
case, the additional costs equal the costs of a complete truck-ride. The result of
the dependence of the costs to transport an order on the entire order pool is that
the carrier’s transport costs are not simply separable in order-size. This makes
determining transport tariffs complex. If transportation costs would have been
separable in order-sizes, the cost increment for adding an order to the pool would
be independent of the existing pool and in that case, costs may be allocated to
an order based on its share in the pool. When costs are not separable in order-
size –as is the case in this problem–, no straightforward logic exists for allocating
transport costs to order-size. Additional rules or principles are needed to arrive at
an allocation of the carrier’s costs to individual orders in order to derive a tariff.
4.5.1 Principles of Cost Allocation
Allocation of costs can be based on various grounds: by volume, weight, number
of items, timing of arrival etc. The purpose of cost allocation can be optimization of
resource utilization or some acceptable or ‘fair’ distribution of cost. Therefore, any
type of cost allocation is essentially ambiguous. The problem of allocating shared
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costs under cooperation is addressed in game-theory. Billera and Heath (1982)
describe the general problem of allocating shared costs. The problem that we have
here is a cooperative game for which the costs of transporting the order-pool need
to be allocated to individual orders. A number of requirements for the allocation
procedure, which are stated in game-theory, are applicable to our situation. We
restate some requirements here in relation to the transport case. First, the carrier
has to recover the costs for transportation. Therefore, the allocation should be such
that the sum of the tariffs charged to each order adds up to the total costs at least.
Second, published tariffs should be symmetrical, meaning that the tariff for an
order is independent of the sequence in which orders arrive.
We analyze three mechanisms of allocating costs: marginal allocation, Shapley
value and semi proportional allocation. Based on a simulation study, we show the
resulting tariffs for these allocation mechanisms.
A number of requirements for the allocation principle, also frequently stated in
game theory, are applicable to our situation. First, the carrier has to recover the
costs for transportation, therefore, the allocation should be such that the sum of
the rates charged to orders at least add up to the total costs on average. Second,
published tariffs should be symmetrical, meaning that the rate for an order is in-
dependent of the state of the order pool at the time of submission of the order.
Only the order’s size, not its timing, may be input to the rate applied. Below three
precise allocation principles will be considered in more detail, the marginal costs,
the Shapley value, and the semi-proportional principle. In each case computations
are founded on considerations of the costs impact of adding an order to an existing
order pool. For a realization of the order pool O = (q1, · · · , q|O|) we compute the
separate impact of the k-th order being of size q as
τk(O, q) =
Ntruck((q1, . . . , qk−1, qk))− Ntruck((q1, . . . , qk−1)) if q = qk0 if q 6= qk . (4.3)
Note that the allocation τ is efficient in that Ntruck(O) = ∑|O|k=1 τk(O, qk).
We add to the requirement of cost recovery to the properties that were found
from literature in Section 4.3. Then, transport tariff functions for LTL-orders are
expected to satisfy:
1. transport rates increase monotonically with increasing order-size
2. transport rates per unit decrease monotonically as function of order-size
3. transport rates are sub-additive
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4. transport rates sum up to at least the carrier’s costs.
These properties are assessed for each cost-allocation mechanism.
4.5.2 Expected Marginal Transport Costs
Marginal cost allocation might be used when the aim is to consider and optimize
for the total system. The transport tariff in the case of marginal costs is determined
at dispatch time by the additional costs for transporting an extra order of size q
on top of the costs for transporting the orders that had already accumulated in
the order-pool. When the additional order fits into a partially filled truck that was
already scheduled for other orders, then no additional costs apply. Otherwise, the
costs of the required extra truck is charged to the order.
Figure 4.3 shows the tariffs derived from marginal transport cost analysis for
different order-arrival rates as a result of a simulation study. The arrival-rate is
varied between 0.1 and 10, but plotted here are only the tariffs for arrival rates
λ = 1, λ = 2 and λ = 10 order arrivals per time unit. The graph on the left of the
figure shows results for orders drawn from the small-order distribution, while the
orders in the right graph are drawn from the medium-size order-distribution.
The graphs show that the arrival rate strongly affects the tariff that is charged
for orders of small order-size. When the arrival rate λ = 10, the tariff for small
orders is almost zero, while in the case of a small arrival rate, the tariff for small
orders is greater than zero. The reason for this is that when other trucks are dis-
patched, the probability that such small order can be combined is high, resulting
in marginal costs close to zero. On the other hand, when the order-pool is empty,
any additional order causes the need to deploy a truck to transport it. Therefore,
the expected marginal tariff for the smallest order equals the costs of a truck-ride,
weighted by the probability that no orders arrive. We discuss tariffs for the smallest
order in more detail later in Section 4.7.2.
The slope of the tariff function differs for different order arrival rates. The tar-
iff for a small arrival rate is relatively insensitive to the size of an order for small
orders. The functional form of such tariff shows some similarity to the carrier’s
step-function of costs. For a high arrival rate however, the tariff depends strongly
on the order-size. This is due to the increased opportunities to consolidate orders
when many orders arrive, with the average utilization rate rising as a result. This
causes the marginal costs for an extra order to approach a function that is increas-
ing linearly in order-size.
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Figure 4.3: Expected marginal transport rates as function of order-size for different
order arrival rates.
The difference between the graph with small order distribution and medium-
sized orders is most prominent for λ = 1 and λ = 2. In the left graph, the distribu-
tion of the order-size is narrow with small average order-size. With one expected
arrival per dispatch period, the size of the order-pool that is transported has aver-
age size 2.4. Therefore, the probability that one additional order can be combined
in the same truck at no extra costs is high. As a result, the tariff function for low
order-arrival rates in the left graph increases relatively slowly as long as the order-
size is small. Tariffs start to increase sharply only for large orders, when the size
of the combined orders exceeds the truck’s capacity. In the right graph, the distri-
bution of order-sizes is wider with bigger average size than in the case on the left.
This reduces the probability that an additional order can be combined for free into
any deployed truck. As a result, the tariffs are higher and the dependence of the
tariff on the size of the additional order is stronger.
For arrival rate λ = 10, the difference between the functional shape in the left
and right graph is not as distinct. The reason is that when many orders arrive
in between two dispatch epochs, the distribution of order-size of the accumulated
order-pool widens. This diminishes the effect of the order-size of an individual
order, which explains the similarity in the shape of the tariff function between
between the small and the medium order-size.
A problem with marginal cost pricing is that orders are cross-subsidized. In this
case, the marginal costs of an order of certain size are less than the fraction such
order claims of the truck capacity. Another problem is that when all orders are
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Figure 4.4: Expected Shapley transport rates as a function of order-size for different
arrival rates.
charged at their marginal costs, the sum of these tariffs is not necessarily sufficient
to recover the transport costs of the carrier. Further, tariffs based on this are not
necessarily sub-additive. A commonly used alternative to marginal cost-pricing is
allocation based on the Shapley value. Tariffs based on the Shapley value do sum
up to the total of the carrier’s transport costs. Costing based on the Shapley value
is discussed in the next section.
4.5.3 Expected Shapley Value for Transport Costs
The Shapley value is a concept that originates from game theory. The Shapley
value is one way to determine the gains that can be associated with each player
in coalitional game. Consider all coalitions a player could form and calculate the
gains the player would get in each coalition. The Shapley value is determined as
the average of the gains of all possible permutations of coalitions possible (Peters,
1992, page 194). In the context of transport tariffs, the Shapley value is calculated
as the weighted marginal costs for each order that is part of the order-pool over all
possible order arrival sequences.
Tariffs that are derived based on the Shapley value are displayed in Figure 4.4.
The functional form of the Shapley tariffs is similar to that of the marginal tariffs,
especially for the graph with medium orders. This is because orders of widely
varying size are shipped which reduces the averaging effect of the Shapley value
compared to marginal tariffs. For small orders, with a narrow order-size distri-
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bution, the functional shape of the Shapley tariffs appears less extreme compared
to the marginal tariffs. Even though tariffs for some order-sizes are still cross-
subsidized by other orders, the Shapley tariffs dampen this effect. Comparison of
the tariff for the marginal and Shapley allocation at q = 0.8 and λ = 1 shows that
the tariff function in case of Shapley tariffs deviates less from the strictly propor-
tional tariff (T(q) = q) compared to the marginal cost pricing of Figure 4.3.
However, Shapley tariffs are not necessarily sub-additive, meaning that under
this tariff, it might be economical for shippers to split a large order into multi-
ple orders of smaller size. An example of an allocation method that results in
sub-additive tariffs is when costs are allocated according to a semi-proportional
allocation rule.
4.5.4 Semi-proportional Transport Cost Allocation
In the case of semi-proportional allocation, each order is charged a fraction of the
carrier’s transport costs, proportional to the ratio of its order-size to the size of the
order-pool, but never exceeding the costs of a full truck. Orders of large order-
size have the highest risk that their proportional share would exceed the costs of
a full truck. Therefore, to ensure that the carrier recovers the costs, we proceed as
follows. First, orders in the order-pool are sorted from large to small order-size.
After that, a fraction of the costs is allocated to the largest order. This fraction is
the minimum of the proportion of the size of the order to the size of the order-pool
and the costs of one truck. Subsequently, a proportional share of the remaining
costs over the remaining order-pool is allocated to the next largest order. This is
repeated until the total costs are recovered.
Tariffs that are based on the semi proportional cost allocation method for dif-
ferent order-arrival rates are shown in Figure 4.5. In case of small distributed
order-size and low arrival-rate, the occurrence of large order-size in the order-pool
becomes very rare. As a result, the standard deviation between replications in-
creases, explaining why the graph is not smooth in this region. It is expected that
the cost function in this region turns out to continue smoothly if the simulation
would continue until sufficient of such occurrences are generated.
The slope of the tariff function for large orders approaches zero, meaning that
large orders of size near the truck’s capacity are charged the costs of a truck’s
dispatch, as observed in practice. This is caused by the low probability for the
carrier of making economic use of the remaining space in a truck for such large
orders.
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Figure 4.5: Expected semi-proportional transport rates as function of order-size for
different order arrival rates
Table 4.2: Overview of expected properties for different cost-allocation transport
tariff functions.
Tariff Property marginal Shapley semi-proportional
Monotonically increasing rate + + +
Recover total costs - + +
Sub-additivity - - +
Monotonically decreasing rate per unit - - +
Table 4.2 summarizes for the assessed cost-allocation methods the expected
properties. The marginal cost-allocation only satisfies the requirement that the
tariff is non-decreasing. The tariff based on Shapley values also satisfies the re-
quirement that orders of one size are not cross subsidizing other orders. Further,
the sum of Shapley rates add up to the total transport costs. Finally, the semi-
proportional cost-allocation satisfies the requirement of sub-additivity on top of
the other requirements. The semi-proportional cost-allocation method functions as
an acceptable method to determine transport tariffs based on cost-allocation.
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4.6 Tariffs by Profit Maximization
4.6.1 Profit Maximization Tariffs: Theoretical Model
In the situation of common carriage, where carrier and shipper are independent
businesses, we consider a carrier who aims to maximize profits from transport
services. The carrier determines the tariff T(q) for shipping orders of size q. The
shipper has a choice to offer orders to the carrier or not, based on the tariff. The
shipper can organize transport differently if he decides that the tariff is too high: he
can go to another carrier or organize the transport himself. The fraction of orders
that shippers submit to the carrier, f (q), is a function of the order-size and tariff.
The a priori probability that an available order has size equal to q is φ(q). There-
fore, since the order-arrival rate is λ, orders of size q emerge with rate λq = λφ(q).
The rate of orders that a shipper submits to the carrier is λq f (q).
The fraction of orders that is submitted to a carrier depends on the transport
tariff. For a tariff T(q) ≥ 1, the shipper submits no orders as it becomes more
economical to hire a truck from another source. When the carrier’s utilization
rate is 100%, the cost per order is q. It is not possible to achieve lower costs per
order without cross-subsidizing orders. Therefore, when a carrier charges a tariff
T(q) ≤ q, shippers decide to submit all the orders that they have to such carrier.
We assume that the submitted fraction on T(q) = [q, 1] decreases exponentially
with constant α to model the sensitivity of the tariffs on the market. The factor α
in the exponent represents the shipper’s utility. For a shipper who can afford to
be price-sensitive —possibly due to strong competitive forces between carriers—
the constant α is greater than one. In that case, tariffs are expected to approach
T(q) = q. On the other hand, in a market that is dominated by carriers, so α ≤ 1
shippers might have little choice but to accept the tariff that the carrier sets.
In summary, given that an arrived order has size q, the proportion of orders
that are submitted, f (q), is modeled as:
f (q) =

1 if T(q) ≤ q(
1−T(q)
1−q
)α
if q < T(q) ≤ 1
0 if T(q) > 1.
(4.4)
The expected size of the order-pool, Qtot, that has arrived between two dispatch
events (inter-dispatch time is 1 time unit) is
Qtot =∑
q
f (q)λq q.
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The expected revenues R(λ, T(q)) for the carrier are calculated by summing the
revenues for orders of size q
R(λ, T(q)) =∑
q
T(q) f (q)λq. (4.5)
With C(λ, T(q)) the expected costs, the carrier’s expected profit can be calcu-
lated. Maximization of the expected profit Π∗ results in the following problem
Π∗ = max
T(q)
Π(λ, T(q)) = max
T(q)
(R(λ, T(q))− C(λ, T(q)))
The carrier’s costs depend on the order arrival rates as well as tariffs. In general,
the costs are not separable in order-size, as the submission rate of orders of certain
size affects the efficiency with which other orders are packed and shipped.
However, assume for the moment that the carrier’s cost function can be approx-
imated by a function linear in total quantity shipped, with proportionality constant
c. In this case, there are no economies of scale in order quantity and therefore the
expected costs and profits are separable in q:
Π(λ, T(q)) =∑
q
(
T(q) f (q)λq − cq f (q)λq
)
. (4.6)
Maximization of the expected profit leads to a maximization problem for each
q ∈ [1/QF, 2/QF, · · · , 1]. When this is solved, the optimal tariffs T∗(q) are
T∗(q) = min
(
max
(
1+ αcq
1+ α
, q
)
, 1
)
(4.7)
Figure 4.6 shows the optimal tariffs for some values of c and linear price-
sensitivity for the shipper, α = 1. When the stepwise increasing function of costs
in number of trucks is approximated by the linearly increasing costs function, the
constant c needs to be c ≥ 1. The special case of c = 1 occurs when all trucks are
filled to their capacity, which in general does not occur, due to the uncertainty in
order arrivals. The resulting tariffs for this linear approximation of the carrier’s
cost function are strictly increasing in order-size and piecewise concave. The rate
(p/q) decreases monotonically. When the shipper’s response to the price changes
(α), the tariff at q = 0 changes ( T(0) = 1/(1 + α)): when the shipper is sensitive
to the price (α large), the carrier is forced to set tariffs near to T(q) = q. When
the shipper is not price-sensitive (α small), the carrier can charge higher tariffs for
orders of small size.
4.6. Tariffs by Profit Maximization 97
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
ta
ri
ff
q
c = 0
c = 1
c = 2
c = 5
Figure 4.6: Optimal transport tariffs for separable costs and α = 1.
4.6.2 Simulation results, Common carriage
The tariffs in the case of common carriage, with a carrier optimizing for maximum
profits are derived by simulation. Due to the computational issues, the truck-size
is limited to QF = 6, but as before, the order-size is normalized in the results. The
other settings remain unchanged. Figure 4.7 on the left shows the tariff functions
for the case of λ = 10 arrivals per time unit and the small order-size distribution.
The crosses in the graph show all rates that were tried in order to determine the
maximal expected profits. The standard deviation between replications is below
1%.
Figure 4.7 on the right shows the optimal tariffs for varying order arrival rates.
The occurrence of order-arrivals for λ = 1 becomes so rare that the standard devi-
ation between replications increases to up to 10%. The exact shape of these tariff
functions therefore is uncertain, but the general trend that these tariffs approach
the carrier’s step function of costs is clear. The expected profit per dispatch is listed
in Table 4.3
Table 4.3: The expected profit per dispatch for several order arrival rates.
λ Π(λ)
0.1 0.001
1 0.005
10 0.886
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Figure 4.7: Derivation of optimal tariffs in the case of common carriage. Crosses
indicate trial rates.
4.7 Discussion on Transport Tariffs
Efficiency gains in the fields of managing inventories, logistics between companies
and production planning are typically found as a result of cooperation. For both
the vendor and the buyer, enhanced cooperation impacts the management of in-
ventories as well as the organization of transporting goods from vendor to buyer.
When a vendor and buyer decide to cooperate, the information flow improves
and the leverage for making decisions in which constraints and circumstances of
both parties are taken into account increases. This creates opportunities in mak-
ing processes such as transport more efficient. In order to assess the potential of
opportunities and alternatives to organize transportation more efficiently, it is es-
sential to have a method for estimating the impact of this on the costs and service
for transport. In this chapter, we study consolidation of multiple orders in a truck
on a single link. Orders are of of size Less-Than-a-Truck-Loads (LTL). We derive
transport tariffs for such orders for the situation of both private as well as common
carriage. We show that tariffs with practically required and expected properties
can be derived based on a relatively simple model.
4.7.1 Tariff Comparison
In the case of private carriage, transport tariffs are the result of allocating the car-
rier’s costs of transport to orders. We have considered three allocation mechanisms:
marginal, Shapley and semi-proportional allocation of costs. The plots in Figure 4.8
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of tariffs for private carriage, based on three cost allocation
mechanisms. λ = 1 Arrival per time-unit.
show a comparison for these three tariff functions. The marginal tariffs are lower
than the Shapley tariffs for all order-sizes. This is because in the case of marginal
tariffs, only the marginal costs of the last order are considered, while for the Shap-
ley tariffs the average of many marginal costs is used. In the case of proportional
tariffs, costs are allocated according to a different principle. Therefore, the func-
tional shape differs and these tariffs are lower compared to Shapley tariffs for low
order-size, but more expensive when the order-size is greater.
The semi proportional tariff fulfils best the requirements for allocating shared
costs that we discussed in section 4.5.1. Indeed, the total costs of transport are re-
covered using these tariffs. Further, the tariffs are symmetrical in the order-arrival
sequence. Tariffs that are based on the semi-proportional allocation are strictly in-
creasing in order-size. Further, the numerically derived tariffs are concave, mean-
ing that the tariffs reflect economies of scale in order-size. Furthermore, the tariff
function is sub-additive which means that it is not efficient to split an order into
multiple smaller orders.
4.7.2 Tariffs for Small Orders
All tariffs show a strong dependence on the order arrival rate when the order-sizes
of orders is small. In Figure 4.9, the minimum tariffs for infinitesimally small order-
size are plotted in detail. A carrier can ship an order of the smallest size at zero
costs when there is already a commitment to dispatch a truck. Only when no other
100 Chapter 4. A Model for Transport Tariffs for Single Orders on a Single Link
2 4 6 8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
ta
ri
ff
(0
)
arrival rate
marginal
Shapley
semi prop
P(0 arrival)
Figure 4.9: Comparison of tariffs for different cost allocation methods for the small-
est order size. This is derived by extrapolation of the derived tariff functions to
approach 0.
orders arrived during a dispatch period does a small order trigger the need to de-
ploy a truck. Therefore, the theoretical marginal tariff for such order is the costs of
a truck, weighted by the probability that no orders arrive. Indeed, for the marginal
costs allocation tariff, the tariff equals this value. This tariff serves as a lower bound
for small-order tariffs. In the case of the Shapley tariff, where the tariff is based on
the expected marginal costs for an order averaged over all order-sequences, the car-
rier’s costs for deploying a truck is shared between the orders. As a consequence,
the tariff function is always higher compared to marginal tariffs. In the case of the
proportionally allocated costs, the tariff for small orders is in between the marginal
and Shapley tariff. The reason is that the proportional allocation function allocates
a smaller fraction of the costs to small orders, compared to Shapley tariffs.
4.7.3 Cooperation
The focus of many arrangements for cooperation between a vendor and a buyer
is to improve the organization of logistics operations between them. Take for ex-
ample the case of Vendor Managed Inventories, in which case the vendor manages
a buyer’s inventory. Because of this, rather than shipping when the buyer sends
a purchase order, the vendor decides when and how much to ship to the buyer,
in an efficient manner as discussed in the literature of Chapter 3. Many stud-
ies (Çetinkaya and Lee (2000), Cachon (2001a), Disney et al. (2003)) assume that
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the shipper’s costs for transport depend stepwise on the number of trucks that is
deployed. When a shipper requests transport for an order of size less than a truck-
load, the tariff often is less than that of a truckload. This is why we argue that
the tariff that a shipper is charged depends on the quantity that is shipped. As a
consequence, the actual savings on transportation costs that a vendor can achieve
by implementing VMI are less than what is commonly argued in literature.
By implementing VMI, the biggest transportation cost savings from consolida-
tion can be achieved by a vendor who is currently using private carriage. When
common carriage is used, part of the efficiency gains that VMI enable are already
achieved by consolidating multiple orders from the market.

Chapter 5
Incentive Alignment and
Inventory Capacity
In general, a problem in shifting decision authority under advanced supply-chain
collaboration arrangements is that the decisions that one party makes, may affect
the other party’s costs. As defined in Section 2.1, a buyer in a true VMI arrange-
ment faces holding costs for inventory that is placed at the buyer, under authority
of the vendor. In order to maintain some form of control over these costs, the buyer
tends to enforce financial compensation for costs incurred by him or control over
boundary conditions within which the vendor manages operations. An example of
this is a buyer who determines minimum and maximum inventory levels for the
buyer’s inventory that is managed by the vendor under VMI.
In this chapter, we investigate a VMI arrangement in which the vendor assumes
responsibility for the buyer’s inventory management. The buyer retains some con-
trol over supply-chain decisions by determining the inventory storage-capacity that
is available to the vendor, by setting minimum and maximum inventory levels. This
is often used to protect product availability (see Fry et al. (2001), Kaipia et al. (2002),
Disney and Towill (2003a), Claassen et al. (2008)). The minimum and maximum
levels determine a bandwidth within which the vendor maintains the inventory
level. The level of trust between the buyer and the vendor affects the difference
between the minimum and maximum inventory levels. Parties aiming for repeat
business can be expected to refrain from gaming by strategically timing demand
or shipments (Claassen et al., 2008).
The vendor uses trucks of limited capacity for the transportation of products
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to the buyer. The vendor offers incentives for the buyer to influence the buyer’s
decisions. We characterize how such incentives from vendor to buyer contingent
on the bandwidth of allowable inventory can function to coordinate supply-chain
decisions. The effects of the inventory bandwidth on the vendor’s and buyer’s
operational decisions and costs are investigated in order to assess the value of this
bandwidth to the supply chain. We consider two scenarios: an altruistic vendor,
aiming to coordinate decisions for optimal supply-chain performance, and a selfish
vendor, aiming to minimize the vendor’s costs only.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss the litera-
ture on mechanisms to distribute the benefits of cooperation among supply chain
partners.
This chapter is organized as follows. We present a general introduction in in-
centive alignment in supply chains in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 gives an overview
of the literature on incentive alignment in supply chains. This discussion is built
on general principles regarding supply chain coordination. These principles func-
tion as a guide to understand the effects of our proposed coordination mechanism
based on inventory bandwidth at the buyer. Section 5.3 deals with modeling a
VMI setting in which the buyer determines the maximum inventory level while
the vendor determines the delivery of goods to the buyer. We develop an exact
iterative algorithm to determine the vendor’s optimal replenishment policy for the
dyad under consideration, given the inventory bandwidth. We investigate how in-
centive alignment can coordinate supply chain decisions in Section 5.4. Numerical
examples are used to gain insight in the resulting coordination of the supply chain
under an altruistic and a selfish vendor. Based on this analysis, we draw conclu-
sions about the coordination of the supply chain under different VMI constraints
in Section 5.5.
5.1 Incentive Alignment in Supply Chains
The conceptual model of Chapter 3 shows how advanced collaboration arrange-
ments can lead to various cost savings. The primary mechanisms behind cost
savings with collaboration arrangements such as VMI is that the party in the sup-
ply chain who bears the cost consequences of a particular operational policy is the
party who decides, sets and executes this operational policy. This contrasts the
conventional supply-chain arrangement in which the buyer has the lead in making
operational decisions by deciding on when and how much is ordered at each time-
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period, while the vendor fulfils these requests by delivering the ordered goods
within agreed standards of service. To meet such standards, the vendor can make
provisions by establishing flexibility in production, transportation, and/or storage
of finished goods. These provisions come at a cost. In this way, the buyer’s pattern
of ordering decisions imposes costs on the vendor. In order to have a sustainable
partnership between buyer and vendor, these costs are —implicitly or explicitly—
factored into the price that is charged by the vendor. Often, these costs are part of
the agreed upon price per unit paid by the buyers.
Even though the price per unit may involve discounts offered on annual vol-
umes, it rarely incorporates details of the buyer’s order pattern. Buyers only receive
indirect and partial feedback on the cost impact of their ordering strategy. As a con-
sequence, the buyers’ ordering decisions do not fully factor in the vendor’s costs.
Such a vendor-buyer setting does not lead to perfect supply chain coordination,
i.e. coordination that achieves the lowest-cost solution for the vendor-buyer supply
chain dyad. An operating arrangement in which responsibilities are rearranged to
match cost implications more closely opens up the opportunity to improve the co-
ordination of supply chain operations and to close the gap to perfect supply chain
coordination.
The type of coordination sought should be such that unwanted ‘gaming’ effects
are discouraged. Gaming effects can adversely affect the total costs in a supply
chain when a member of the supply chain reduces his private expenses by im-
posing more than the expense reduction as extra costs to the rest of the supply
chain. Coordination mechanisms close the gap between operational decisions that
are made in a conventional supply-chain arrangement and operational decisions
made in a perfectly coordinated, centrally controlled, supply chain. Perfect supply
chain coordination for supply chain partners leads to a set of operational decisions
for which total supply chain costs are minimal. The benefits that arise as a result
of the coordinating contract may be shared among the supply chain partners.
As discussed in Chapter 2, the bargaining power of one firm in relation to other
firms significantly impacts agreements on supply chain arrangements between two
parties, and with that the deviation from a conventional supply-chain arrange-
ment. Other elements that influence the operating arrangement are considerations
of a strategic nature. Another aspect to take into account regarding supply chain
collaboration is the effort involved in administrating the arrangement. Despite the
importance of each of these considerations, economic feasibility of the operating
arrangement is expected to be prominent. In this line, the focus of this chapter
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lies on economic benefits that accrue from the new operating arrangement for the
buyer and the vendor. As stated earlier, supply chain partners are assumed to
behave economically rational.
Economic rationality on a supply chain perspective demands that the supply
chain as a whole benefits of changing to a new collaboration arrangement. The
cost savings that one party realizes due to economizing transport or production
must exceed any additional costs inflicted on other parties in the supply chain.
Individual economic rationality takes into account that each party in the supply
chain is assumed an independent decision-making unit. Therefore, the supply
chain savings need to be shared among all parties in such a way that no individual
party is worse off after the new arrangement is implemented.
In the case of a VMI arrangement, the vendor makes the operational decisions
regarding replenishment at the buyer’s location. As the leader in the arrangement,
the vendor has the opportunity to achieve efficiency gains by coordinating pro-
duction, transportation and stocking activities. To entice the buyer to hand over
the authority of replenishments to the vendor, the buyer will demand guarantees
about his costs and benefits that result from the new arrangement. Indeed, con-
sider the following example. Exploiting the latitude given to him under a VMI
arrangement, the vendor may increase the efficiency of transportation by accumu-
lating replenishment loads over time until a full truck can be dispatched. In this
way, the transport costs per unit will decrease. The average inventory level for the
buyer however, increases. The decrease in transportation cost benefits the vendor,
but at the expense of added costs for holding inventory for the buyer. Therefore,
provisions have to be made in order to share the benefits among the supply chain
partners in a manner that is satisfactory to both parties.
In any VMI arrangement where the buyer and vendors are independent parties,
attention has to be paid to distribute the benefits of VMI in such a way that the
arrangement is acceptable to each supply chain partner. As mentioned above,
one form of acceptance that is often encountered in practice is acceptance through
dominance. A dominant party can force certain supply chain decisions and still
demand the lion’s share of the savings. However, we consider supply chains in
which no party is dominant. A mechanism may be needed to have accrued benefits
flow from one party to others. Different classes of such mechanisms exist. The
simplest sharing principle consists of a fixed monetary transfer that is agreed upon
ex-ante, under conditions for agreed upon behavior. A problem with such a sharing
principle is that it is based on the anticipated behavior of the parties. The transfer
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is independent of the actual operational decisions that are made, and -ex post- it
might be beneficial to deviate from the agreed upon behavior.
On the other extreme, one can consider a transfer mechanism by which supply
chain savings are distributed in some fixed proportion among the partners. Such
a transfer mechanism modifies the local costs experienced by each supply chain
partner with each operational decision. It is possible that each party shares in the
supply chain savings in such a way, that each partner has an incentive to act in the
best interest of the supply chain as a whole. The transfer mechanism then functions
to coordinate supply-chain decisions by allocating costs among the supply chain
partners. A carefully designed transfer mechanism may close the gap to a centrally
coordinated supply-chain.
Evidently, in a supply chain in which all parties are consolidated into one cor-
poration, perfect supply chain coordination can be achieved. In practice however,
corporations have limited size and scope. Supply chain coordination is sought
for chains of companies who retain the authority and responsibility for their own
business. A hybrid form between a fully centralized and completely decentralized
supply chain can be created by allowing relatively simple transfer mechanisms be-
tween the parties. The challenge is to develop an agreement of money transfers
that is contingent on operational decisions, but leaves the principal responsibility
for the business to the individual supply chain partners. The aim of the transfer
scheme is to incite the supply chain partners to make operational decisions, which
decrease total supply chain cost.
5.2 Literature on Coordination Mechanisms in Supply
Chains
The issue of coordinating operational decisions in supply chains is classically stud-
ied from a strategic and an operational point of view. Strategic decisions could
involve material handling systems or data exchange technology. In this chapter,
the focus is on operational models.
The main factors that are of importance in the optimization of a supply chain
are the costs of holding inventory for the buyer, the costs of holding inventory
for the vendor, the costs involved in transporting the products from the vendor to
the buyer and the costs involved with producing or handling the products at the
vendor’s site. The focus in most optimization models is a subset of these factors.
Operational models can be divided into three categories according to the focus
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of the optimization, as in Thomas and Griffin (1996). We will discuss these three
categories next.
The first category of models for coordination focuses on optimization of the
production and setup costs for the vendor and the order-costs for the buyer. A
jointly optimal lot-size for shipments between vendor and buyer is determined
(see e.g. Monahan (1984)). A second category of coordinating operational models
focuses on coordination of transportation and production activities (see for instance
Blumenfeld et al. (1985), Bertazzi et al. (2005) and van der Vlist and Broekmeulen
(2006)). Both activities, vehicle routing and dispatching and scheduling produc-
tion, pose problems that are hard to solve. Few models address both problems
simultaneously. In practice, inventory buffers are often used to decouple these
problems. In the third category of models for supply chain coordination, the focus
of the optimization is on multi-echelon inventory distribution. The inventory at
every echelon and the costs of distribution is taken into account when determining
operational decisions that minimize cost. Common in all models of coordinating
mechanisms is that the operational decisions taken result in replenishment timing
and quantities that differ in a coordinated setting from an uncoordinated setting,
leading to supply chain cost savings. As mentioned before, the savings that are re-
alized by coordination must be divided among the supply chain partners. There is
no a-priori limitation as to how the benefits of coordination are distributed between
the supply chain partners.
Failure of coordination in supply chains is common. Conflicts in the incentive
schemes can lead to adverse effects for the supply chain. Managing these incentive
conflicts can lead to better coordination and to Pareto improvements for the supply
chain. A Pareto improvement for the supply chain holds that the change is an im-
provement for at least one party, while no other party is worse off. Multiple types
of contracts can be used to achieve coordination. In general, since the interactions
between parties are complicated, the way a coordination mechanism functions or
how an incentive scheme works out is not trivial. Decisions made by one party
might depend on decisions made previously by other parties and can influences
subsequent decisions for all parties. To complicate matters further, there is common
knowledge between the parties: each party knows what the other party optimizes
for, and each party knows that the other party knows this, ad infinitum. The party
that is taking the first decisions tries to maximize the utility of these decisions by
anticipating all subsequent decisions that are made by the supply chain parties.
In order to gain some understanding of coordination mechanisms, the prob-
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lem is structured into two classes: single period newsvendor problems and multi-
period problems as in Cachon (2003). The single period newsvendor problem can
be used to illustrate several coordinating contracts. In the newsvendor problem,
a buyer is allowed to place an order once at the beginning of a sales season. The
buyer faces stochastic demand from end-consumers. Under uncertainty of the end-
demand volume, the newsvendor buyer determines the order-size. If demand turns
out to be less than the quantity that he ordered, the buyer has costs due to excess
stock at the end of the season (overage): the buyer could have saved money had
he ordered less products. Alternatively, when demand exceeds the order-quantity,
the buyer could have sold more items and faces opportunity costs for the lost sales
(underage).
The issue of determining the right order-size affects not only the buyer: when
the buyer orders too little and an out-of-stock situation occurs, the vendor suffers
also. The vendor loses income due to missed margin on these lost sales. This means
that a buyer does not experience the full impact of a lost sale. An essential feature
of all coordinating contracts is that it lets the buyer receive a bigger proportion of
the costs that are involved in taking a decision that is not optimal to the supply
chain. In this way, the buyer is enticed into ordering more than the amount that he
would have ordered in absence of such a contract.
An example of a coordinating contract for the newsvendor setting is the buy-
back or markdown contract. The vendor reduces the risk of overage for the buyer
by offering to buy back at a certain price the stock that is not sold (Pasternack
(1985)). In this way, the buyer’s full order quantity is partially protected against
not selling. The costs per item due to overage decreases and the newsvendor buyer
orders more. Another, closely related agreement is the revenue sharing contract.
In this case, the buyer pays the vendor a wholesale price per unit plus a percentage
of the revenues the buyer generates. In the videocassette rental industry, such
contracts are commonly used (Cachon and Lariviere (2005)). Other coordinating
contracts are a quantity flexibility contract, under which the vendor fully protects a
proportion of the order against underselling. A buyer can receive an extra amount
of products for which payment is due only when the product is actually sold. In
the case of a sales-rebate contract, the vendor provides an incentive for each item
that is sold above a certain threshold (Taylor (2006)).
Any of the contracts described above could be used to achieve coordination of
the newsvendor chain. Other coordinating contracts, where the benefits can be
divided differently among the supply chain partners could achieve similar results.
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There is no distinct coordinating contract that stands out as the best. However,
the administrative and monitoring effort involved in managing a contract in com-
parison to the cost benefits the contract offers may tip the balance in favor of a
particular mechanism. This could be one explanation why the simple but Pareto
inferior wholesale price contracting still abounds in practice. Wholesale pricing
mechanisms are Pareto inferior to other contracts in general, since such contracts
fail to realize a set of operational decisions that are optimal for the supply chain.
Therefore, there is some coordination mechanism leading to Pareto improvements
for the supply chain. Total supply chain costs are reduced and no party in the
chain is worse off with this mechanism.
Until now, we have discussed single period newsvendor models. In the single
period newsvendor problem, the order-size is determined once at the beginning of
a sales period. Excess inventory that remains at the end of the period is disposed of.
An extension of this problem considers multiple periods and allows inventory to
be carried over to the next period. Holding costs are charged to account for inven-
tory that is carried over from one period to the next. When an out-of-stock event
occurs, not all goods that are demanded can be supplied. Unsatisfied demand is
assumed back-ordered and a penalty is charged for each back-ordered unit per unit
of time. Instead of determining the one-time order quantity, the problem is now to
determine the optimal quantity to order each time-period. Coordinating contracts
in case of a multi-period problem are comparable to the newsvendor problem, in
that the vendor can persuade the buyer to increase replenishment order and inven-
tory levels by subsidizing the buyer’s inventory holding cost. For various supply
chain settings, including a supply chain consisting of one vendor and one buyer,
Leng and Zhu (2009) study how side payments or transfer payments can be used to
coordinate the supply chain. A side payment to coordinate the supply chain must
have a constant transfer term and a transfer function.
When only the buyer’s inventory is considered for which holding and back-
order costs apply, and transport costs and transport capacity are neglected, the
optimal policy is a base-stock policy, see Clark and Scarf (1960). This means that
each time-period, the inventory is brought back to an order-up-to level. The opti-
mal operational policy changes when, for example, the costs for transport or some
setup costs for starting a production batch are taken into account. Such costs do
not increase linearly with the quantity of products that are transported or produced
and thus give rise to economies of scale effects. Because of this, it is efficient for re-
plenishments taking place in bigger quantities and at a lower frequency compared
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to situations where no economies of scale apply.
Bichescu and Fry (2009a) analyze the profits in a periodic-review supply chain
model where the vendor determines shipment frequency and the buyer determines
shipment quantities. Full information symmetry is assumed. The central solution
is compared to a simultaneous decentralized decision and a decision in which the
vendor hold greater channel power and acts as a Stackelberg leader. In the latter
case, the vendor determines the shipment frequencies after which the buyer sets
the order quantity. Channel profits in this case can be very close to the centralized
scenario, but at the costs of lower customer level.
When the costs for the buyer is a function of the inventory at the buyer’s only,
the optimal policy for a buyer is to order each period up to the reorder level. The
vendor cannot take advantage of economies of scale in transport or production.
In contrast, a VMI arrangement between the vendor and buyers can function to
coordinate the supply chain. One instance of such VMI arrangement is when a
vendor determines the reorder level for the buyer and pays back-order penalty
costs to the buyer in case of backlogging at the buyer (Cachon, 2001b). The buyer’s
cost function consists of inventory related costs and the balance of the transfer
payments. To avoid that the vendor places the entire inventory at the buyer’s firm,
a constraint to the optimization is that no buyer is worse off after VMI than before
VMI implementation.
Bichescu and Fry (2009b) study a VMI arrangement in which the buyer deter-
mines the service level or reorder point, while the vendor determines the shipment
quantity. They conclude that the savings that are realized by a supply chain under
such an arrangement depend significantly on the relative division of channel power
between both parties. The lowest system costs are achieved when the vendor is a
powerful agent who is leading the Stackelberg game.
As long as each firm is accepting to share a fixed pre-defined fraction of the
benefits that are gained with the VMI arrangement, a VMI arrangement can lead
to perfect supply chain coordination. The exact supply chain cost parameters are
assumed known among the supply chain partners. Such an arrangement is dif-
ficult to maintain, especially if one considers dynamics in the costs and periodic
renegotiations of the contracts. In that case, it is not clear how costs or cost-savings
change over time and how this will or should affect the fixed transfer payments
over time. Therefore, other coordination schemes are worth considering.
A specific implementation of a VMI arrangement in which the buyer deter-
mines minimum and maximum inventory levels is a so-called (z, Z)-VMI contract
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(Fry et al., 2001). The study of Fry et al. (2001) discusses three actual cases of VMI-
implementations in which the buyer defines the minimum (z) and maximum (Z)
inventory levels at the buyer’s location. Whenever the inventory undershoots the
lower or overshoots the upper inventory level, the vendor pays the buyer a penalty
per unit of inventory that is not within the (z,Z)-limits. In the model, only costs for
holding inventory and for backlogs or expediting production are considered. No
costs are taken into account for production or delivery of products. The transfer
payment that occurs as a result of these penalties functions to coordinate the sup-
ply chain. The study shows that (z,Z)-contracts function significantly better than
traditional arrangements under most circumstances, as long as the values for z and
Z are chosen correctly.
Up to now, non-divergent networks have been discussed. Divergent networks,
consisting of a vendor and multiple buyers are an extension of this. Buyers in
such a network might be relatively independent of each other, as in the case where
the buyers are geographically separated. When this is the case, the divergence
of the network affects the vendor only. Alternatively, the buyers might be in close
proximity to each other in an economic sense. By this, we mean that end-customers
of a buyer are able to choose to purchase the items at a cheaper shop. In that case,
the buyer-firms can compete with each other by setting the retail price. When
the price for the end-customer determines the demand volume, the total demand
volume for the vendor is a function of all buyers’ retail prices. The divergence of
the network affects all parties. Such a divergent supply chain can be coordinated
by a simple wholesale pricing scheme under some conditions that are discussed
next (Bernstein et al. (2006)).
In order to clarify the decisions and responsibilities of each supply chain part-
ner, let σB denote the complete set of operational decisions that the buyer makes.
In a standard supply chain arrangement between a buyer and a vendor, the oper-
ational decisions of a buyer can consist, for example, of decisions on the reorder
and an order-up-to levels (as in Silver et al. (1998)). The complete set of operational
decisions the vendor makes is denoted by σV . The vendor’s operational decisions
may comprise scheduling production and transportation as well as ordering raw
material and managing the vendor’s inventories. The operational decisions of all
partners taken together determine the costs for the firms in the chain and the sup-
ply chain as a whole. Decisions of one party can have an effect on the costs of
another partner in the supply chain.
The concept of Echelon operational autonomy (EOA) , introduced by Bernstein
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et al. (2006), is discussed briefly in Chapter 3. EOA specifies that operational de-
cisions of the buyers (σB) impact the buyers’ costs only, while decisions of the
vendor may impact the costs of the entire echelon. EOA may or may not hold
under different supply chain models. When EOA applies, the vendor can choose
a set of operational decisions such that the supply chain costs for the echelon are
minimized.
The model that Bernstein et al. use for their study concerns a divergent supply
chain consisting of a vendor and multiple buyers facing Cournot competition. The
conditions under which a vendor can achieve perfect supply chain coordination
using a simple constant wholesale discounting scheme are:
1. Echelon Operational Authority.
2. Profit functions for buyers are quasi-concave in quantity sold.
3. The second derivative of the profit function for each buyer i is greater than
the sum of partial derivatives of i to the rest of buyers
(− ∂2pii(∂qi)2 > ∑j 6=i
∣∣∣ ∂2pii∂qi∂qj ∣∣∣ , for i = 1, . . . , N, with pii the profit function and qi the
annual demand).
The first condition ensures that the vendor’s decisions can steer supply chain-wide
cost. The second condition implies that a Nash equilibrium exists for the prices and
thus demand each buyer realizes, while the third condition ensures the uniqueness
of the equilibrium. Taken together, when these conditions are fulfilled, the vendor
is able to select wholesale discounts such that the selected annual sales volume by
the buyers form a unique Nash equilibrium in which total supply chain costs are
minimized (Bernstein et al., 2006).
The EOA condition is not satisfied in a traditional supply chain setting. In
this setting, the buyer decides on the order-quantity for replenishments. This has
a direct impact on the vendor’s costs in terms of scheduling the replenishments,
buyer’s inventory, production and the vendor’s inventories. Under VMI arrange-
ments however, the vendor has the autonomy to determine operational decisions
that can impact echelon cost. When the buyer’s decisions are such that these do not
affect the vendor’s costs or any other buyers’ cost, the EOA condition is fulfilled.
In the case of the (z,Z)-contract of Fry et al. (2001), there is no echelon opera-
tional autonomy. The buyer can set z and Z and by doing this, he affects the costs
of the vendor. Perfect supply chain coordination under a (z, Z)-contract therefore
is not guaranteed. As argued in the paper, the resulting policy might even be worse
than the traditional case.
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In the subsequent section, we describe a model of a supply chain that consists
of a vendor and —in general— multiple buyers. An incentive scheme that is based
on the level of the maximum inventory storage capacity that is available to a ven-
dor for a storing a specific product at the buyer’s inventory is investigated and
characterized. We study how such coordinating contract can coordinate a supply
chain. The focus of our model is on coordinating the inventory level of a buyer and
the distribution from the vendor to the buyers. Unlike many models in literature
where the transport means have infinite capacity, replenishments are modeled with
trucks which have a limited capacity for transporting products from a vendor to the
buyer. We extend the work of Jin and Muriel (2009) who studied direct shipments
from a single warehouse to multiple buyers. In their model, transport is performed
by trucks of limited capacity, but no capacity constraints on the inventory levels are
taken into account.
The combination of transport by capacitated transport-means and limited ca-
pacity for storing inventory has not been studied before. The cost savings that
are realized by the vendor through accumulation of replenishments over time to
organize transport more economically can be shared with the buyers. We propose
a transfer payment as a discount on the wholesale price per item. The transfer is a
function of the inventory bandwidth at the buyer’s location that is available to the
vendor to use.
5.3 Modeling Coordination by Inventory Capacity
Our goal is to characterize the effects of offering transfer payments based on the
maximum inventory level that the buyer makes available at his location to a vendor.
In order to study the effects of paying a transfer fee that is based on the maximum
inventory capacity, the dependence of the operational decisions of the buyer and
vendor on the inventory capacity needs to be investigated. We confine ourselves
to a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a vendor and a number of buyers.
We assume that the buyers face constant demand d per period of time, in order
to maintain tractability of the model. The buyers are responsible for and bear the
costs of holding inventory at their location, while the vendor is responsible for
organizing transport to ship products to the buyer. Replenishments from vendor
to the buyers are performed by trucks that have a limited capacity Q. We assume
that the vendor has sufficient inventory for replenishments. The transportation
lead-time is negligible and considered zero. The capacity for storing products in
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the inventory facility of a buyer is limited.
As in the previous section, let σB denote the complete set of operational de-
cisions that the buyers make. We add a subscript i = 1, . . . , N to indicate the
operational decisions σBi of buyer i. The vendor’s decisions are denoted by σV .
The buyers select the optimal policy by minimization of the local cost. The local
costs for buyer i, CBi , may depend on all the buyers’ decisions as well as the ven-
dor’s operational decisions: CBi (.) = CBi (σV , σBi ). Given the operational decisions
of the vendor, the buyer optimizes for minimal local cost, so
σ∗Bi (σV) = argmin
σBi
CBi (σV , σBi ) .
The buyers’ decisions impact the costs of the vendor. With σB indicating the set
of operational decisions for all buyers (σB = {σB1 , . . . , σBN}), the vendor’s costs
are a function of the buyers’ optimal set, σ∗B, and the vendor’s decisions σV , so
CV(.) = CV(σV(.), σ∗B). The vendor’s optimal operational decisions are the result
of local cost minimization. Since the vendor in our setting reacts to the buyer’s
optimal operational policies, the optimal policy for the vendor is
σ∗V(σ∗B) = argmin
σV
CV(σV , σ∗B).
The base-case of our model is a conventional supply chain setting in which the
buyer issues replenishment orders, which are satisfied by the vendor according to
an agreed-upon service level. In this case, the optimal replenishment policy for the
buyer is a base-stock policy.
Supply chain optimality is achieved by finding operational decisions ({σV , σB})
that minimize the total supply chain costs. Total supply chain costs are the sum of
the vendor’s and the buyer’s local cost, C = CV + CB1 + · · ·+ CBN . Any transfer
mechanism in which the coordination costs and benefits are redistributed among
the supply chain partners cancel out in the cost function for the total supply chain.
As explained previously, any transfer mechanism that is based on the total
supply chain costs can lead to supply chain optimal solutions. In such situation,
some omnipotent supply chain coordinator can design a transfer mechanism that
replaces the autonomy of each supply chain partner by the scheme of transfers.
Costs and benefits are transferred in such a way that supply chain optimal deci-
sions become optimal for each partner. Therefore, the result of such mechanism
is evident: the operational decisions of each supply chain partner are exactly the
supply chain optimal decisions. The situation is as if a central decision-maker has
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all responsibility at the cost of the individual responsibility of the supply chain
partners. We do not seek such solution. Instead, we are seeking a transfer scheme
in which the supply chain partners remain responsible for their own business, but
the transfer scheme still functions to coordinate the supply chain.
In the analysis so far, decisions of a buyer might affect the costs of other buyers
because of routing effects. In the remainder of this section, we limit the problem to
trucks that travel on direct links between the vendor and each buyer. This way, the
costs at the vendor separates and the problem decouples into a series of problems
for buyer-vendor dyads. Decoupling of the buyers allows us to focus the analysis
of the vendor’s and the buyer’s operational policies on the relations and interac-
tions between one vendor and one buyer. Therefore, we use subindex B instead
of subindex Bi. The system is illustrated in Figure 5.1. There is a single vendor
(V) and a one buyer (B). The vendor sends items by trucks with capacity Q to the
buyer. The buyer has space for (s + ∆) units inventory. The value s indicates the
inventory level that triggers replenishments. Demand d is considered constant.
V B
≤ Q
d
σV σB = (s,∆)
Figure 5.1: One vendor (V) and a single buyer (B). The vendor sends items by
trucks of capacity Q to the buyer. The buyer determines the re-order level s and
capacity to store (s + ∆) units of inventory. Demand d is considered constant.
The problem becomes more tractable when the system is decoupled into mul-
tiple vendor-buyer dyads: the vendor’s operational decisions are a direct result of
the operational decisions the buyer takes. Since the buyer optimizes to minimize
his local cost, the decisions σ∗B might differ from supply chain optimal decisions.
As a result, the vendor’s decisions deviate from the supply chain optimal decisions
as well. Therefore, total supply chain costs can be reduced using a mechanism to
allow better-coordinated decisions.
Consider a VMI arrangement. The buyer transfers the authority to decide on the
operational replenishment decisions to the vendor. The buyer retains the authority
to take tactical decisions on the re-order level s and the capacity that is available
to the vendor for placing inventory s + ∆. The values z and Z as used by Fry et
al.’s (z, Z)-policy (Fry et al. (2001)) are lower and upper critical values for inventory
beyond which penalty payments are made that function as transfer mechanism to
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coordinate the chain. In contrast to this, the buyer’s inventory capacity (s + ∆)
is a hard constraint in our model, as is the constraint that the buyer’s inventory
before demand may never undershoot s+ 1. The vendor offers the buyer a transfer
payment that is contingent on the inventory bandwidth ∆.
The cost function for the buyer is a function of the tactical decisions on (s,∆)
and the vendor’s operational decisions σV . The buyer can still take operational
decisions regarding the marketing and pricing of the product, but the effects of
these decisions are considered constant for this model. Therefore, we consider
that the set of operational decisions for the buyer is empty (σB = ∅). The vendor
takes the operational decisions of scheduling trucks to replenish the buyer. These
decisions are constrained by the minimum and maximum inventory levels that are
permitted. To manage this, only the bandwidth of the allowable inventory level is
relevant for the vendor. The buyer’s re-order level s does not affect the vendor and
functions only to guarantee a minimum service level for the buyer. The vendor’s
cost function CV(σV ,∆) thus depends on his own operational policy as well as
the inventory bandwidth. Under this VMI arrangement, the costs of the vendor
do not depend on operational decisions of the buyer. Therefore, the decisions of
the vendor impact the costs of himself and the subsequent echelon of the buyer,
while the buyer’s decisions affect only himself. Therefore, the condition for echelon
operational autonomy is fulfilled.
Common knowledge, or complete information transparency between buyer and
vendor is assumed: both parties know each other’s cost function and the basis of
their optimization. This way, the buyer deduces the operational decisions that the
vendor takes as a function of the values he selects for s and ∆. The vendor knows
that the buyer uses this information to minimize his cost. The vendor uses this to
design the transfer scheme as compensation for the inventory bandwidth in such
a way that his costs are minimal. The sequence of steps and responsibilities is as
follows:
1. vendor determines transfer function T (∆)
2. buyer determines inventory parameters s and ∆
3. vendor decides optimal operating policy σV , based on
minimization of CV(σV ,∆, T (∆))
4. buyer determines optimal operating policy σB, based on
minimization of CB(σB, σV ,∆, T (∆))
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The first two decisions are of a tactical nature, while the last decisions concern the
operational policies.
Since the decision-making behavior of other parties is known, each party can
make decisions while taking subsequent decisions of the other party into account.
To analyze the decision process, the steps are considered in opposite direction. The
operational decisions for a buyer σ∗B are determined only after the transfer function
T (∆), the value ∆ that the buyer selected at a tactical level and the vendor’s policy
σV that matches these choices are known. Knowing σ∗B’s dependency on T (∆)
and ∆ , the vendor determines his optimal policy σ∗V . The buyer determines the
optimal value for the inventory bandwidth ∆ to minimize his cost, knowing how
the operational policies depend on ∆. The vendor knows the resulting flow of
decisions for a given transfer scheme that is a function of ∆ and a parameter β,
Tβ(∆). Therefore, this scheme can be designed in such a way that his costs are
minimized. The equations are as follows:
σ∗B(σV ,∆, β)) = argmin
σB
CB(σB, σV ,∆, Tβ(∆)) (5.1)
σ∗V(∆, β) = argmin
σV
CV(σV ,∆, Tβ(∆)) (5.2)
∆∗(β) = argmin
∆
CB
(
σ∗B
[
σ∗V(∆, β),∆, Tβ(∆)
]
, σ∗V(∆, Tβ(∆)), ∆, Tβ(∆)
)
(5.3)
β∗ = argmin
β
CV
(
σ∗V [∆∗(β), β] , ∆∗(β), Tβ(∆∗(β))
)
To summarize, the model’s assumptions so far are listed in Table 5.3. We consider
that events occur in discrete time. The sequence of events in a period is such
that first inventory is replenished and second demand is met. At the beginning
of a period t, the inventory is It, the level after a replenishment rt is I+t , the level
after demand equals the inventory level at the beginning of the next period before
demand, It+1. So
I+t = It + rt and It+1 = I
+
t − d .
The following set of constraints determine the feasibility of a policy:
s < I+t ≤ s + ∆, ∀t (5.4a)
s + 1 ≥ d . (5.4b)
Inventory capacity constraint (5.4a) limits the maximum inventory after replenish-
ment and ensures that the buyer’s inventory is always brought to a level above s.
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Table 5.1: The assumptions of the model.
General
• two-echelon system consisting of a vendor and a buyer
• complete information transparency between vendor and buyer
Buyer Vendor
• pays inventory holding costs at rate h per
unit per unit of time
• pays transport costs ν per truck dispatch
• has limited space (s + ∆) for inventory • transports with trucks of capacity Q
• meets constant demand d • has delivery lead-time zero
• has sufficient items to replenish buyer
• maintains inventory between s and s + ∆
Constraint (5.4b) ensures that end-of-period inventory is non-negative, i.e. demand
can be met by inventory.
A replenishment of rt units may be delivered through multiple trucks each
accommodating a maximum of Q products. The truck shipments that make up
a replenishment will be referred to as deliveries. So a replenishment r = ∑kj=1 rj
can consist of k deliveries of sizes (rj)j=1,··· ,k all occurring at a particular time. Of
course, we have rj ≤ Q for each j. There is no limit on the number of trucks
deployed at any one time. However, we will assume that the minimum number of
trucks is used for each replenishment.
Note that ∆ = 1 implies by (5.4a) that I+t = s+ 1 for all t. Then It+1 = I
+
t − d =
s + 1 − d and rt+1 = I+t+1 − It+1 = d. So ∆ = 1 represents a base-stock policy
where there is no room to vary the replenishment size: every period the per period
demand is replenished. For ∆ > 1, the inventory level after replenishment is not
fixed by Constraint 5.4 and the vendor has some latitude in deciding on the strat-
egy. The vendor can use this flexibility to schedule replenishments more efficiently
as long as the replenishment policy ensures that the buyer’s inventory level after
replenishment is maintained between s+ 1 and s+ ∆ by (5.4a). A replenishment is
required in period t whenever the inventory It ≤ s. The size of a replenishment is
bounded by the capacity constraints of the inventory. Call the inventory level It the
state of the system. Since demand is discrete and deterministic, the state assumes
values in the range of s − d to s + ∆ − d. The number of states assumed is thus
bounded by s + ∆− d− (s− d) = ∆.
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Next, we study the optimal policy for a vendor for given truck size Q, inventory
bandwidth ∆, and per period demand d.
5.3.1 Vendor Optimal Policy: Formal Model Formulation
In this section we are concerned with determining vendor optimal delivery policies.
Among these policies, the policy that implies the lowest costs for the buyer is
selected.
A policy is optimal for the vendor if it achieves the smallest average number
of deliveries per unit of time among all policies. We are interested in long-run
costs per period. So, the smallest possible average number of deliveries per period
has to be achieved over a long, in principle infinitely long, time horizon. This
means that, possibly after a transient phase, we can assume the system to be in
any of the states in which the system orders. These ordering states are {s + 1−
d, . . . , s}. In particular, we may take the system to start with the first period having
the lowest possible beginning of period inventory, s + 1− d. Given the vendor’s
delivery policy that sets the frequency of delivery, this initiation of the timing of
replenishment is optimal for the buyer. The minimum inventory s+ 1− d is a sunk
inventory, existing in every period. We may and will take s + 1− d = 0 without
loss of generality, so
s = d− 1 . (5.5)
To find a vendor optimal policy we first set up a formal representation for the
problem in a model. To state the formal model we introduce notation to specify
that the upper bound on inventory is respected. For an integer x define φd,Q(x) ≡
Q + (x mod d) and for a counting number n
φ
(n)
d,Q(x) = φd,Q
(
φ
(n−1)
d,Q (x)
)
with φ(0)d,Q(x) ≡ x,
so
φ
(n)
d,Q(x) = Q + (φ
(n−1)
d,Q (x) mod d) .
For a pair of counting numbers k and T, consider the following conditions,
where the value r1 is an integer. The operators bxc and dxe indicate the floor
respectively the ceiling of x, meaning that x is rounded down respectively up to the
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nearest integer.
(k− 1)Q + r1 = Td (5.6a)
T = bkQ/dc and k = dTd/Qe (5.6b)
then
Q− d < r1 ≤ Q (5.6c)
We will see below that the numbers k and T are the number of deliveries and the
total number of time-periods respectively in an inventory cycle. A more intuitive
understanding of the model is presented in Section 5.3.2. Here follows the formal
development.
Note that (5.6c) follows from (5.6a) and (5.6b), as (5.6b) implies that T > kQ/d−
1 and k ≥ Td/Q. Moreover, for Q − d < r1 ≤ Q the value of r1 is uniquely
determined from (k− 1)Q + r1 = Td for given values of (Q, d) and (k, T). So the
equations (5.6) determine r1, if such value exists, uniquely.
We are interested in particular pairs of integers denoted as Ω.
Ω(Q,∆, d) = {(k, T) ∈ N2|0 < min(k, T), and (k, T) satisfies (5.6),
with φ(n)d,Q(r1) ≤ s + ∆ for n = 0, . . . , k− 1} .
Theorem 1 (Formal Model). Consider a problem with truck capacity Q, with inventory
bandwidth ∆ and per period demand d. The minimum number of trucks per period, e∗, is
given as
e∗ = bd/Qc+
min{k/T|(k, T) ∈ Ω(Q,∆′, d′)} if d mod Q 6= 00 if d mod Q = 0 (5.7)
where ∆′ = ∆− bd/QcQ and d′ = d mod Q.
Note that for d < Q we have bd/Qc = 0 and d mod Q = d so that
e∗ = min{k/T|(k, T) ∈ Ω(Q,∆, d)} .
Also note that by (5.6b), Td/Q ≤ dTd/Qe = k so that k/T ≥ d/Q and therefore
e∗ ≥ d/Q. There is another, less evident, lower bound on e∗ that involves the
maximum inventory that can be carried.
Lemma 1. For any (k, T) ∈ Ω(Q,∆, d), we have k/T ≥ 1/(b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1).
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Proof. From the definition of φ and since x mod d = x− bx/dcd, we have for any
integer x that Q = φ(n)d,Q(x)− φ
(n−1)
d,Q (x) + bφ
(n−1)
d,Q (x)/dcd. We take the sum of this
expression for n = 1 to n = k− 1:
(k− 1)Q = φ(k−1)d,Q (x)− φ
(k−2)
d,Q (x) + bφ
(k−2)
d,Q (x)/dcd + φ
(k−2)
d,Q (x)− φ
(k−3)
d,Q (x)
+ bφ(k−3)d,Q (x)/dcd + · · ·+ φ
(1)
d,Q(x)− φ
(0)
d,Q(x) + bφ
(0)
d,Q(x)/dcd
= φ(k−1)d,Q (x)− φ
(0)
d,Q(x) +
k−2
∑
n=0
bφ(n)d,Q(x)/dcd .
Now φ(0)d,Q(x) = x and φ
(k−1)
d,Q (r1) mod d = 0, as (k− 1)Q + r1 is a multiple Td of
d. So,
(k− 1)Q + r1 =
k−1
∑
n=0
bφ(n)d,Q(x)/dcd .
Consequently,
T =
(k− 1)Q + r1
d
=
k−1
∑
n=0
bφ(n)d,Q(x)/dc
≤
k−1
∑
n=0
b(s + ∆)/dc = kb(s + ∆)/dc .
It follows that k/T ≥ 1b(s+∆)/dc = 1b(∆−1)/dc+1 , using (5.5) to arrive at the latter
expression. 
The next subsection addresses the proof of the theorem. In the course of the
proof we will identify efficient replenishment cycles of certain length T with k
deliveries.
5.3.2 Vendor Optimal Policy: Formal Model Analysis
In our search for an optimal policy a first observation is that we can reduce the
problem to the case where d < Q by the following reflection.
Observation 1. Delivery of a full truckload is maximally efficient for the vendor. There-
fore, when per period demand exceeds the capacity of a truck, it is optimal to dispatch a
number of full trucks per period, bd/Qc, until a remainder of demand is left that is less
than a truckload Q.
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So we only need to prove Theorem 1 for the case d < Q. In the following we
therefore assume that d < Q .
The maximum inventory allowed, s + ∆, may limit the amount of product that
can be delivered in a period. In determining the possible quantities delivered three
cases can be distinguished according to whether full truck deliveries are never,
sometimes, or always feasible.
1. Full truck deliveries are never feasible. Since delivery occurs at inventory levels
{s+ 1− d, . . . , s} an upper bound on the amount delivered is s+∆− (s+ 1−
d) = ∆− 1+ d. So full truck deliveries are never feasible if
Q > ∆− 1+ d . (5.8a)
2. Full truck deliveries are sometimes feasible. When s + 1− d + Q ≤ s + ∆ a full
truck delivery is feasible when starting inventory is s + 1− d whereas such
delivery is infeasible if starting inventory is s and s+Q > s+∆. So full truck
deliveries are possible depending on circumstance when
∆ < Q ≤ ∆− 1+ d . (5.8b)
3. Full truck deliveries are always feasible. When s + Q ≤ s + ∆ full truck delivery
is always feasible, independent of a period’s starting inventory. So if
Q ≤ ∆ (5.8c)
feasibility of full truck delivery is guaranteed.
Third Case. The third case, expressed by condition (5.8c), is easiest to analyze. A
truckload fits in the inventory bandwidth (Q ≤ ∆), so at any time when a delivery
is made -this is called a replenishment epoch- a full truck can be delivered. As the
vendor wishes to minimize the number of truck dispatches, only truckloads are
delivered. This results in the following schedule of dispatches, starting in Period 1
with beginning of period inventory s + 1− d = 0. Dispatch m(n) trucks in period
n where m(n) = M(n)−M(n− 1) with
M(n) ≡ min{m|mQ ≥ nd} . (5.9)
The value M(n) is the minimum number of full truck deliveries required during
periods 1 through n to keep inventory after replenishment above s in each of the
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periods. This schedule is optimal for the vendor, and among all policies optimal
for the vendor it is optimal for the buyer.
We need to verify that Theorem 1 applies. To this end write x = bd/Qc and let
d′ = d mod Q. Also, let (k, T) be a pair of integers such that kQ = Td′. A ’minimal’
solution would be (k, T) = (d/g, Q/g) where g is the greatest common divisor
(gcd) of Q and d. In any case, for any such pair
x + k/T = x + d′/Q = (xQ + d′)/Q = d/Q .
Put r1 = d′. The value r1 is the size of the first delivery. It is easily verified that
(k, T) ∈ Ω(Q,∆, d′). So by (5.7), e∗ = d/Q and Theorem 1 applies.
First Case. The first case, condition (5.8a), demands a little analysis. The max-
imum inventory allowed, s + ∆ can cover demand for at most b(s + ∆)/dc =
b(∆ − 1)/dc + 1 periods. The number of periods between two replenishment
epochs is therefore bounded by b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1. Therefore, the average number of
trucks dispatched per period can under no policy be less than 1b(∆−1)/dc+1 .
Now consider the following policy. Starting with zero inventory at the begin-
ning of period 1 deliver an amount (b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1) d < Q and repeat delivering
such quantity every b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1 periods. Clearly the average number of trucks
dispatched per period is 1b(∆−1)/dc+1 and this policy therefore is optimal.
We need to verify that Theorem 1 applies in this case also. First note that Q >
∆− 1 + d ≥ d and so e∗ = min{k/T|(k, T) ∈ Ω(Q,∆, d)}. Therefore, by Lemma
1 e∗ ≥ 1b(∆−1)/d+1c . Now consider (k, T) = (1, b(∆− 1)/d + 1c) with r1 = b(∆−
1)/d + 1cd ≤ Q. Then (k, T) ∈ Ω(Q,∆, d) with k/T = 1b(∆−1)/d+1c . So Theorem 1
applies.
Second Case. Having completed the analysis of the first and third case, the
second, most involved case remains to be analyzed. The analysis of this second
case consumes the major part of the remainder of this and the next section. In this
case, at certain replenishment epochs full truck-deliveries fit in the inventory while
at other replenishment epochs only less-than-a-truckload shipments might fit.
The first and third case only had one binding constraint: the inventory capacity
and the truck’s capacity respectively. In this second case, potentially for some
replenishment epochs the truck’s capacity is binding , while the inventory capacity
is a binding constraint for other epochs. Yet it may happen that at an epoch in fact
neither of the two constraints is binding. An example of this happening is shown
in the following example. In this example, we take d = 4, Q = 7, s = 3, and ∆ = 6.
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The inventory capacity is s + ∆ = 9. An optimal replenishment policy is shown in
Table 5.2. The pattern of replenishment repeats from period 6 onwards. In periods
1 to 5 there are three deliveries, two full truck deliveries and one delivery of size
less than a full truck. Note that for the first delivery neither the truck’s capacity of
Q = 7 units nor the maximum inventory level s + ∆ = 9 is binding.
Table 5.2: A simple example of a minimum-length cycle.
period I ri I+ d I+ − d
1 0 6 6 4 2
2 2 7 9 4 5
3 5 − 5 4 1
4 1 7 8 4 4
5 4 − 4 4 0
6 0 6 6 4 2
A sequence of replenishment-state pairs (rt, It) is a deterministic policy. As
the state space is finite, the parameters are stationary and the horizon is infinite, an
optimal policy exists among the stationary deterministic policies. We only consider
deterministic stationary policies. This means that for policies considered, It = I′t
implies that rt = r′t. As the state space is finite, a stationary policy (rt, It) cycles
with a cycle length T bounded by the size of the state space, so T ≤ ∆.
The vendor’s costs increase per truck that is dispatched. Therefore, the vendor
tries to ship replenishment quantities that are as close as possible to full trucks. To
create opportunity for shipping large quantities, a replenishment is delayed until
the latest moment possible, until the buyer’s inventory level I ≤ s. The buyer’s
inventory ranges between I = {s− d + 1 = 0, 1, 2, · · · , s, s + 1, · · · , s + ∆}.
An inventory cycle is a sequence of states (Iτ)τ=t1,...,t2 such that It1 = It2+1 = i. A
cycle is a minimum-length inventory cycle if in addition to It1 = It2+1 = i, it holds
that Iτ 6= i, for τ = t1 + 1, . . . , t2. So a minimum-length cycle is a cycle that does
not contain sub-cycles. As It1 = It2+1 = i, a cycle repeats.
In a period with replenishment the state must be in {s − d + 1 = 0, . . . , s =
d − 1}. There are only d of such states. Therefore, the number of replenishment
epochs that occurs in a minimum-length cycle is bounded by d.
For a cycle (It)t replenishment quantities are determined from rt = It+1 + d− It.
We assume that a minimum number of trucks is deployed to deliver each of these
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delivery quantities. We call such a cycle where we implicitly assume an efficient
use of trucks a replenishment cycle.
We consider cycles starting with zero inventory at the beginning of period 1.
Then during a minimum-length cycle the states at other periods in the cycle are
positive. The next lemma expresses the intuitive result that a vendor optimal cycle
with sub-cycles has vendor optimal sub-cycles only.
Lemma 2. Suppose that a cycle contains sub-cycles. If the cycle is vendor optimal then
any two sub-cycles are vendor optimal as well.
Proof. Let the cycle have k deliveries and length T. Consider two sub-cycles that
cover the full cycle. Let the two sub-cycles have numbers of deliveries and cycle
lengths given as k′ and T′, and k′′ and T′′. Then
k
T
=
k′ + k′′
T′ + T′′ = β
k′
T′ + (1− β)
k′′
T′′
where β = T
′
T′+T′′ . It follows that
k
T ≤ min
{
k′
T′ ,
k′′
T′′
}
only if k
′
T′ =
k
T =
k′′
T′′ . 
Given a policy for the vendor we try to find a timing of deliveries such that
inventory is kept as low as possible. The following lemma shows how this is
achieved. In the following we will order deliveries according to their time. If
multiple deliveries occur at the same time then the less-than-truckload deliveries
go before the full-truckload deliveries.
Lemma 3. For each minimum-length replenishment cycle (It)t there exists a replenishment
cycle (I′t)t with the same length such that
1. the number of deliveries in (It)t is not more than in (I
′
t)t ,
2. each delivery after the very first delivery in cycle (I′t)t is a full-truck delivery,
3. the inventory costs for the buyer under (I′t)t is not more than under (It)t .
Proof. If cycle (It)t consists of a single replenishment, the lemma’s statement is evi-
dent. So, assume now that the cycle (It)t has k ≥ 2 replenishment epochs. If all but
the first delivery are full truck deliveries, nothing remains to be proven. Also if all
but the first replenishment consists of truckload deliveries once again the Lemma
is evident. So consider a case where a less-than-truckload delivery ` occurs in an
period after period 1. Let t` > 1 be the time that the delivery r` occurs. We can
assume that ` is the first delivery in the period t`. We have 0 < It` ≤ s = d− 1.
Now, consider shipping x units more in period t` sharing the truck together with
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delivery ` and at the same time reducing the amount shipped with deliveries pre-
ceding delivery ` by x. We can do so without hitting a stock-out by an amount
equal to It` . We need to consider truck capacity also in order to succeed in ship-
ping x with delivery ` in the same truck. Considering both inventory and truck
capacity, the maximum shift, x, such that the replenishment cycle remains feasible
is
x = max{y|y ≤ It` and rt` + y ≤ Q} . (5.10)
So x = min(It` , Q− rt`). Now It` > 0 because Lemma 2 ensures that in a minimum
length optimal replenishment cycle the inventory equals zero only once, at the
start of the cycle, and so It` > 0 and thus x > 0. Continue in this manner with
scheduling out product shipment until such is no longer possible. This means
that ultimately (5.10) does not apply: there is no non-full truck delivery after the
first delivery. Note that the shifting does not increase the number of deliveries.
Furthermore, as shifting postpones delivery the holding costs for the buyer will be
reduced under the shifting. The result is a replenishment cycle satisfying the three
claims of the lemma. 
Note. The result in Lemma 3 can also be found in Jin and Muriel (2009), where
the result is proved by a contradiction argument.
We will call a replenishment cycle satisfying condition 2 of Lemma 3 a just-in-
time (jit) replenishment cycle. Lemma 3 shows that among the jit replenishment
cycles there is a cycle that has the least number of deliveries per period among all
cycles. So a jit cycle that achieves the least number of deliveries per period among
all jit replenishment cycles does so too among among all replenishment cycles. To
summarize, Lemma 2 states that among the optimal cycles there is one of minimal
length and Lemma 3 states that among the minimal length cycles there is one cycle
that is a jit replenishment cycle. We can thus focus on pairs of numbers k and T
with the interpretation that k deliveries are made in a replenishment cycle of T
periods. Of these deliveries, at least k− 1 are truckload deliveries.
Consider a jit replenishment cycle of length T and with k deliveries. Clearly
(k− 1)Q + r1 = Td
where 0 < r1 ≤ Q is the size of the first delivery. So we have condition (5.6a).
Lemma 4. Let (Iτ)τ=1,...,T be a vendor-optimal jit replenishment cycle of length T with k
deliveries. If Q ≤ ∆− 1+ d, then (k, T) satisfies (5.6b), i.e.
T = bkQ/dc and k = dTd/Qe .
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Proof. Let t1, . . . , tk be the periods with delivery. The amount that is shipped during
a cycle of T periods equals the demand during the cycle, so rt1 + rt2 + · · · rtk =
rt1 + (k− 1)Q = Td, based on Lemma 3. Condition Q ≤ ∆− 1 + d allows that at
least one delivery in the cycle is a full truck. We know that IT+1 = 0 and using
It−1 = It + d− rt−1 with
rt =
0 if t /∈ {t1, . . . , tk}Q if t ∈ {t2, . . . , tk}
we can deduce the inventory level throughout the jit replenishment cycle. Also
I1 = 0 and r1 = rt1 is determined from
r1 = I2 − I1 + d = I2 + d > 0 . (5.11)
Suppose, ad absurdum, that the first truck would fit one more period’s demand d:
r1 + d ≤ Q. Since the starting inventory is zero in period 1 we have I+1 = r1 + d ≤
Q ≤ ∆− 1 + d = s + ∆. So, shipping one more period’s demand in the first truck
would result in a feasible cycle employing the same number of trucks but with a
cycle length that is one period longer. This is not possible by the assumption of
the lemma that the cycle is a vendor-optimal jit cycle, with minimum deliveries per
period. So r1 = Q− b with 0 ≤ b < d < Q. But then from b + kQ = Td it follows
that T = bkQ/dc and k = dTd/Qe. 
Define the nonnegative integers a and ρ as
a = bQ/dc and ρ = Q− bQ/dcd .
Note that Q = ad + ρ.
Lemma 5. Consider a vendor optimal jit replenishment cycle with k deliveries and cycle
length T
1. If k/T = 1/a then k = 1 and each delivery has size ad.
2. If k = 1 then 1/T = 1/a and each delivery has size ad .
Proof. We begin with the proof of 1. If ρ = 0 then the policy that dispatches always
full trucks Q = ad is clearly optimal. This policy is also clearly the unique policy
that is optimal. For this policy k = 1.
Next consider cases where ρ > 0. Then d/(ad + 1) < 1/a = k/T implies that
a policy that always ships ad + 1 units is infeasible, as it would otherwise improve
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on the value k/T for the optimal cycle. So s+ ad+ 1 = d− 1+ ad+ 1 = (a+ 1)d >
s + ∆, or (a + 1)d− 1 ≥ s + ∆. An upper bound on the time periods between two
deliveries is b(s+∆)/dc and so a fortiori ((a+ 1)d− 1)/d = a+ 1− 1/d is an upper
bound on the time between two deliveries. So the maximum integer time between
two deliveries in any policy is a. As an optimal policy achieves 1/a deliveries per
period, the time between any two deliveries must always be a periods exactly. In
particular r1 ≥ ad. The only policy that achieves r1 + (k − 1)Q = kad is the one
with r1 = ad and k = 1.
Next consider the lemma’s second claim. Note that r1 = Td together with
r1 = Q− b and 0 ≤ b < d < Q implies T = a. 
Corollary 1. For the size, r1, of the first delivery of a vendor optimal jit replenishment
cycle with length T and k deliveries, the following holds.
r1 = Q− (kQ− bkQ/dcd) , (5.12)
and
r1 = ad + ρ′ where a ≡ bQ/dc and 0 ≤ ρ′ < d . (5.13)
Proof. Expression (5.12) is evident from Lemma 4. Furthermore, from r1 = Q− b
with 0 ≤ b < d < Q it follows that r1 = αd + ρ′ with α equal to a or a− 1. We are
going to show that α = a− 1 can be excluded.
We distinguish two cases.
1. First suppose that k = 1, then evidently r1 = ad is the only option consistent
with the cycle’s optimality.
2. Suppose now k ≥ 2 and suppose, ad absurdum, that r1 = (a− 1)d + ρ′ with
0 ≤ ρ′ < d. Then x = ad − r1 = d − ρ′ > 0. Now consider changing the
cycle by shipping x units extra in the first delivery and shipping x less with
the second delivery, while at the same time delaying the second delivery
by one time-period. (It may happen that a second delivery now coincides
with a third delivery but this is not relevant for the subsequent argument.)
The resulting cycle no longer is a jit cycle but it is feasible, and even vendor
optimal. The new cycle breaks up in two cycles, the first sub-cycle consisting
of a periods after which the state returns to zero. The sub-cycle has one
delivery of ad covering a periods of demand. This sub-cycle is vendor optimal
by Lemma 2. So k/T = 1/a. But then k = 1 by Lemma 5 and we have arrived
at a contradiction. Hence α = a.
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
Note that Corollary 1 implies that
Q− d < bQ/dcd ≤ r1 ≤ Q, (5.14)
in line with (5.6c) under the assumed conditions Q > d (from page 123) and Q ≤
∆− 1+ d (Case 2 on page 123).
Consider a period where inventory is x after the replenishment opportunity, but
before demand has been met. The inventory immediately after the first subsequent
full truck delivery is φd,Q(x) = Q + (x mod d). Immediately after n subsequent
consecutive full truck deliveries the inventory is φ(n)d,Q(x) = φd,Q
(
φ
(n−1)
d,Q (x)
)
. So
for a jit cycle with k deliveries starting with a first delivery of r1 units feasibility for
the maximum inventory capacity is equivalent to
φ
(n)
d,Q(r1) ≤ s + ∆ for n = 0, . . . , k− 1 . (5.15)
as k− 1 consecutive full truck deliveries are part of the feasible cycle. So for feasible
jit replenishment cycles Expressions (5.6) and (5.15) hold.
The converse is also true. Let (k, T) ∈ Ω(Q,∆, d). As d < Q, we have bQ/dc ≥ 1
so r1 ≥ bQ/dcd ≥ d implies that r1 brings inventory above s = d− 1. So a fortiori
any of the other full-truck deliveries will bring the inventory above s = d − 1.
Therefore, (k, T) represents a feasible (jit) cycle.
5.3.3 Vendor Optimal Policy: Formal Model Solution
A straightforward method for calculating an optimal policy is based on the follow-
ing lemma.
Lemma 6. Within the set of jit replenishment cycles, the transport effort, measured as the
number of trucks used per period, decreases with an increasing number of deliveries of a
full truck used in a cycle.
Proof. Consider a jit replenishment cycle of k deliveries and cycle length T and
another cycle of k − 1 deliveries. The latter cycle can cover demand for T − `
periods with ` ≥ 1, since it replenishes one truckload Q > d less. The transport
effort, measured as the fraction of periods with deliveries, of the second cycle is
therefore
k− 1
T − ` =
k
T
k− 1
k
T
T − ` =
k
T
kT − k
kT − k` ≥
k
T
. (5.16)

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By definition, at least k− 1 trucks carry full truck shipments in a jit cycle with
k deliveries in total. Abstracting from the inventory levels, we denote a cycle with
k deliveries and length T simply as a (k, T) cycle. Note that by a (k, T) cycle we
mean in fact the equivalence class of all jit inventory cycles with k trucks used
in T periods. As argued on page 125, there are maximal d replenishments in
a minimum replenishment cycle. This results from the fact that the state of the
system just before a replenishment is between s − d and s − 1 and every state is
only visited once. Therefore, k ≤ d.
Lemma 6 shows that the following algorithm computes an optimal policy.
1. Start considering a replenishment cycle with k = d deliveries.
2. Considering a jit replenishment cycle with k deliveries, compute the first re-
plenishment r1 from (5.12). Next check its feasibility under allowing only full
truck deliveries after period 1.
3. If the cycle turns out infeasible, then put k ← k− 1 and return to the second
step, else the current cycle is optimal.
The number of calculations required for checking feasibility of a cycle with k de-
liveries is bounded by bkQ/dc. So an upper bound on the number of calculations
required for the algorithm to stop is
d
∑
k=1
bkQ/dc ≤
d
∑
k=1
kQ/d =
d(d + 1)Q
2d
= (d + 1)Q/2 .
Below we are presenting an algorithm that has a smaller upper bound on the num-
ber of calculations required.
Lemma 7 (Immediate Solvability). Write Q = ad + ρ and ∆+ d− 1 = bd + σ with
0 ≤ ρ, σ < d.
There is an optimal cycle with a single delivery of size
r = xd where x is some counting number.
⇐⇒ Q = ad or a ≥ b
When either of the two cases holds then x = min(a, b).
Proof. Assume an optimal cycle consisting of a single delivery of size r = xd. Con-
sider the policy that ships min(a, b)d products every min(a, b) periods. From opti-
mality of the cycle with xd as delivery size we have x ≥ min(a, b).
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Assume, ad absurdum, that ρ > 0 and a < b. Then x = a. Consider the policy
that ships deliveries of ad + 1 ≤ Q units each time a delivery is required. Since
d− 1 + ad + 1 = (a + 1)d ≤ bd ≤ ∆+ d− 1 this policy is feasible and strictly im-
proves the policy that ships xd each time. Thus we have arrived at a contradiction
and we conclude that either Q = ad or a ≥ b or both.
Now assume that Q = ad. Consider an optimal minimum-length jit replen-
ishment cycle with k deliveries and length T. Then (k − 1)Q + r1 = Td and so
r1 = (T − (k− 1)a)d. But the first replenishment being a multiple of d means that
k = 1. That is, the policy that ships a multiple of d is optimal.
Now assume that a ≥ b. For any policy the time between deliveries is bounded
by b. The policy that ships bd units each delivery is feasible and the number of
truck dispatches per time is 1/b. This policy is therefore optimal. 
When Q = ad or a ≥ b Lemma 7 shows that it is optimal to ship min(a, b)d
every min(a, b) periods. If neither Q = ad nor a ≥ b the situation is more involved.
The structure of a replenishment cycle hinges on the values for the remainders
ρ′ = r1 − ad and ρ = Q− ad where a = bQ/dc. To analyze the situation in more
detail we consider ‘filtering out’ full period demands to reduce the structure of the
problem to a simpler one. This reduction is carried out in two steps. The first step
eliminates periods that need not be considered in optimizing cycles. The second
step then alters demand per period to match the reduced set of periods. The two
steps taken in tandem will lead us to our main result.
We begin with the introduction of the step that eliminates periods from con-
sideration. The elimination uses that both Q and r1 cover a periods of demand in
full, see Lemma 5. The periods can be viewed as ’sunk’, not making part of the
optimization. There are k deliveries making a total of ka periods in a cycle that
need not be considered. So the plan is to view
• only the remainder of the capacity of a truck after deduction of ad covering a
’sunk’ periods at each delivery,
• only the relevant part of the inventory capacity, ∆− da, after deduction of ad
which is included in each delivery,
• only the remaining periods that need to be covered, T− ka, i.e., after deduct-
ing ka periods that have been covered by the k deliveries.
The following formalizes this idea.
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Consider a cycle (k, T) ∈ Ω(Q,∆, d). Then
φd,Q−ad(r1 − ad) = Q− ad + ((r1 − ad) mod d)
= Q− ad + (r1 mod d)
= φd,Q(r1)− ad .
More generally, φ(n)d,Q−ad(r1 − ad) = φ
(n)
d,Q(r1)− ad. Therefore, by Eq. (5.15)
φ
(n)
d,Q−ad(r1 − ad) ≤ s + ∆− ad for n = 0, . . . , k− 1 .
It is easy to see that (k, T − ka) satisfies (5.6a) under (Q− ad,∆− ad, d), as
(k− 1)(Q− ad) + r1 − ad = (T − ka)d . (5.17)
Furthermore 0 ≤ r1 − ad ≤ Q− ad, so (5.17) implies
k =
⌈
(T − ka)d
Q− ad
⌉
provided r1 − ad > 0. Hence
T − ad = bk(Q− ad)/dc and (Q− ad)− d < 0 < r1 − ad ≤ Q− ad .
We obtain immediately the first implication stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Consider parameters (Q,∆, d) with a = bQ/dc > 0. Then
1. If r1 − ad > 0 then (k, T) ∈ Ω(Q,∆, d)⇒ (k, T − ka) ∈ Ω(Q− ad,∆− ad, d).
2. Conversely, (k′, T′) ∈ Ω(Q− ad,∆− ad, d)⇒ (k, T) = (k′, T′+ k′a) ∈ Ω(Q,∆, d)
and r1 > ad.
Proof. Case 1 has been shown in the text leading to the lemma.
Consider now Case 2. Let r′1 be the value that makes (5.6) true under (Q− ad,∆−
ad, d) for (k′, T′). Consider the value r1 with r′1 = r1 − ad. Note that φ(n)d,Q−αd(r1 −
αd) = φ(n)d,Q(r1)− αd for any integer α, negative or positive. So
φ
(n)
d,Q−αd(r1 − αd) ≤ ∆− ad⇒ φ
(n)
d,Q(r1) ≤ ∆
ensuring that the inventory capacity is never overshot. Now from (k′, T′) ∈ Ω(Q−
ad,∆− ad, d) we obtain by (5.6) that
(k′ − 1)(Q− ad) + r′1 − ad = T′d ⇒ (k′ − 1)Q + r1 = (T′ + ka)d
T′ = bk(Q− ad)/dc ⇒ T′ + ka = bkQ/dc
(Q− ad)− d < b(Q− ad)/dcd
≤ (r1 − ad) ≤ Q− ad ⇒ Q− d < bQ/dcd ≤ r1 ≤ Q
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and also
k′ =
⌈
(T − ka)d
Q− ad
⌉
⇒ (k− 1)(Q− ad) + (r1 − ad) = (T − ka)d
and
0 < r1 − ad ≤ Q− ad
so that (k− 1)Q + r1 = Td and ad < r1 ≤ Q which implies that k = dTd/Qe. So
(k, T) ∈ Ω(Q,∆, d). 
Corollary 2. Consider parameters (Q,∆, d) with a = bQ/dc > 0. If (k′, T′) ∈ Ω(Q−
ad,∆− ad, d) then (k, T) is a feasible jit replenishment cycle
Lemma 1 shows that the transformations retain feasibility. The following lemma
asserts that optimality is retained as well.
Lemma 9. Consider parameters (Q,∆, d) with a = bQ/dc > b(∆ + d − 1)/dc and
Q > ad ≥ d. If (k, T) is an optimal minimum-length jit replenishment cycle then
k
T − ak = min(k′ ,T′)
{
k′
T′ |(k
′, T′) ∈ Ω(Q− ad,∆− ad, d)
}
.
Proof. Let (kˆ, Tˆ) ∈ Ω(Q − ad,∆ − ad, d). By Lemma 8, (kˆ, Tˆ + kˆa) represents a
feasible cycle and so kˆ
Tˆ+kˆa
≥ kT . Then, as x 7→ x/(1− ax) is monotonic,
kˆ
Tˆ′
=
kˆ
Tˆ′+kˆa
1− a kˆ
Tˆ′+kˆa
≥ k/T
1− ak/T =
k
T − ak .
Lemma 8 states that (k, T − ka) ∈ Ω(Q− ad,∆− ad, d) completing the proof of the
lemma. 
Observation 2. Consider the cycle (k′, T′) feasible under (Q′,∆′, d) = (Q − ad,∆ −
ad, d). Clearly Q′ < d so considering (Q′,∆′, d) as a vendor problem with trucks of
size Q′ means that these trucks cannot fit a period’s demand d, as mentioned before in
Observation 1. But then we will schedule full truck deliveries of size Q′ until the remainder
of demand that has to be fulfilled is less than Q′. So consider
µ = b(d− 1)/Q′c and d′ = d− µQ′ =
d mod Q′Q′ if d mod Q′ = 0
Then evidently (k′, T′) is feasible and optimal under (Q′,∆′, d) = (Q− ad,∆− ad, d) if
and only if (k′ − µT′, T′) feasible and optimal under (Q′,∆′, d′).
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Solution Algorithm
The optimal replenishment schedule for a vendor, within the constraints deter-
mined by an instance of (Q,∆, d) is determined with the following algorithm.
Algorithm Truck
1. Initialization. Consider the instance (Q,∆, d) and set n = 1.
2. Branch. If Q ≤ ∆ then Step 3 else go to Step 4.
3. Always Full. Set g = gcd(Q, d), αn = Q/g and (kn, Tn) = (d/g, αn) and go to
Step 8.
4. Subbranch. If bQ/dc ≥ b(∆− 1+ d)/dc then go to Step 6 else go to Step 5.
5. Reduction. Put αn = bQ/dc and µn = b(d− 1)/(Q− αnd)c, and
(Q, d)← (Q− αnd, d− µn(Q− αnd)) (5.18a)
∆← ∆− αnd (5.18b)
Set n← n + 1. Go to Step 4.
6. Immediate Solvability. Set αn = min (bQ/dc, b(∆+ d− 1)/dc) as well as
(kn, Tn) = (1, αn) and go to Step 7.
7. Result. For m = n− 1, . . . , 1 do
(km, Tm) = (km+1 + µmTm+1, Tm+1 + (km+1 + µmTm+1)αm) . (5.19)
Go to Step 8.
8. Output. Set (k, T) = (k1, T1).
The algorithm has a flow diagram depicted in Figure 5.2.
Note that transformation (5.19) can be written as(
km
Tm
)
=
(
1 µm
αm 1+ µmαm
)(
km+1
Tm+1
)
where(
1 µm
αm 1+ µmαm
)
=
(
0 1
1 αm
)(
0 1
1 µm
)
.
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Initialize, n = 1
Q ≤ ∆?
bQ/dc ≥
b(∆− 1+ d)/dc ?
Reduction
update (Q, d,∆)
n ← n + 1
Set αn = min (bQ/dc, b(∆+ d− 1)/dc)
(kn, Tn) = (1, αn)
Calculate (ki, Ti), for i = n− 1, . . . , 1Always
full trucks
Output (k1, T1)
no
no
yes
yes
Figure 5.2: Algorithm Truck: flow diagram.
As (
kn
Tn
)
=
(
1
αn
)
=
(
0 1
1 αn
)(
0
1
)
we have for ∆ < Q that(
k1
T1
)
=
(
0 1
1 α1
)(
0 1
1 µ1
)
. . .
(
0 1
1 αn−1
)(
0 1
1 µn−1
)(
0 1
1 αn
)(
0
1
)
.
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This latter representation of the calculation (5.19) in Step 7 makes it possible to
introduce a variant of Algorithm Truck that eliminates Step 7 altogether. The
details of this variant are in the following algorithm.
Algorithm Truck Variant
1. Initialization. Consider the instance (Q,∆, d).
2. Branch. If Q ≤ ∆ then Step 3 else go to Step 4.
3. Always Full. Set g = gcd(Q, d), M :=
(
0 d/g
1 Q/g
)
and go to Step 7.
4. Subbranch. If bQ/dc ≥ b(∆− 1+ d)/dc then go to Step 6 else go to Step 5.
5. Reduction. Put α = bQ/dc and µ = b(d− 1)/(Q− αnd)c, and
(Q, d)← (Q− αd, d− µ(Q− αd)) (5.20a)
∆← ∆− αd (5.20b)
Set M← M×
(
0 µ
α 1+ αµ
)
. Return to Step 4.
6. Immediate Solvability. Set α = min (bQ/dc, b(∆+ d− 1)/dc), update M ←
M×
(
0 1
1 α
)
and proceed to Step 7.
7. Output. Set
(
k
T
)
= M×
(
0
1
)
.
For integers (x, y) consider the transformation E(x, y) = (y, x mod y) and note
that
(d, Q′) = (d, Q mod d) = E(Q, d) .
If (k′, T′) is a feasible optimal cycle under (Q′,∆′, d − µQ′), then (k, T) = (k′ −
µT′, T′) is a feasible optimal cycle under (Q′,∆′, d), with µ = bd/Q′c. Note that
(Q′, d′) = (Q′, d mod Q′) = E(d, Q′) .
Also note that the transformation (5.18a) can be presented as
(Q, d)← (Q mod d, d mod (Q mod d)) = E2(Q, d) .
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Euclidean Algorithm
1. Initialize. Consider a pair of integers (x, y) with x > y. Go to Step 2.
2. Iterate. If y 6= 0 then (x, y)← E(x, y) and repeat Step 2 else go to Step 3.
3. Output x.
The output of the Euclidean Algorithm is the greatest common divisor of x
and y, gcd(x, y). The number of times Step 2 needs to be applied before arriv-
ing at the output is bounded by (log y)/(log θ) + 1 where θ = (1 +
√
5)/2, see
(Buchmann, 2000, Theorem 1.8.6).
Proposition 1. Algorithm Truck terminates. An upper bound on the number of cal-
culations before termination is
B = O((log d)/(log θ) + 1) = O(log d) .
where the ‘big O ’notation O(x) denotes a generic function with the property that O(x) ≤
C|x| for some constant C > 0 and all x large.
Proof. We distinguish two types of runs of the algorithm according to whether
Step 3 is called.
Assume that Step 3 is visited: ∆ ≥ Q. We then need to calculate gcd(Q, d). This
can be done through the Euclidean Algorithm which needs no more than B
iterations.
Assume that Step 3 is not visited: ∆ < Q. Each Step in the algorithm is called
once with the exception of Step 5. Each of the visits to this step implements two
iterations of the Euclidean Algorithm, E2. So the number of times Step 5 is called
is bounded by B/2. 
Note that for ∆ < Q Algorithm Truck can be viewed as the Euclidean Al-
gorithm on (Q, d) supplemented with the stop criterion
Q > ∆− 1+ d or αd = Q
of Step 4. In each Step 5 demand d is decreased by at least one and it could mean
that the final problem is considered for d = 1 before meeting the stop criterion
Q > ∆− 1+ d or αd = Q.
Theorem 2. The output of Algorithm Truck (k1, T1) determines a vendor optimal jit
replenishment cycle for problem instance (Q,∆, d).
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Proof. When Q ≤ ∆ then the vendor optimal replenishment cycle is immediately
clear: deliveries of full trucks can always be made. By no means, it is possible to
have less trucks per time-period than when all trucks are full (Case 3 in Section 3
and Theorem 1). When Q > ∆, the inventory bandwidth ∆ is constraining at least
for some replenishment epochs. The problem instance is iteratively reduced by
transformations guaranteed allowed by Lemma 8.1. until a representation of the
problem is reached for which the vendor optimal cycle is known by Lemma 7. In
that case the optimal cycle consists of a single replenishment per cycle of size equal
to xd with x = min(bQ/dc, b(∆+ d− 1)/dc. Note that condition Q mod d = 0 in
the algorithm is contained by inequality bQ/dc ≥ b(∆− 1 + d)/dc. Since Q > ∆
the following holds b(∆ + d − 1)/dc ≤ b(Q + d − 1)/dc. The right-hand side of
this equation equals Q/d for Q mod d = 0, so that equality holds for the original
condition.
By Lemma 8.2 this optimal replenishment cycle for the reduced problem can
be transformed to a vendor optimal jit replenishment cycle for the original prob-
lem, as in Step 7 of Algorithm Truck. The feasible optimal cycle for a re-
duced problem (km, Tm) (Qm,∆m, dm) is transformed into a feasible cycle (km +
µm−1Tm, Tm) for (Qm,∆m, dm−1) by Observation 2, using µm−1 = b(dm−1− 1)/Qmc.
Subsequently, this cycle is transformed to a feasible optimal cycle for problem
(Qm−1,∆m−1, dm−1) by Lemma 8.2, to (km, Tm) = (km+1 + µmTm+1, Tm+1 + (km+1 +
µmTm+1)αm). Lemma 3 and Corollary 1 determine the sequence of the deliveries
and the size of the first replenishment. 
5.3.4 Numerical Examples
Using the Algorithm Truck, we can determine the vendor’s optimal policy and
costs for given (Q, d,∆). In order to study the effects on the supply chain, the total
supply chain costs (CSC ) are considered. The total costs for the supply chain are
the sum of the vendor’s and the buyer’s costs. The vendor’s costs are the costs
for deploying the trucks according to an inventory cycle (k, T) at costs ν per truck.
Consequently, inventory is held at the buyer’s for which the buyer incurs inventory
holding costs per item per period of time. So
CSC(k, T) = CV(k, T) + CB(k, T) = νk/T + hI(k, T) .
In this, (k, T) = argmin(k,T) CV using Algorithm Truck. The average inventory at
the buyer’s location is indicated by I(k, T).
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Lemma 10. The average inventory in a vendor optimal jit-cycle satisfies
I =
⌊
∆− 1
d
⌋
d
2
for ∆ ≤ Q− d (5.21a)
I >
⌊
∆− 1+ d
d
⌋
d
2
for ∆ > Q− d . (5.21b)
Proof. First consider ∆ ≤ Q − d, then full trucks are never delivered and k = 1
and T = b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1. The inventory is d[(T − 1) + (T − 2) + · · ·+ 2 + 1]. So
I = dT(T − 1)/2T = d(T − 1)/2. Consequently,
I =
⌊
∆− 1
d
⌋
d
2
, for ∆ ≤ Q− d .
For ∆ > Q− d, the delivery schedule of the first case is still feasible, with k = 1
and T = b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1. So, no delivery is of size smaller than Td. However, the
extra flexibility due to the inventory capacity allows cycles with k ≥ 1. For k > 1,
inventory has to cover at least one period’s demand, so the inventory at some point
must be at least Td. For the average inventory in this case, the following holds
I >
dT(T − 1)/2+ Td
T + 1
=
T(T + 1)
T + 1
d/2
= Td/2 ,
or I > b(∆− 1+ d)/dcd/2. 
Conjecture 1. The average inventory for the buyer in a vendor optimal cycle does not
decrease when the maximum inventory level that is reached in the cycle increases.
Lemma 10 makes this conjecture true for ∆ < Q− d. For ∆ ≥ Q− d, the lower
bound of the average inventory is indeed non-decreasing in ∆. We assume that
this non-decreasing behavior also holds for the average inventory. The assumption
that the average inventory in a cycle increases with the maximum inventory level is
tested and confirmed in the numerical experiments. It is also conceptually logical:
the transport effort decreases with increasing ∆ (see Lemma 6), as transport can
become more efficient, when more stock are allowed to be stored at the buyer. A
formal proof however, remains for future research.
Theorem 3. Assuming that Conjecture 1 holds, then the optimal solution for the supply
chain can be enforced by the setting the inventory capacity.
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Proof. Assume that, under a binding constraint for ∆, the (k, T) cycle is supply
chain optimal, but another cycle (k′, T′) 6= (k, T) is cheaper for the vendor under
the same capacity constraint. According to Lemma 6, the vendor’s transport effort
and thus transport costs decrease when the cycle length increases. Therefore, T′ >
T. The supply chain optimal cycle and the vendor’s optimal cycle are the same
during the final T periods of the cycle. The vendor’s optimal cycle however adds
T′ − T periods in front of this. Since ∆ is binding, the maximum inventory level in
cycle (k, T) is ∆. Every inventory level is reached only once in an inventory cycle.
Therefore, the maximum inventory level reached prior to the last T periods must be
less than ∆. Therefore, according to Conjecture 1 I(k′, T′) < I(k, T). Then, a cycle
(k′, T′) results in lower costs for the vendor as well as the buyer, contradicting the
assumption that (k, T) is supply chain optimal. 
For different sets (Q, d,∆), Algorithm Truck is used to derive the vendor op-
timal jit-cycle and to calculate the implied CV , CB, and CSC. In Figure 5.3, the costs
are plotted for d = 16 units per period as a function of the inventory capacity. The
combinatorial nature of the problem makes it interesting to use a prime number
for the trucks’ capacity. The capacity of the truck is set to Q = 31 in the graph on
the left, and Q = 50 in the graph on the right. We take for the costs for transport
ν = 50 per truck and holding costs h = 1 per unit per time.
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Figure 5.3: Supply chain costs for vendor, buyer and total costs as a function of the
inventory capacity ∆.
Figure 5.3 demonstrates that indeed —for inventory capacity exceeding a pe-
riod’s demand— the vendor’s transport costs decrease when the inventory capacity
increases. The additional inventory capacity allows more efficient vendor optimal
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inventory cycles. A consequence of delivering the goods more efficiently is that
inventory is stored at the buyer’s and hence the buyer’s inventory holding costs
increase. We indicate the minimum total supply chain costs by indicated C∗SC, oc-
curring at inventory capacity ∆∗. For truck-size Q = 31 (the graph on the left of
Figure 5.3) the total supply chain costs are minimal for ∆∗ = 20. For Q = 50 (right
graph) a range of inventory capacities, 33 ≤ ∆∗ ≤ 48, leads to minimum supply
chain cost.
A lower bound to the supply chain costs is found by assuming that the truck’s
capacity is infinite, the inventory capacity is unconstrained and time is continuous.
In that case, straightforward economic order quantity (EOQ) calculations can be used
(see Harris (1913) or Silver et al. (1998)) to determine the minimum cost. With
CSC = (T − 1)hd/2 + ν/T, minimum costs are achieved when T∗ =
√
2ν/(hd)−
hd/2. The minimum costs for the supply chain then is
CEOQSC =
√
2νhd− h d
2
. (5.22)
For the problem that is considered in this chapter, with trucks of limited size,
limited capacity for inventory, and discrete time, the optimal total supply chain
costs (C∗SC) can be determined exactly for every value of demand d in 1 ≤ d ≤ Q.
Using the same costs parameters for transport and holding costs as in Figure 5.3,
we now plot the optimal —minimum— supply chain costs C∗SC as a function of d in
Figure 5.4 on the top row, together with CEOQSC . The graphs on the left of Figure 5.4
show the cost-function for a truck of size Q = 31, the optimal costs for Q = 50
are plotted in the graphs on the right-hand side. The supply chain costs using the
economic order quantity as in (5.22) are plotted as comparison. In the bottom row
of Figure 5.4, the minimum (∆−) and maximum (∆+) values for ∆∗ to achieve these
minimum costs are plotted.
A few characteristics of the graphs are noted. The supply chain costs per unit
of time increase as a function of demand. The total optimal supply chain costs per
period under capacity constraints on inventory and truck size and with discrete
time-periods (C∗SC) is always higher than the optimal EOQ supply chain cost. Fur-
ther, the costs per period never exceed the costs of a truck-ride. The reason for
this is that it is always possible to deliver demand each period, so that inventory
holding charges are avoided. When demand exceeds a certain level, this upper
bound for CSC = ν is reached. Above this threshold for demand, delivering in each
time-period is more cost effective than holding inventory. So inventory capacity
has no value in this case. In this situation, demand is such that (k, T) = (1, 1) is the
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Figure 5.4: Upper row: actual minimum supply chain costs and EOQ supply chain
costs versus demand. Bottom row: the patterned area indicates the inventory ca-
pacity ∆− and ∆+ versus demand that is optimal for the vendor.
most efficient inventory cycle. In order to derive a lower bound for the threshold
demand above which this is true, we derive a lower bound for CSC first.
The vendor’s costs CV(k, T) equals ν k/T. The buyer only bears inventory hold-
ing costs. A lower bound for the buyer’s average inventory in cycle (k, T) is pre-
sented next.
For k = 1 the average inventory is simply I = (T− 1) d/2. For k > 1 the size of
all replenishments equals a = bQ/dc plus a remainder smaller than d. Therefore,
one replenishment plus the existing inventory can cover demand for either τ = a or
τ = a+ 1 periods, after which the next replenishment is due. The sum of inventory-
periods between such replenishments is τ(τ − 1)d/2 plus the remainder before
the next replenishment. Let x be the number of times the between-replenishment
duration is a and k − x the number of times a replenishment lasts a + 1 periods.
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Then T = x a + (k − x) (a + 1). A lower bound I(a) on the average inventory
as a function of a in a cycle (k, T) is the sum of the inventory-periods between
replenishments divided by T
I(a) =
1
2T
{(xa(a− 1)d + (k− x)a(a + 1)d + ak(k− 1))} ,
where the last term is a result of the fact that no state can be visited twice in a
inventory cycle. Therefore, the inventory just before the next replenishment is at
least 1, 2, 3, . . . , k− 1, once for a duration of at least a periods.
Rewriting the lower bound I(a) and substituting x = k(a + 1)− T leads to
I(a) =
d a
2T
(−2x + k(a + 1)) + ak k− 1
2T
=
d a
2T
(2T − k(a + 1)) + ak k− 1
2T
.
Since a < T/k < a+ 1 it must be that T/k− 1 < a ≤ T/k. The minimum of I(a) for
a = T/k and a = T/k− 1 is a lower bound on the average inventory. Evaluating
I((T − k)/T) and I(T/k) gives
I
(
T − k
k
)
=
d(T − k)
2kT
T +
(
T
k
− 1
)
k(k− 1)
2T
, and (5.23a)
I(
T
k
) =
d(T − k)
2k
+
T
k
k(k− 1)
2T
. (5.23b)
The minimum value for I(a) is found for Eq.(5.23a). This leads to a lower bound
on the average inventory for k > 1 :
ILB =
d(T − k)
2k
+
1
2T
(T − k)(k− 1) .
When k = 1, the average inventory is in fact equal to ILB(1, T). Therefore ILB is in
fact a lower bound for all inventory cycles (k, T).
For any (k, T), the supply chain costs satisfy CSC(k, T) ≥ kνT + hILB . For
CSC(1, 1) ≤ CSC(k, T) the optimal solution for the supply chain is to ship each
period. Shipping each period occurs when
ν ≤ kν
T
+
d h(T − k)
2k
+
h
2T
(T − k) (k− 1) .
That is,
d ≥ k
T
2ν+ h− h k
h
.
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As argued on page 131, the maximum possible value for k equals d− 1. This leads
to d ≥ k/T(2ν/h + 1− (d− 1)h/h) or
d ≥ k
k + T
2(ν+ h)
h
.
Since k ≤ T − 1, it must be that 0 < k/(k + T) < 1/2. The maximum is 1/2,
therefore when d satisfies
d ≥ (ν+ h)
h
, (5.24)
the supply chain optimal inventory cycle is (k, T) = (1, 1).
The lowest value of CSC occurs at d = 1. For d = 1, the truck’s and inventory
capacity limits have minimal influence on the costs, so the EOQ supply chain costs
can be used as an estimate to CSC(d = 1). The supply-chain costs with T discrete
and capacity constraints is
CSC(1, T) ≥
√
2νh− h/2 .
In between the lowest and highest values for CSC , the costs increase in a piecewise
concave manner, a result of the iterative reduction of the problem in Algorithm
Truck.
Figure 5.5 shows C∗SC for different values of the parameters ν, h, and Q. The
default parameters are h = 1, ν = 50, Q = 50. The total costs are the linear sum of
the transport costs and the inventory holding costs, which is why only the ratio of
ν and h affects CSC . In the graphs on the left of Figure 5.5, the ratio between ν and
h is modified by varying the costs of deploying a truck, ν = {10, 25, 50, 100}. In
the graph on the right-hand side of Figure 5.5, the impact of the size of the truck is
depicted, with Q = {25, 50, 100, 150}.
In line with the discussion above, for ν lower, less benefits of scale economies
can be realized and regular shipping becomes optimal even when demand is low.
In that case, maximum supply chain costs (C∗SC = ν) are reached. For increasing ν,
the benefits of realizing economies of scale with more efficient shipment schedules
are visible and maximum supply chain costs apply only at higher levels of demand.
Further, C∗SC at d = 1 increases as ν decreases and is invariant to changes in Q as
long as Q 1.
So far, supply chain optimal costs have been considered. A problem with prac-
tical implementation of this is that in order to reach this solution the buyer incurs
more costs than in the case where he makes no inventory capacity available. There-
fore, in order to make inventory cycles that lead to lower supply chain costs feasible
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Figure 5.5: Minimum supply chain costs as a function of demand for different
values of ν (left) and different values of Q (right).
for the buyer, some compensation to make the inventory capacity available should
be given. The vendor benefits of the efficiency gains and realizes all of the supply
chain’s cost savings. The cost savings depend on ∆, so therefore the vendor can
transfer an amount of money to the buyer that depends on ∆. Ideally, such transfer
fee leads to a situation in which the buyer selects ∆∗ to minimize his local cost, such
that C∗SC is realized. In that case complete supply chain coordination is achieved.
We study the performance of a transfer fee depending on ∆ in the next section.
5.4 Aligning Incentives
A transfer function is proposed that is based on the cost savings that the vendor is
able to achieve. A first approximation for the vendor’s cost savings as a function
of ∆ is based on the number of periods of demand that can be placed in inventory.
We indicate the vendor’s approximated cost savings per period by SV . The domain
of interest is 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ Q , since inventory bandwidth above Q is never used. A
simple case arises when the vendor ships each time-period to fulfil the number of
periods allowed by ∆, so CV = ν/T = ν/(b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1), so the vendor’s cost
savings compared to the costs in a base-stock policy are SV = ν− CV , so
SV = ν
(
1− 1b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1
)
= ν
b(∆− 1)/dc
b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1 .
As long as ∆ ≤ Q − d, these cost savings are exact as under this condition, full
trucks are never feasible and k = 1 (Case 1 in Section 5.3.2). For Q− d < ∆ ≤ Q,
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the transport efficiency might be improved using inventory cycles as derived in the
previous section. However, the maximum gain by an inventory cycle where k 6= 1
is limited. With T = b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1) for k = 1, the effort e of any cycle k 6= 1 is
bound by e < 1/(T + 1), since the complete demand for an extra period cannot be
stored in ∆. Therefore, the following bounds for the cost savings apply
ν
∆− 1− d
∆− 1 < SV ≤ ν
∆− 1
∆− 1+ d , 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ Q . (5.25)
In Figure 5.6, the vendor’s actual cost savings, taken from the graph on the
right-hand side of Figure 5.3 are plotted together with SV and the upper and lower
bounds on the cost savings. Clearly, the vendor’s cost savings are between the
bounds of Eq. (5.25).
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Figure 5.6: The actual vendor’s cost savings, compared to the approximated cost
savings SV and the upper and lower bounds (UB and LB) for this approximation
as function of ∆. Inset: close-up of the region 0.8 ≤ ∆ ≤ 1.
We study the case where the vendor offers this bound of the supply chain cost
savings as a transfer to the buyer in order to make inventory capacity available.
By offering at most the cost savings the vendor realizes, he ensures not affecting
his own performance negatively. Still, an issue with simply offering the lower
bound of expected cost savings is that nearly all of the supply chain’s cost savings
end-up with the buyer. To manage this, the vendor introduces a linear parameter
β to control the fraction of the approximated savings that are transferred to the
buyer. A transfer payment is assumed never to be negative. The transfer function
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is expressed as
T (∆, β) =
β ν
(
1− d∆−1
)
, d < ∆ ≤ Q
0, otherwise.
with 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. The transfer is paid from the vendor to the buyer, so the
buyer’s expenses (EB) become the costs for holding inventory minus the trans-
fer, so EB = CB − T (∆, β). The vendor’s expenses equal the costs of transport plus
the transfer, so EV = CV + T (∆, β). In the case β = 0 there is no transfer and
thus no coordination. This is the base-case. When β = 1, the vendor transfers the
maximum amount of the lower bound to the buyer and maximum supply chain
coordination under a transfer is expected. By setting 0 < β < 1, the buyer has
flexibility to control the amount transferred and thus the supply chain costs as well
as his private costs.
5.4.1 Analysis of Decisions with Transfer when ∆ ≤ Q− d
When the vendor offers transfer function T (∆, β), the sequence of decisions that
are made by the vendor and the buyer becomes
1. vendor determines β∗
2. buyer determines ∆∗
3. vendor determines σ∗V = (k, T).
Note that the objective that we consider here is to minimize the total supply chain
cost, so the vendor selects β∗ such that the supply chain costs are minimized. The
optimal values are determined in the opposite direction from the flow of decisions:
σ∗V = argmin
σV
CV(σV(∆(β)))
∆∗(β) = argmin
∆
EB(σ∗V ,∆, β)
β∗ = argmin
β
CSC(σ∗V , β,∆∗) .
In the theoretical analysis of the decisions under a transfer under Case 1 in
Section 5.3.2, the inventory capacity is limited, ∆ ≤ Q− d, so full trucks are never
delivered. Then, k = 1 and T = b(∆− 1)/dc+ 1. The vendor’s costs are CV = ν/T
and the buyer’s expenses are EB = min∆{hI(∆)− T (β,∆)}. For ∆ ≤ Q − d, the
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average inventory is known to be I(T) = (T − 1)d/2. The cost structure of EB
is such that the inventory costs increase with the floor of the periods of demand
that fit in the inventory capacity. At the same time the amount that is transferred
increases monotonously with inventory capacity. Therefore, the buyer selects ∆
such that the floor nearly jumps to the next integer, so
∆− 1
d
=
n d + (d− 1)
d
, n ∈N ,
so ∆ = (n + 1)d with n ∈ N. For ∆ < d, there is no transfer and the buyer’s costs
are zero. Otherwise, T = βν(1− d/∆), so
E∗B =
0 for ∆ < dminn {n hd2 − βν(1− 1n+1 )} for d ≤ ∆ < Q .
The minimum costs achievable for the buyer is found by allowing n to be continu-
ous and by solving for ∂CB∂n = 0. Write α =
√
(h d)/2ν. Then
n∗ =
√
β/α− 1 . (5.26)
For β < α2, n∗ would be negative, which is not feasible. In this case, it must be that
n∗ = 0. No transfer is made. The supply chain costs equal CSC = ν. The resulting
minimal expenses for the buyer are then
E∗B =
0 for β < α2ν (2α√β− α2 − β) for β ≥ α2 .
So with the vendor’s costs CV = ν/T = ν/(n + 1), the supply chain costs are
CSC = ν/(n∗ + 1) + n∗hd/2. Note that the total supply chain costs may never
exceed ν as it is always possible not to store inventory and ship each period. This
condition CSC ≤ ν makes CSC = ν when β < α. Further, from n∗ ≥ 0 we know
that β > α2 which is always fulfilled as long as β ≥ α and β ≤ 1. So the supply
chain costs of our system where the buyer determines the inventory capacity that
is made available are
CSC =
να
(√
β+ 1√
β
− α
)
for 0 ≤ β < α
ν for α ≤ β ≤ 1 .
The supply chain costs for this system can be compared to the solution that is
found using EQO analysis (Eq. (5.22)), CEOQSC = να(2− α) shows that for β = 1
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supply chain coordination is achieved, as then CSC = C
EOQ
SC . Note that this is still
under the assumption that ∆ < Q− d. For β < 1, it might be possible that C∗SC is
realized under a transfer scheme, but this depends on the parameters and on how
n∗ is rounded.
5.4.2 Supply Chain Coordination
Using different values for parameters Q, ν and h, the decisions and costs of the
two supply chain partners can be determined exactly. The buyer’s minimum costs
depend on β, which is used to select the optimal value for ∆ that minimizes the
buyer’s expenses. This ∆ determines the vendor’s most efficient inventory cycle
and thus the vendor’s cost. The sum of these are the total supply chain costs CSC
under the transfer mechanism. The total supply chain costs are compared to the
optimal supply chain costs, C∗SC, that are derived as discussed in Section 5.3.4 on
page 142. The relative supply chain costs (CSC(β)/C∗SC)− 1 are considered in the
comparison. Figure 5.7 shows the relative supply chain costs in relation to the
optimal supply chain costs C∗SC for the uncoordinated case (β = 0) on the left-hand
side and for the case where β = 1 on the right-hand side. The relative supply chain
costs range in the non-coordination case range from over 400% above C∗SC for small
demand to the 0% difference for d ≈ Q. In the coordinated case, the maximum
deviation from the optimal supply chain costs is 20% for the cases considered here,
at approximately d ≈ Q/2. For Q = 50, the average deviation from C∗SC in case of
no coordination is 52%. In the case β = 1, the supply chain costs are within 1.4%
of C∗SC on average.
In the non-coordinated situation, the relative costs of not coordinating the sup-
ply chain decrease with increasing demand. As the size of the per period demand
becomes comparable to the capacity of the truck, the truck-size constraints becomes
important. The relative extra costs when the buyer and vendor do not coordinate
decrease to zero as demand approaches the truck’s capacity.
The vendor can determine the fraction β that is transferred to the buyer. The
relative supply chain costs for different values of β compared to C∗SC are plotted
in Figure 5.8. The costs for β = {0.25 , 0.50 , 0.75 , 1} are derived. The total supply
chain costs decrease when β increases. This is in line with the theoretical derivation
of section 5.4.1 for ∆ ≤ Q− d and is intuitively understood. When a larger fraction
of the supply chain cost savings’s (when β is closer to 1) is transferred to the party
who incurs the extra costs (the buyer), the resulting solution and total supply chain
costs decrease and go nearer to C∗SC.
5.4. Aligning Incentives 151
r e
l.
co
st
[%
]
d [1/Q]
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Q = 25
Q = 31
Q = 50
Q = 100
β = 0
re
l.
co
st
[%
]
d[1/Q]
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
5
10
15
20
Q = 25
Q = 28
Q = 50
Q = 100
β = 1
Figure 5.7: The total supply chain costs relative to the optimal supply chain costs
for β = 0 (no-coordination) and β = 1. (h = 1, and ν = 50).
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5.4.3 Vendor Optimal Coordination
A selfish vendor, aiming to maximize his own profits, can determine the parameter
β in the transfer function T (∆, β) to minimize his private costs, rather than to aim
for achieving the lowest total supply chain cost. Lower values of β allows a greater
fraction of the cost savings to flow to the vendor, albeit at the cost of overall cost-
savings. The sequence of decisions remains as before, with the only difference that
the selfish vendor selects β∗ to be the result of a minimization of the vendor’s own
expenses instead of the total supply chain costs, so
β∗ = argmin
β
CV(σ∗V(∆(β))) + T (β,∆∗) .
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In continuation of the analysis in Section 5.4.1, this can be analyzed analyti-
cally for the case where ∆ < Q − d, so that full trucks are never feasible. The
vendor’s total expenses are EV = CV + T (β,∆). As before, the optimal value for n,
determined by the buyer n∗ =
√
(2νβ)/(hd)− 1. Thus
EV = ν
(
1
n + 1
+ β(1− 1
n + 1
)
)
= ν
√
hd
2νβ
+ νβ− ν
√
hdβ
2ν
.
To simplify the equations, α =
√
(hd)/(2ν) as before. The vendor selects β∗ to
minimize his expenses, so
β∗ = argmin
β
EV
= argmin
β
(√
1
β
−√β) να+ νβ . (5.27)
The minimum is found when the derivative equals zero, so when 2νβ3/2 − αν(1+
β) = 0. Two of the three roots of this equation are complex, the remaining solution
yields a real value for β. The optimal value for β that is calculated theoretically
under the constraint that ∆ ≤ Q− d and n continuous is indicated by βˆ∗.
βˆ∗ = 1
36
(
3
√
54 α+ α3 + 6
√
81 α2 + 3 α4 +
α2
3
√
54 α+ α3 + 6
√
81 α2 + 3 α4
+ α
)2
,
so βˆ∗ depends on α only. The second derivative of EV(βˆ) to βˆ is positive for
0 ≤ βˆ ≤ 1 and α ≥ 0, meaning that the optimum is a local minimum to the
vendor’s expenses. The optimal value βˆ∗ starts at 0 when α = 0. At α = 1 the
optimal fraction βˆ∗ = 1. Further, the constraints on the fraction that is shared,
0 ≤ βˆ∗ ≤ 1 force α ≤ 1. When α > 1 the holding costs dominate and demand is
delivered every period.
The relation between βˆ∗ and α is plotted in Figure 5.9. Further, we know from
Section 5.4.1 that when βˆ < α there is no transfer and no coordination. To illustrate
this condition, the line βˆ = α is also plotted. Indeed, βˆ∗(α) ≥ α on 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The
plot shows that βˆ∗ increases almost linearly with α. This means that as the ratio
(hd)/ν increases, the vendor has to increase the share of the cost savings in order
to persuade the buyer to make inventory capacity available. This makes intuitively
sense: when the costs of transport versus holding inventory is high, the vendor
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can keep a large fraction of the cost savings. On the other hand, when inventory
holding costs are high compared to the costs of transport, the vendor has to transfer
most of the cost savings to the buyer.
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Figure 5.9: The optimal value for βˆ∗ for different values of α =
√
(hd)/(2ν) for the
case where ∆ ≤ Q− d.
In Figure 5.10 the optimal value β∗ that is derived numerically as a function of
d is plotted for values Q = {31, 50, 100} together with the theoretical βˆ∗. Note that
the truck size in the calculation of βˆ∗ is infinite. For d small, all three experimental
curves are similar, indicating that β∗ in this region depends only on h and ν. When
d reaches Q/2, the fraction β∗ starts to differ. This is a result of the inventory cycles
that might be possible if more inventory cacity is made available. The theoretical
optimal βˆ∗ increases with the square of d. Figure 5.11 shows the expenses (savings)
for the buyer and the expenses for the selfish vendor as a function of d for different
truck-size Q = {31, 50, 100} and h = 1, ν = 50.
We derived the supply chain costs for a transfer function in which β = 1 and
the costs for a transfer function that is optimal for the vendor, so β = β∗. These
costs are compared to the optimal supply chain cost, as would be achieved un-
der an omnipotent supply chain coordinator. Figure 5.12 shows the results. The
top row of Figure 5.12 shows the relative total supply chain costs in relation to
the optimal supply chain costs for a vendor-optimal sharing fraction, β∗, and for
β = 1. The bottom row of Figure 5.12 plots the savings for the vendor (SV(β)) for
vendor-optimal β∗ and β = 1. For the transfer function with beta = 1, the maxi-
mum deviation from supply chain optimal costs is 20% for certain values of d and
Q = 0, while for many values of d, supply chain-optimal costs are realized. On
average over d, the deviation is below 1.5%. The majority of the cost savings, over
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Figure 5.10: The optimal value for β∗ and the theoretical optimal βˆ∗ as a function
of d.
E
B
(β
∗ )
[1
/
ν
]
d
0 10 20 30 40 50
−0.02
−0.04
−0.06
−0.08
−0.1
Q = 31
Q = 50
Q = 100
EB (βˆ
∗ )
E V
(β
∗ )
[1
/
ν
]
d
0 10 20 30 40 50
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Q = 31
Q = 50
Q = 100
ES (βˆ
∗ )
Figure 5.11: The expenses as a function of d, based on β∗ determined by a selfish
vendor for different truck-size Q and the calculated βˆ∗. On the left-hand side, the
buyer’s expenses (note that these are in-fact savings, so negative expenses) and on
the right-hand side the vendor’s expenses.
90% flow to the buyer. Under a selfish buyer with transfer function β = β∗, the
supply-chain costs are at least the costs of β = 1. The potential cost savings from
further coordination are highest for low values of demand compared to the truck’s
capacity. This makes intuitively sense, as the risk of an inefficient truck-ride is high
for d  Q. However, the majority of the share of the cost savings now flow to the
vendor.
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Figure 5.12: In the top row: relative total supply chain costs in relation to optimal
supply chain costs for a transfer function with vendor optimal sharing fraction, β∗,
and β = 1. The bottom row displays the savings for the vendor (SV(β)) for vendor
optimal β∗ and β = 1. Further h = 1, ν = 50.
5.5 Conclusions
In general, a problem in shifting decision authority under advanced supply-chain
collaboration arrangements is that the decisions one party takes may affect the
other party’s costs. A buyer in a VMI arrangement faces holding costs for inventory
that is placed at the buyer, under authority of the vendor. In order to maintain some
form of control over these costs, the buyer tends to enforce financial compensations
or conditions on minimum and maximum inventory levels. Instead, under a VOI
arrangement, the vendor bears the costs for holding the buyer’s inventory, so the
buyer does not need to face the risk of incurring costs over which the buyer has
no control. In the VOI situation, the vendor is responsible for all relevant supply
chain decisions as well as for all costs resulting from these decisions that affect the
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vendor and the buyer. The vendor has echelon operational autonomy and is able
to fully coordinate supply chain decisions for optimal supply chain performance
(Bernstein et al., 2006).
As reported by for instance Fry et al. (2001) and Kaipia et al. (2002), a buyer
who faces the costs for holding inventory may set limits to the inventory capacity.
In this manner, the buyer retains some responsibility on supply chain decisions and
affects supply chain coordination. The limits that are set by the buyer determine
the vendor vendor’s leverage to control the supply chain and function to transfer
part of the savings from the vendor to the buyer. We have built on this concept.
We consider a system of a vendor and a buyer, and assume that demand from the
buyer is constant. Transport between vendor and buyer takes place in trucks of
limited capacity. The buyer determines constraints on the capacity that is made
available to the vendor to store the buyer’s inventory.
We have analyzed supply chain coordination in this model of a dyad of a ven-
dor and buyer. To this end, we have first developed an exact algorithm to derive
the optimal supply chain decisions for a given amount of storage capacity at the
buyer. With that, we have assessed the performance of the supply chain under an
optimal policy as a function of the storage capacity that the buyer makes available.
Additional storage capacity can lead to cost savings and thus represents value. The
vendor offers incentives to the buyer to coerce him to increase the storage capac-
ity that is made available. Two cases are considered: an altruistic vendor aiming
to optimize total supply chain costs and an opportunistic vendor optimizing for
individual minimum costs. We have proposed a transfer function as a function of
storage capacity that is based on a lower bound for the cost savings. The altruistic
vendor offers this transfer fully to the buyer as an incentive to increase storage
capacity for supply chain coordination. We conclude that the incentive fully co-
ordinates supply chain decisions when ∆ ≤ Q− d. The supply chain costs under
the incentive scheme deviate less than 1.5% on average over d, and less than 20%
for any value of d in the numerical examples we examined. The main share (ap-
proximately 90%) of the cost savings from coordinating the supply chain under
VMI flow to the buyer. In practice, this is expected to occur only when the buyer
is in a power position or if there are other benefits for the vendor that are exter-
nal to the model considered. We find that a vendor with some leverage over the
buyer can keep a bigger portion of the benefits. The vendor offers a proportion of
the aforementioned transfer function to the buyer as an incentive. This proportion
is optimized to minimize the vendor’s costs. The average deviation from supply
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chain optimal costs in that case is around 6%. The main share of the cost savings
are gathered by the supplier in this case.
The concept of coordination through incentive alignment via inventory capacity
of Chapter 5 is a simple and therefore potentially powerful method to coordinate
supply chain operations. Both parties preserve some authority on supply chain
decisions. The model can be improved further and made more convincing to prac-
titioners by modeling stochastic demand instead of constant demand.

Chapter 6
Conclusions and Discussion
We have studied collaboration arrangements in practice and theory. To this end,
the conditions for collaboration and benefits of collaboration as they are perceived
in practice are uncovered. We have created a conceptual model of the mechanisms
behind conditions for collaboration arrangements and benefits of collaboration ar-
rangements. Transport tariffs, as a specific example of benefits derived of coor-
dinated decision-making in collaboration arrangements, have been investigated in
detail. We have demonstrated how transport tariffs can be derived based on a sim-
ple model. We have explored and analyzed supply chain coordination via a simple
inventory-level-based incentive scheme. In this chapter, we review how the find-
ings contribute to the objective of the dissertation to contribute to the understand-
ing of the mechanisms behind the constraints and consequences of collaboration
arrangements.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.1, we review the results and
limitations of the research by returning to the four research questions of Section 1.3.
After that, we discuss the results in relation to the original objectives in Section 6.2.
Finally, we point out avenues for future research in Section 6.3.
6.1 Results
6.1.1 Collaboration in Practice
To improve the understanding of collaboration arrangement in supply chains, we
have started this research by analyzing observations of collaboration arrangements
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in practice. The first research question formulated in Section 1.3 addresses the
conditions and benefits of collaborative arrangement in practice.
RQ1: What are the conditions for and the benefits of collaboration arrangements in prac-
tice?
We have analyzed literature describing empirical research on collaboration be-
tween supply chain partners in practice in Chapter 2. The methodology in the
reviewed articles that are based on empirical results of collaboration includes sur-
veys, interviews, and case studies. Based on this literature, we have proposed a
structured associative model for drivers of collaboration in supply chains.
Based on the definitions and description of collaboration arrangements by espe-
cially Clark and Hammond (1997), Cachon and Fisher (1997), Sabath et al. (2001),
Stank et al. (1999), Le Blanc et al. (2006) and Claassen et al. (2008), we categorize
collaboration forms into four main categories: conventional, Factory Gate Pricing,
Vendor Managed Inventories (VMI) and Collaborative Planning and Forecasting.
Drivers of collaboration arrangements are differentiated into conditions for col-
laboration and benefits of collaboration. We further distinguish operational and
strategic drivers of supply chain collaboration.
The first operational condition for supply chain collaboration follows mainly
Lamb (1997), Kulp (2002), andClaassen et al. (2008) and is related to the richness
of the information that is exchanged between supply chain partners. Collaboration
is positively associated with information exchange that contains more valuable
content. The quality of the information exchanged is a second operational condition
for collaboration, following Clark and Hammond (1997), Dong and Xu (2002) and
Kulp (2002).
We identified three strategic conditions necessary for VMI in the reviewed lit-
erature. The first strategic condition is the ability of a firm to join an advanced
collaboration arrangement. This is related to firm size (Vergin and Barr, 1999), ex-
perience with advanced collaboration arrangements (Vergin and Barr, 1999, Peck
and Juttner, 2000), and the state of ICT systems in the firm (Daugherty et al., 1999,
Corbett et al., 1999, Kaipia et al., 2002, Claassen et al., 2008). The second strate-
gic condition is the strategic fit between the partnering firms. The fit depends on
the strategic position and the strategic match of the firms. This depends on the
strategic position a firm currently has and the anticipated position that results
from collaboration (Fiocca, 1982, Cox, 2001, de Leeuw and Fransoo, 2009). Trust
between the firms is a very important factor in the strategic fit (Corbett et al., 1999,
Lambert et al., 1999, Narayanan and Raman, 2004). The third strategic condition
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is the product fit of the products concerned in the advanced collaboration arrange-
ment. The product fit depends on the market characteristics and competitiveness
(see Bensaou (1999), Olsen and Ellram (1997a), Dong et al. (2007) and de Leeuw and
Fransoo (2009)). Furthermore, supply risks and demand fluctuations contribute to
the product fit for the collaboration arrangement (Kaipia et al., 2002, Holweg et al.,
2005).
Benefits are the second important factor that drives advanced collaboration ar-
rangements. As with the conditions for collaboration, we have separated the ben-
efits of collaboration into operational and strategic benefits. Operational benefits
of collaboration apply to the improved efficiency of operational activities such as
transportation, production, or holding inventories, according to the findings of mainly
Cachon and Fisher (1997), Vergin and Barr (1999), Kaipia et al. (2002), and Disney
and Towill (2003a). The service level at the buyer remains at least constant, as re-
ported in Cachon and Fisher (1997), and Peck and Juttner (2000), or even improves
compared to the conventional arrangement, as reported by Kaipia et al. (2002) and
Tyan and Wee (2003).
We identify three main types of strategic benefits that result from advanced
supply-chain collaboration arrangements. The first type of strategic benefit from
collaboration is found in an improved strategic position of a firm. The strategic po-
sition can improve due to improved customer intimacy, according mainly to Lamb
(1997), Corbett et al. (1999) and Challener (2000). As reported by Vergin and Barr
(1999) and de Leeuw and Fransoo (2009), a lock-in effect, where transacting via
the advanced collaboration arrangement increases the relative costs for the buyer
to switch vendors, further strengthens the strategic position of a vending firm. The
second type of strategic benefit of collaboration applies to the improved marketing
knowledge that the vending firm obtains as a result of the richness and quality of
data exchange that occurs in advanced collaboration arrangements, as reported by
Collins (1997), and Vergin and Barr (1999). The third type of strategic benefit of col-
laboration results from a reduction in the overhead required to manage inventories
and replenishments for the buyers, as discussed by Aichlymayr (2000) .
We endorse the notion of van der Vaart and van Donk (2008) that basic agree-
ment on definitions and constructs used in survey-based research concerning sup-
ply chain integration is needed in order to improve the consistency and comparabil-
ity of results and conclusions from survey-based research. This allows researchers
to validate and strengthen previous conclusions and to build further on these. We
proposed and discussed constructs to measure the variables in the model. These
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constructs can be used to validate observations that are based on conclusions in
the empirical literature.
As mentioned above, a limitation of the empirical research methodology that
is used to derive the associative model on collaboration in practice, is the issue of
consistency of basic definitions and measures in the reviewed literature, as noted
by van der Vaart and van Donk (2008). We have contributed to establishing con-
sistency in the broader research methodology by proposing an overall conceptual
model for collaboration in practice, combined with a set of constructs to test and
validate the relations in this model. The empirical data are gathered via methods
of survey research, case-study research or interviews of employees in firms that
are knowledgeable or responsible for supply chain management. Consequently,
another limitation of this research is that these data are based on perceptive rather
than absolute measures. Perceptive measures are difficult to validate and can be
unreliable projections of reality (Ketokivi and Schroeder, 2004). Furthermore, al-
locating identified business consequences of collaboration to specific collaboration
dyads is ambiguous. This ambiguity results from the fact that benefits often re-
sult from scale economies that apply to multiple buyers, resulting from multiple
—possibly both advanced and conventionally arranged— dyads. The expert opin-
ion on benefits of collaboration is further compromised as a result of extrinsic
fluctuations in the business environment. Finally, an intrinsic limitation of us-
ing an empirical research methodology approach is the descriptive nature of such
methodology. The model of collaboration in practice that we have derived contains
associative links between conditions and benefits of collaboration. Understanding
the mechanisms that are behind conditions and benefits of collaboration requires
analytical modeling.
6.1.2 Analyzing Collaboration
After having explored the practice of supply chain collaboration, the next step is
to understand the mechanisms behind collaboration. Therefore, we have reviewed
and structured recent analytical literature on advanced collaboration arrangements
to answer the second research question in Chapter 3.
RQ2: In a supply chain collaboration arrangement, what are the mechanisms that translate
the conditions for and the form of such arrangement into benefits? In particular, how
does this translation happen in situations where economies of scale and capacitated
resources are manifest?
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Collaboration arrangements between firms in a supply chain can be used to
coordinate operational decisions in the supply chain. As argued by, among oth-
ers, Goyal (1976), Monahan (1984) and Lee and Rosenblatt (1986), coordination of
supply chain decisions reduces supply chain inefficiencies and thus reduces costs.
Transacting on markets with price mechanisms as a coordinating instrument for
supply chain decisions (Coase, 1937) may be considered a loose form of collabo-
ration between vendor and buyer. However, supply chain decisions can be more
accurately coordinated when firms decide to engage in tighter forms of collabora-
tion. In the extreme, a supply chain centrally managed by an omnipotent supply
chain manager can realize full coordination of supply chain decisions by optimiz-
ing total supply chain performance (Clark and Scarf, 1960, Eppen and Schrage,
1981, Federgruen and Zipkin, 1984a). In contrast to a centrally coordinated supply
chain, firms in advanced collaboration arrangements function as separate firms and
maintain some individual responsibility for their supply chain operations. We have
argued that the potential costs savings and performance improvements by closing
the gap between a centrally coordinated supply chain and a supply chain of firms
that collaborate loosely gives rise to advanced forms of supply chain collaboration.
Based on the main factors of supply chain coordination —quantity of replen-
ishments, timing of replenishments and inventory requirements as identified by Li
et al. (2005)— we have argued that supply-chain collaboration arrangements con-
sist of agreements between a vendor and a buyer on exchange of information and
a division of decision authority.
We conclude from operations research models that collaboration leads to bene-
fits in production efficiency, transport efficiency and inventory efficiency, without
compromising service levels, see among others Dong and Xu (2002), Cheung and
Lee (2002), Bernstein et al. (2006), Çetinkaya and Lee (2000), and Axsäter (2001).
The division of the benefits resulting from collaborating is not trivial, as argued
by, for instance, Corbett and de Groote (2000). We have concluded that advanced
collaboration arrangements have to be economically attractive to each of the parties
for them to join. We have introduced the condition for individual rationality for
advanced collaboration arrangements. Two ways to realize individual rationality of
an arrangement are discussed: incentive alignment and dominance. First, individ-
ual rationality can be achieved by sharing the benefits in such a way that no party
is worse-off with the advanced collaboration arrangement. Alignment of incentives
to coordinate supply chain decision-making is researched by among others Corbett
and de Groote (2000), Cachon (2003), Narayanan and Raman (2004) and Corbett
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et al. (2004). Narayanan and Raman (2004) describes how a vendor can use some
form of incentive alignment to buy responsibility. In that case, a vendor offers buy-
ers financial incentives to coerce the buyers into changing the operational decisions
in a manner that is favorable to the vendor. Depending on positions of strategic
dominance and the dependence on the business relation, a dominant party can de-
viate from this principle and take a bigger portion of the benefits (see Cox (2001)).
This is the second way to make joining a collaboration arrangement rational for
each party: individual rationality is achieved by continuation of business rather
than financial compensation.
In general, the party with most decision authority in the dyad is best off in
terms of profits and costs (Fry et al., 2001, Kaipia et al., 2002). In a VMI arrange-
ment, the vendor dominates the dyad. However, in order to coerce the buyer into
accepting this change in authority the buyer must be certain not to be worse off as
a result. In practice therefore, the buyer may maintain some control by setting the
vendor’s boundary conditions for managing the VMI arrangement as described
by Fry et al. (2001), Claassen et al. (2008). Alternatively, a buyer may forfend all
decision authority by demanding the vendor to manage the buyer’s stock point un-
der consignment, VOI, so that all inventory holding costs disappear for the buyer
(Piplani and Viswanathan, 2003). Based on these findings from the analytical lit-
erature on supply chain collaboration, we have presented a conceptual model in
Figure 2.2.
6.1.3 Practice and Theory Combined
To synthesize an overall picture of collaboration, we build upon the results of the
research on the first two research questions. We combine the conditions and ben-
efits of collaboration in practice from Chapter 2, as shown in Figure 2.2, with the
resulting analytical model of Chapter 3, as shown in Figure 3.4. Figure 6.1 shows
the resulting combined model. On the left, the conditions to make advanced col-
laboration arrangements work are presented. These are split between operational
conditions, on top, and strategic conditions, at the bottom of the figure. The collab-
oration arrangement is defined by agreement on the exchange of information and
decision authority, as shown in the center of the figure. The two forms of individ-
ual rationality, dominance and incentive alignment, ensure economical rationality
for each firm to participate in the arrangement. Finally, on the right, the benefits
that such collaboration arrangement may provide are shown, the operational ben-
efits on the top-right and strategic benefits at the bottom. The solid connections
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in Figure 6.1 indicate that these connections are backed by analytical models. The
dashed relations are associative. Specifically, analytical models in the literature
support the empirically expected positive relation between the benefits of collabo-
ration and operational conditions for information richness and information quality.
Further, we have discussed analytical models in the literature that support the op-
erational benefits that were found in practice. These included efficiency gains in
production, transport and inventory management. We have not found analytical
research studies in which strategic benefits from supply chain collaboration have
been modeled. Even though advanced collaboration arrangements such as VMI
improve supply chain efficiency, such arrangements are implemented only when it
is individually rational for each supply chain partner to join the collaborative effort.
Dominance in the dyad and incentives drive individual rationality for a firm.
Collaboration
arrangement
information
authority
Individual
Rationality
dominance
incentives
+
info richness
info quality
strategic fit
ability
product fit
+
+
+
+
+
production efficiency
transport efficiency
inventory efficiency
service level
overhead reduction
strategic position
marketing knowledge
+
+
+
+
+/-
+/-
+
Figure 6.1: Combined Model of conditions and benefits that are associated with
collaboration arrangements in theory and practice. The solid connections are ana-
lytically modeled, the dashed relations are associative.
We note a few limitations on the resulting combined model. Often, an under-
lying assumption in analytical models with respect to information sharing is that
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the quality of information is perfect and that information becomes available simul-
taneously to both vendor and the buyer. Further, we assume that supply chain
partners in the dyad act in an economically rational way, implying that firms will
collaborate in any advanced supply chain arrangement as long as no adverse ef-
fects occur. As already mentioned in Section 1.4, an ‘important shortcoming of
idealized problems is that the effect of the human factor on the performance of
the operational process is largely neglected’ (Bertrand and Fransoo, 2002). Mod-
els necessarily simplify reality to make them analytically tractable and in order
to gain generic insight into and understanding of the interaction and mechanisms
behind certain observations. The choices made to simplify reality so that it can
be modeled hold the intrinsic risk of neglecting parameters that are significant to
the analysis. Despite their apparent relevance based on empirical research, some
conditions are omitted in analytical models as a result of the complexity involved
in modeling such considerations. To give an example of such a problem, consider
the following question: How does one model economically irrational behavior of
a firm without making the model appear artificial and arbitrary? In conclusion,
the challenge inherent in modeling reality with analytical models to understand
mechanisms behind supply chain collaboration is compounded by the difficulty in
measuring, verifying and validating theoretically expected outcomes with results
in practice or with results of realistic and repeatable experiments. The complexity
and interdependency of a firm’s supply chain performance with its environment,
the unavoidable fluctuations in the market, combined with sociological behavior of
humans involved in supply chain management make repeatable predictions and
validation of operational benefits of collaboration arrangements a challenging task.
However, despite these shortcomings of analytical modeling, the generic under-
standing and knowledge that can be derived from an idealized model may lead to
valuable insights into the solution of operational problems.
6.1.4 Transport Tariffs
Part of the potential costs savings from coordination are realized by optimizing
transportation logistics between vendor and buyer. In the analytical literature, the
cost of transport are often modeled as a fixed fee per truck-ride, independent of the
volume that is transported, dependent on the traveled distance only. Any arrange-
ment in which the vendor can control and thus improve on shipment sizing and
timing will therefore be favorable to the vendor. The complexity of deriving the po-
tential efficiency gains in transport through economizing on timing, quantity and
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routing is compounded by the complexity of translating transport effort into costs.
Specifically, part of the potential cost savings on transport from shipping more ef-
ficient shipment quantities —that is, fuller trucks— can also be realized by using
third-party logistics providers. This is because these parties can offer discounted
transport tariffs for shipments of size less-than-a-truckload in size. This implies
that analytical models, in which a fixed fee per truck-ride is assumed, overestimate
the benefits in transport costs savings that result from advanced collaboration ar-
rangements. The third research question concerns transport tariffs.
RQ3: How can tariffs for transportation of less-than-a-truckload quantities be modeled to
coordinate the usage of trucks efficiently?
In Chapter 4, we have studied the consolidation of multiple orders of size Less-
Than-a-Truck-Load (LTL) on a single link. We have derived transport tariffs based
on allocation of the carrier’s costs and based on the carrier’s profit maximization.
Tariffs based on cost allocation apply to a situation of private carriage, while tariffs
based on profit maximization apply to common carriage. Under private carriage,
the shipper and carrier are part of the same firm and transport tariffs function to
coordination transport requirements within the firm. In the case of transport with a
common carrier, an external party assumes the role of carrier. This party sets trans-
port tariffs that are attractive to shippers by sharing part of the efficiency gains. We
show that tariffs with properties that are expected and required in practice can be
derived using relatively simple models.
We have proposed and analyzed three allocation mechanisms as a basis for
transport tariffs: marginal, Shapley and semi-proportional allocation of costs for
tariffs based on cost allocation. We have found only a limited number of studies
on the properties of transport tariffs. Langley Jr. (1980) analyzed the effects of sev-
eral functional forms for transport tariffs that he proposed. Arcelus and Rowcroft
(1991), Swenseth and Godfrey (1996), Tyworth and Zeng (1998) and Smith et al.
(2007) analyzed transport tariffs by fitting proposed transport tariff functions on
actual tariffs. Based on these studies, we have identified properties that transport
tariffs should comply with, listed in Table 6.1. The tariff based on the marginal or
Shapley cost allocation is not sub-additive. This means that it might be beneficial to
split a larger order into multiple smaller orders, which is undesirable for a carrier.
The tariff that is based on semi-proportional cost allocation complies with all prop-
erties for transport tariffs we identified. The carrier recovers its costs for transport
using this tariff. The tariff is symmetrical in the order-arrival sequence. The rate
that is charged for transport under this tariff increases strictly based on order-size.
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Table 6.1: Overview of expected properties for different cost-allocation transport
tariff functions (reprint of Table 4.2).
Tariff Property marginal Shapley semi-proportional
Monotonically increasing rate + + +
Recover total costs - + +
Sub-additivity - - +
Monotonically decreasing rate per unit - - +
The transport rate per unit decreases monotonically as a function of order-size, due
to scale economies. Finally, this tariff function is sub-additive, meaning that it is
not efficient to split an order into multiple smaller orders.
We find that all proposed tariff functions strongly depend on the order arrival
rate, especially at small order-sizes. The reason for this is that a carrier can ship
an order of the smallest size at zero cost when there is already a commitment to
dispatch a truck. Only when no other orders have arrived during a dispatch period
does a small order trigger the need to deploy a truck. As a result, the transport
rate that the carrier charges to transport a small-sized order is reduced when the
order-arrival rate increases. The possibilities to fill trucks efficiently increases for
a carrier at high order-arrival rates —when many orders arrive within a dispatch
period. The transport rate per unit is constant and equivalent to the truck’s costs
divided by the truck’s capacity in the limit where the carrier leaves no space unused
in truck-rides.
We have analyzed transport tariffs for a carrier who maximizes profits. In this
case, transport tariffs are such that only a part of the cost savings from consolidat-
ing shipments are relayed back to the shippers. The remaining part of the savings
represent the carrier’s profits. We have presented numerical examples of tariffs for
a profit-maximizing carrier. The market is modeled by setting a price-dependent
probability that the shipper grants the carrier a shipment. The resulting tariff func-
tion behaves in line with the properties for transport tariffs that are mentioned
above.
We conclude that the cost savings from transport efficiency gained by imple-
menting an advanced collaboration arrangement are highest when a vendor is
using private carriage. In this case, the vendor collects all of the benefits from
the opportunities that arise from consolidating shipments and transporting more
efficiently. For a vendor who used to ship with common carriers, a part of the effi-
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ciency gains from consolidating multiple orders is already realized by the common
carrier and reflected in the tariffs on the market. Consequently, the potential sav-
ings on transport costs from implementing advanced collaboration arrangements
such as VMI or FGP are lower.
The main limitation in this research on transport tariffs is that the model con-
siders transport on a single link only. We have not taken into account consolidation
opportunities from transport routes to multiple destinations in close proximity to
each other. We expect the generic shape and properties of the transport function
to be similar, but the additional potential to economize transport would lead to
reduced transport tariffs compared to the tariffs derived for transport on a single
link. Further, although each truck of the carrier has a limited capacity, the total
number of trucks available to the carrier in our model is assumed to be infinite.
When a carrier only has a limited number of trucks that can be used, the problem
will be to set tariffs at such level that not only the loading per truck is optimized,
but also the usage of the number of trucks. A side-remark to this research is that
firms often work with contracts that are based on the total annual transport needs
and transport tariffs, rather than considering transport tariffs based on an order
of specific size. Such annual contracts further contribute to the complexity of as-
sessing the cost savings from implementing VMI arrangements in a supply chain.
However, the research in this chapter contributes to a further understanding of the
cost factors behind transport tariffs. The findings on transport tariffs can support
setting up and assessing the value of annual contracts for transport services.
6.1.5 Incentive Alignment
The fourth research question deals with the incentive alignment to alter the deci-
sion authority in collaboration arrangements.
RQ4: How can supply chain decisions be coordinated with a simple incentive scheme be-
tween vendor and buyer in the case of transport by capacity-constrained trucks?
In general, a problem in shifting decision authority under advanced supply
chain collaboration arrangements is that the decisions one party makes may affect
the other party’s costs. A buyer in a VMI arrangement faces holding costs for inven-
tory that is located at the buyer, under authority of the vendor. In order to maintain
some form of control over these costs, the buyer tends to enforce financial compen-
sations or conditions on minimum and maximum inventory levels. Instead, under
a VOI arrangement, the vendor bears the costs for holding the buyer’s inventory, so
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the buyer does not need to face the risk of incurring costs over which the buyer has
no control. In the VOI situation, the vendor is responsible for all relevant supply
chain decisions as well as for all costs resulting from these decisions that affect the
vendor and the buyer. The vendor has echelon operational autonomy and is able
to fully coordinate supply chain decisions for optimal supply chain performance
(Bernstein et al., 2006).
As reported by, for instance, Fry et al. (2001), a buyer who faces the costs of
holding inventory may set limits on the inventory capacity. In this manner, the
buyer retains some responsibility on supply chain decisions and affects supply
chain coordination. The limits that are set by the buyer determine the vendor’s
leverage to control the supply chain and function to transfer part of the savings
from the vendor to the buyer. We have built on this concept in Chapter 5. We
consider a system of a vendor and a buyer, and we assume constant demand from
the buyer. Transport between vendor and buyer takes place in trucks of limited
capacity. The buyer determines constraints on the capacity that is made available
to the vendor to store the buyer’s inventory.
We have analyzed supply chain coordination in this model of a dyad of a ven-
dor and buyer. To this end, we have first developed an exact algorithm to derive
the optimal supply chain decisions for a given amount of storage capacity that the
buyer makes available. With that, we have assessed the performance of the sup-
ply chain under an optimal policy as a function of the storage capacity that the
buyer makes available. Additional storage capacity can lead to cost savings and
thus represents value. The vendor offers incentives to the buyer to coerce him to
increase the storage capacity that is made available. Two cases are considered: an
altruistic vendor aiming to optimize total supply chain costs and an opportunistic
vendor optimizing to reach individual minimum costs. We have proposed a trans-
fer function as a function of storage capacity that is based on a lower bound for
the cost savings. The altruistic vendor offers to transfer this incentive completely
to the buyer as an incentive to increase storage capacity for supply chain coordina-
tion. We conclude that the incentive does coordinate supply chain decisions. On
average, the supply chain costs under the incentive scheme deviate less than 1.5%
from the optimal total supply chain costs. The main share (approximately 90%) of
the cost savings from coordinating the supply chain under VMI flow to the buyer.
In practice, this is expected to occur only when the buyer is in a power position or
if there are other benefits for the vendor that are external to the model considered.
We find that a vendor with some leverage over the buyer can keep a bigger por-
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tion of the benefits. The vendor offers a proportion of the aforementioned transfer
function to the buyer as an incentive. This proportion is optimized to minimize the
vendor’s costs. The average deviation from supply chain optimal costs in that case
is around 6%. The main share of the cost savings are reaped by the supplier in this
case.
6.2 Discussion
The objective of this thesis, as stated in Section 1.3, has been to contribute to
• the exploration of the conditions for and the consequences of advanced col-
laboration arrangements in practice,
• and the understanding of the mechanisms behind the constraints and conse-
quences of collaboration arrangements.
We have discussed how collaboration in a supply chain to coordinate deci-
sions can range from internal coordination within a firm, where an entrepreneur
drives coordination, to collaboration on external markets, where pricing mecha-
nisms drive coordination. Arrangements between different firms to collaborate
on a market can range from loose collaboration on transaction basis on a market
to tightly collaborating firms sharing all their relevant information and decision
authority. We have argued that the main characteristics defining collaboration ar-
rangements are agreements on the exchange of information and on the authority to
make decisions that affect the supply chain. In Chapter 2, we have identified four
basic types of supply-chain collaboration arrangements based on the division of
authority around triggering and arranging replenishments: conventional arrange-
ment, VMI, FGP, and CPFR. However, we have noted that decision authority is
rarely clearly divided between firms. Each firm aims to maintain some control, at
least over the supply chain operations that affect their costs. This is why many
collaboration arrangements are studied and implemented that deviate more or less
from the four basic types. To illustrate this point, under VMI a buyer might not
be comfortable bearing the costs of holding his inventory, as the inventory man-
agement is done by the vendor. Under VOI, the buyer mitigates this problem by
channeling the inventory holding costs to the vendor. Alternatively, the buyer may
set minimum and maximum levels within which the vendor has to maintain the
inventory to control his inventory costs.
172 Chapter 6. Conclusions and Discussion
We have synthesized a conceptual model combining conditions for collabora-
tion arrangements and the benefits that are realized as a result of collaboration,
shown in Figure 6.1. This is based on the results from empirical literature and re-
search in Chapter 2 as well as on results from analytical research in Chapter 3. Our
conceptual model displays the factors that drive the advanced supply-chain collab-
oration arrangements between firms. We have shown both empirical results and
analytical models that explain the mechanisms for the drivers that are related to the
supply chain operations. We have identified the richness and the quality of the in-
formation that is exchanged as the operational conditions. The operational benefits
that drive collaboration are the increased efficiency of transportation for replenish-
ments, increased efficiency of production planning and the increased efficiency
of inventory management, which results in lower average inventory levels, while
maintaining at least the same service level at the buyer. The relations that we have
identified between the conditions and benefits of a strategic nature are more com-
plex to analyze. Analytical understanding remains for future research. An issue
with this model is that the field of research of operations management, according
to Bertrand and Fransoo (2002), "still lacks a well-defined, shared methodological
framework for identifying and measuring the relevant characteristics of real-life
operational processes." As van der Vaart and van Donk (2008) note, there is little
consistency in the basic definitions and constructs that are used to measure im-
pact and integration in practical research on collaboration. Our model contributes
towards achieving consensus among the research community on the definitions
and constructs to be used to analyze advanced collaboration arrangements. In
Chapter 2 we have discussed how the relations in the model can be measured and
validated empirically by means of survey research.
In Chapter 3, we have argued that analytical literature generally overestimates
the benefits of implementing VMI compared to a conventional setting in transport
costs. This is because analytical models rarely take into account the fact that firms
may use the services of a third-party logistics provider, who consolidates freight
from several sources on intelligently selected transport routes. The efficiency gains
that are realized by the third-party logistics provider will be partially passed on to
the shipping firm. This is not taken into account when transport costs are modeled
by a simple fixed fee per truck-ride, independent of the shipped quantity. We con-
clude that while a vendor with private carriage can realize the full potential trans-
port savings under advanced collaboration arrangements, the potential savings in
transport costs for a vendor using common-carriage are lower. To understand the
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background of the tariffs a carrier charges to a shipper for consolidating freight,
in Chapter 4 we developed a simple model by which tariffs for a common carrier
and a private carrier are determined. Properties for transport tariffs in practice are
identified. We present a mechanism to derive transport tariffs that comply to all
identified properties required for transport tariffs.
In Chapter 5, we have demonstrated how decisions in supply chains can be
coordinated via a simple incentive scheme. For this, we have considered a VMI
arrangement, in which the buyer determines the capacity that the vendor has avail-
able for managing the inventory. The vendor offers an incentive to the buyer that
depends on the inventory capacity. We conclude that the supply chain costs are on
average less than 1.5% more than the costs of a centrally coordinated supply chain
when an altruistic vendor —that is, a vendor who optimizes for total supply chain
performance— organizes the coordination. In these cases, over 90% of the bene-
fits resulting from the coordination are reaped by the buyer. We have shown that
with this form of incentive alignment in the case of an opportunistic vendor who
optimizes his private costs, still coordinates supply chain decisions. The resulting
costs are approximately 6% above the costs of a centrally coordinated chain, but in
this case, the lion’s share of the savings is enjoyed by the vendor.
6.3 Areas for Future Research
The research presented here contributes to a further understanding of the coordina-
tion of supply chain decisions via advanced collaboration arrangements. However,
interesting areas for future research remain.
The conceptual model for collaboration arrangements in practice found in Chap-
ter 2 can be further validated and improved. Following van der Vaart and van Donk
(2008), we have argued that the complexity of a multitude of varying occurrences
of collaborating arrangements and the ambiguity of definitions used limit the abil-
ity to ‘build-upon’ previous research and therefore limit progress. The conceptual
model we presented, with the proposed measurements to validate it, can be used
as a foundation to build upon. Future research, via large-scale surveys or in-depth
interviews with experts in practice may lead to stronger support for and improve-
ments of the relations in the model and the measurements. The strategic conditions
and benefits could serve as focal areas, as these relations and conditions so far have
been: 1)surveyed using multiple varying definitions and constructs, and 2) difficult
to understand and prove analytically. For this, we propose a dual approach. First,
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the strategic relations in the conceptual model for collaboration can be tested in
multiple large-scale surveys, across multiple industries and multiple countries. As
is clear from the model based on understanding collaboration in Chapter 3, the an-
alytical understanding of strategic conditions and results of collaboration remains
a challenge. The strategic conditions and benefits are hard to define properly. More
empirical results may improve the ability to model these conditions for analytical
understanding. To overcome the difficulty of modeling the strategic benefits over
the short- and long-term, we propose that longitudinal empirical studies be set up
to research the development of the strategic position of firms over time.
The transport tariffs that we derive from a simple model in Chapter 4 lead to
two directions for future research. The first direction is the further refinement of the
model for deriving transport tariffs. In particular, the carrier can be modeled to in-
clude freight consolidation due to routing. Further, the total number of trucks that
is available to the carrier can be made finite in the model. This way, one achieves a
situation that holds some similarity to the problem of demand management with
stable tariffs. The second direction for future research based on transport tariffs is
to analyze the implementation of the resulting quantity dependent LTL-transport
tariffs in operational models in order to calculate the cost benefits of collaboration.
The resulting benefits of collaboration are expected to be lower, but more realistic,
since part of the cost-savings from transport consolidation are already realized.
The concept of coordination through incentive alignment via inventory capacity
in Chapter 5 is a simple and therefore potentially powerful method to coordinate
supply chain operations. Both parties preserve some authority on supply chain
decisions. The model can be improved and made more convincing to practitioners
by modeling stochastic demand instead of constant demand.
In the research of this thesis, the unit of analysis is the buyer-vendor dyad.
A vendor with multiple buyers can transact with multiple vendor-buyer dyads. In
future research, it would be interesting to take into account the interaction between
dyads in a supply-chain collaboration arrangement. The operational decisions that
are made in one dyad may affect the operational performance of another dyad of
the same vendor. For a system consisting of a vendor and multiple buyers, this
explains the performance gap between a centrally coordinated supply chain that
covers the decisions of all dyads, and the performance of a supply chain where
decisions are coordinated on the level of multiple dyads. The buyer-dependent
business environment will determine the performance gap between centrally and
dyad-coordinated supply chains. Future research may study the buyer-dependent
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environmental factors that make it worthwhile to consider coordination on a higher
level than the dyad.
The trend of moving from products to services may also lead to interesting re-
search directions. Instead of delivering a physical product that the customer uses
to satisfy needs, firms increasingly focus on delivering the service to satisfy needs
instead of the product. To give an example of where this applies, consider the car
manufacturing industry, where high plant utilization rates are necessary to break
even. The cars that are manufactured are ultimately bought by a customer who has
to buy a car to satisfy his mobility needs. If we extent the concept of collaboration
through VMI all the way to the customer, we can imagine a car manufacturer that
is no longer selling cars, but that sells mobility instead. While demand for new cars
swings with economic indicators, the mobility needs of the end-customers remain
less perturbed. A manufacturer who makes it his business to ensure a guaranteed
service level of mobility to the end customer thus may realize a more stable and
thus more efficient supply chain compared to the current business model. On top
of that, such a manufacturer may pro-actively manage the maintenance of such
vehicles, and may even join forces with the customer to drive more efficiently and
safely to the destination. Similar arguments can be made for other services re-
lying on capital intensive production enablers. Therefore, further research in the
potential gains and the pitfalls of even more intense and tight advanced collabora-
tion arrangements to coordinate decision-making in the supply chain remains an
interesting avenue to explore.

Appendix A
Cost Allocation and Simulation
of Transport Tariffs
A.1 Allocation Details
A.1.1 Marginal Allocation
The marginal procedure for allocating costs can more formally be described as
follows. The impact of the last arrived order being of size q, is τ|O|(O, q). Now
take the average of τ|O|(O, q) for the cases where q|O| = q to arrive at the rate T(q)
to be applied to an order of size q: T(q) = E
(
τ|O|(O, q)
∣∣∣ q|O| = q).
A.1.2 Shapley Allocation
The Shapley procedure for allocating costs can more formally be described as fol-
lows. Choose ` such that 1 ≤ ` ≤ |O| and compute
τ(O, q) = 1|O|! ∑
σ∈Π|O|
τσ−1(`)(Oσ, q)
whereOσ = (qσ(1), · · · , qσ(|O|)) and Π|O| is the set of permutations of |O| elements.
Note that τ(O, q) does not depend on the choice of ` with 1 ≤ ` ≤ |O|. Also note
that in case q /∈ O then τ(O, q) = 0 as τσ−1(`)(Oσ, q) = 0 for any σ ∈ Π|O|.
Now take the average of τ(O, q) for the cases where q ∈ O to arrive at the rate
T(q) to be applied to an order of size q: T(q) = E(τ(O, q)|q ∈ O). Further note
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from #(O) = ∑|O|k=1 τk(O, qk) = #(Oσ) = ∑
|Oσ |
k=1 τk(Oσ, qσ(k)) that
|O|
∑
k=1
τ(O, qk) = 1|O|!
|O|
∑
k=1
∑
σ∈Π|O|
τσ−1(`)(Oσ, qk)
=
1
|O|! ∑
σ∈Π|O|
|O|
∑
k=1
τσ−1(k)(Oσ, qk)
=
1
|O|! ∑
σ∈Π|O|
|O|
∑
k=1
τσ−1(σ(k))(Oσ, qσ(k))
=
1
|O|! ∑
σ∈Π|O|
|O|
∑
k=1
τk(Oσ, qσ(k))
=
1
|O|! ∑
σ∈Π|O|
#(O) = #(O)
A.1.3 Semi-proportional Allocation
For an order pool O = (q1, · · · , q|O|) now consider the following recursions, for
calculating numbers (αj), referred to as allocations, and numbers (ρj), referred to
as remainders,
αj = min{wjρj−1, #(qj)} and ρj = ρj−1 − αj (A.1)
with ρ0 some given positive number and weights given by wj = qj/(qj + · · ·+ q|O|).
Note that w|O| = 1. The allocation (αj) is such that if qj = qj+1 then αj = αj+1. The
next theorem shows that allocating αj to order qj is efficient provided orders are
sorted according to decreasing size. Here, an order pool O = (q1, · · · , q|O|) is said
to be sorted if q1 ≥ q2 ≥ · · · q|O|. The pool is said to have LTL orders only if q ≤ F
for all q ∈ O. Note that in an LTL-orders only pool #(q) = 1 for any q in that order
pool.
Theorem 4. Let O = (q1, q2, · · · , q|O|) be a sorted order pool with LTL orders only. Then
∑
j
αj = ρ0 (A.2)
for any ρ0 ≤ |O| where the allocations αj are computed from (A.1).
Proof. Start by noting that ρn = ρ0 − ∑nj=1 αj and so ∑nj=1 αj = ρ0 is equivalent to
ρn = 0.
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The proof now proceeds by induction on |O|. Note that the theorem holds ev-
idently when |O| = 1. Now assume that Equality (A.2) holds for all sorted or-
der pools containing n − 1 or less LTL orders and consider a sorted order pool
O = (q1, q2, · · · , qn) with LTL orders only. Apply recursion (A.1) to O with start-
ing value ρ0 = |O| = n. Now
ρ1 = n−min
{
q1
q1 + · · ·+ qn n, 1
}
= max
{
q2 + · · ·+ qn
q1 + q2 + · · ·+ qn n, n− 1
}
.
Note that
q2 + · · ·+ qn
q1 + q2 + · · ·+ qn n ≤ n− 1⇔ (q2 + · · ·+ qn)n
≤ (q1 + q2 + · · ·+ qn)(n− 1)
⇔ 0 ≤ q1(n− 1)− (q2 + · · ·+ qn)
and the last inequality holds from q1(n− 1) ≥ q2 + · · ·+ qn which is evidently true
as q1 ≥ qj for all j. So ρ1 ≤ n− 1. Now apply recursion (A.1) with starting value
ρ′0 = ρ1 to O′ = (q2, · · · , qn) and denote all the ensuing allocations and remainders
with a prime. Clearly αj = α′j−1 and ρj = ρ
′
j−1. In particular ρn = ρ
′
n−1. By the
induction hypothesis the theorem applies to O′ and therefore ρn = ρ′n−1 = 0.
We stil need to prove the theorem when ρ0 < n. It is readily seen that the alloca-
tions αj and the remainders ρj are nondecreasing as a function of ρ0. As allocations
and remainders are obviously nonnegative, ρn = 0 for ρ0 < n is immediate from
ρn = 0 for ρ0 = n. 
The following corollary to Theorem 4 is immediate as #(O) ≤ |O|.
Corollary 3. Let O = (q1, · · · , q|O|) be a sorted order pool with LTL orders only. Com-
pute allocations αj to qj through
αj = min{wjρj−1, #(qj)} and ρj = ρj−1 − αj
with ρ0 = #(O) and wj = qjqj+···+q|O| . Then
|O|
∑
j=1
αj = #(O).
The semi-proportional allocation of costs to an order pool O = (q1, · · · ,O|O|
can now be detailed as follows. First, set α′j = bqj/Fc. Put q′j = qj − α′jF as
the remainder of the order after full trucks have been deducted. Consider O′ =
(q′1, · · · , q′|O|). Let σ be a permutation of {1, . . . , |O|} such that q′σ(1) ≥ · · · ≥ q′σ(|O|)
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and consider O′σ = (q′σ(1), · · · , q′σ(|O|)). The order pool O′σ is sorted and has LTL
orders only. Apply the recursion (A.1) to O′σ, resulting in
ασ(j) = min{wσ(j)ρσ(j−1), #(qσ(j))} and ρσ(j) = ρσ(j−1) − ασ(j)
with
ρσ(0) ≡ #(O′) .
Now the semi-proportional allocation allocates τ˜(O, q) = α′j + αj to order q =
qj ∈ O, setting τ˜(O, q) = 0 whenever q /∈ O. Take the average of τ˜(O, q) for the
cases where q ∈ O to arrive at the rate T(q) to be applied to an order of size q:
T(q) = E(τ˜(O, q)|q ∈ O).
A.2 Simulation details
In the simulations sizes of Poisson order arrivals are generated from gamma distri-
butions with outcomes rounded up to an integer. The common first-fit decreasing
heuristic, see Johnson (1974), is used to solve the resulting bin-packing problem of
fitting the orders of an order pool into trucks.
Allocation simulations In the allocation simulations truck capacity, Q, is equal
to 20. The simulation engine simulates 150, 000 inter-dispatch intervals. Note,
though, that the rate for size q, T(q), is computed from E(.|q ∈ O) and the number
of pool instances where q ∈ O is less than 150, 000. In particular, the occurrence of
large order-sizes for a low arrival rate and when working with the small-order-size
distribution Γ(2, 1.2) is so rare that graphs of the rate for these order sizes is not
smooth, see Figure 4.5 on the left.
Discrete event simulation is used to derive transport tariffs. Orders are as-
sumed to arrive according to a compound Poisson process with rate λ and Gamma
distributed order-size. The simulation is performed using two order-size distribu-
tions: a distribution with predominantly small orders (Γ(2, 1.2), average order-size
2.4) and one with slightly greater orders (Γ(2, 5), average order-size 10). Both dis-
tributions seem realistic to model LTL-transport for a truck of capacity QF = 20.
Transport performance and average utilization rate depend strongly on the
order-arrival process. The utilization rate determines the overall efficiency of trans-
port and with that, the carrier’s costs. A plot of the expected average utilization
rate for the carrier as a function of the order arrival rate is given in Figure A.1, for
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Figure A.1: Average Utilization Rate as function of order-arrival rate. Results are
from simulation experiments.
both the small and medium sized order distributions. It shows that the specified
order-arrival patterns cover a range of utilization rates from almost 0.1 to 0.9. The
plots show that, as expected, the average utilization rate increases in the order ar-
rival rate. This is due to economies of scale: as more orders arrive, there are more
consolidation opportunities for the carrier.
Profit maximization For each order size n trial rates are considered making for nF
different tariffs. With 1, 500, 000 order pools generated per tariff, the computation
time grows quickly with increasing n and F, making the search for the best tariff
burdensome. Therefore, the simulations were carried out with n = 5 and Q = 6.
With this choice the number of replications is still 56 × 1, 500, 000 > 22.5 billion.
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Samenvatting (Summary in
Dutch)
Bedrijven in een supply chain kunnen de efficiëntie van de verrichtingen van de
supply chain verbeteren en de kosten verlagen door het coördineren van beslissin-
gen met partners in de supply chain. Hiervoor kunnen verschillende samenwer-
kingsvormen tussen bedrijven gebruikt worden. In dit proefschrift onderzoeken
we de coördinatie van supply chain beslissingen door samenwerkingsvormen. We
focussen op de koper-verkoper dyade. Het doel van het onderzoek in dit proef-
schrift is het leveren van een bijdrage aan het onderzoek naar de condities voor en
de consequenties van geavanceerde samenwerkingsvormen tussen bedrijven, zowel
vanuit de praktijk als vanuit de theorie.
We beginnen in Hoofdstuk 2 met een inventarisatie en categorisatie van sa-
menwerkingsvormen zoals deze in de praktijk bestaan, door middel van een lite-
ratuurstudie van surveys, case-studies en interviews. Hieruit volgt een overzicht
van de condities voor geavanceerde vormen van samenwerking en voordelen van
deze samenwerkingsvormen. De twee belangrijkste samenwerkingsvormen in dit
proefschrift, waarmee bedrijven in supply chains werken, zijn de conventionele
situatie en Vendor Managed Inventories (VMI). In de conventionele situatie ver-
loopt de communicatie tussen de koper en de verkoper via bestellingen van de
koper. De verkoper levert vervolgens het gevraagde binnen de afgesproken voor-
waarden. Bij VMI wordt de voorraad van de koper door de verkoper bestuurd,
inclusief de bepaling van de tijd en de hoeveelheid van de belevering van artike-
len aan de koper. De grotere mate van coördinatie van supply chain beslissingen
die mogelijk is onder VMI kan leiden tot hogere efficiëntie in vergelijking met de
coördinatie in de conventionele samenwerkingsvorm. Dit uit zich in lagere kosten
voor transport, productie of voor het aanhouden van voorraden, bij minimaal ge-
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lijkblijvende service niveaus aan de klanten van de koper. Bedrijven onderscheiden
ook in de praktijk strategische voordelen in geavanceerde samenwerkingsvormen.
De strategische positie ten opzichte van andere bedrijven in de supply chain kan
verbeteren, doordat er nauwer samengewerkt wordt. In geavanceerde vormen van
samenwerking wordt informatie vaker en in meer detail uitgewisseld. Een con-
sequentie hiervan is dat de verkoper veel meer gedetailleerde marktkennis krijgt,
hetgeen een strategisch voordeel kan zijn. Als derde strategisch voordeel voor ko-
pers geldt dat zij minder hulpmiddelen nodig hebben voor het management van
de voorraden.
We onderscheiden op een operationeel vlak twee condities voor het aangaan
van geavanceerde samenwerkingsvormen: de kwaliteit en de rijkdom van de infor-
matie die uitgewisseld wordt.
Op een strategisch vlak onderscheiden we drie condities voor het aangaan van
geavanceerde samenwerkingsvormen. Ten eerste de mogelijkheden van een bedrijf
om een geavanceerde vorm van samenwerking aan te gaan. Dit hangt onder meer
af van de grote van een bedrijf, de ervaring met samenwerkingsvormen en de sta-
tus van de ICT systemen in een bedrijf. Ten tweede is een strategische match tussen
de bedrijven nodig. Deze hangt af van vertrouwen tussen de bedrijven en de stra-
tegische positie van bedrijven en de verandering daarvan voor en na het aangaan
van samenwerking. De derde strategische conditie is de product fit, die van markt
en product karakteristieken zoals de volatiliteit van de vraag en de typische levens-
cyclus van het product. In de onderzoekswereld bestaat een gebrek aan consensus
over de modellen en bepalende parameters waarmee onderzoek naar samenwer-
king tussen bedrijven onderzocht wordt. Als conclusie uit de onderzoeken in de
literatuur stellen we een raamwerk voor waarmee samenwerking onderzocht kan
worden.
In Hoofdstuk 3 analyseren we de condities voor en de voordelen van coördi-
natie van supply chain beslissingen door samenwerking, door bestudering van de
analytische literatuur. Coördinatie van beslissingen door samenwerking via trans-
acties op een markt is de meest losse samenwerkingsvorm. Het onderbrengen van
transacties binnen de eigen organisatie is de meest nauwe vorm van samenwerking.
Onder deze laatste vorm van aansturing, met een allesbepalende supply chain ma-
nager, kunnen beslissingen voor de supply chain dyade optimaal gecoördineerd
worden. Onder VMI en afgeleide samenwerkingsvormen kunnen beslissingen be-
ter afgestemd worden dan via een markt, maar niet noodzakelijk net zo goed als
onder een centraal bestuurde supply chain. We beargumenteren dat een samen-
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werkingsvorm bestaat uit een akkoord over de te delen informatie en verdeling van
de autoriteit om beslissingen te nemen.
We concluderen dat de operationele condities voor samenwerking die in de
praktijk gevonden zijn analytisch onderbouwd kunnen worden. De kwaliteit en
de rijkdom van informatie kwaliteit en de rijkdom van informatie bepalen in de
modellen voor samenwerking de verbeteringen in efficiëntie door coördinatie. We
identificeren als extra conditie voor het aangaan van geavanceerde samenwerkings-
vormen dat het individueel economisch rationeel moet zijn voor elk bedrijf om te
participeren in de samenwerking. Individuele economische rationaliteit kan op
twee manieren gerealiseerd worden. Ten eerste, doordat de positie van een be-
drijf zodanig is dat het economisch voordeliger is een verzoek van een dominant
bedrijf om samenwerking aan te gaan op te volgen. De tweede manier waarop
samenwerking economisch rationeel wordt voor een bedrijf is als de voordelen
van samenwerking in de vorm van financiële compensatie gedeeld worden. In het
geval van de tweede manier koopt een partij die de meeste voordelen kan reali-
seren bij toename van beslisautoriteit in feite deze autoriteit door het aanbieden
van een financiële compensatie. In het geval van pure VMI neemt de verkoper de
volledige verantwoordelijkheid voor de voorraden van de koper over, maar sub-
tielere vormen van deling van beslisautoriteit en financiële compensatie bestaan.
In Hoofdstuk 5 bestuderen we een vorm waarin de compensatie die verkoper de
koper aanbiedt afhankelijk is van de hoeveelheid voorraad die de verkoper bij de
koper mag neerleggen.
De operationele voordelen op het gebied van transport-, productie- en voor-
raadmanagement worden door de analytische modellen onderbouwd. Een belang-
rijk deel van de kostenvoordelen uit samenwerking volgt uit efficiëntievoordelen
in transport. In de modellen waarin de efficiëntievoordelen op het gebied van
transport door coördinatie van beslissingen geanalyseerd wordt, worden de kos-
ten voor transport vaak gemodelleerd als vaste kosten per rit, onafhankelijk van
het volume dat vervoerd wordt. Dit laatste kan, omdat transportkosten vaak re-
latief onafhankelijk zijn van hoe vol een vrachtwagen beladen is. Hierdoor leidt
elke samenwerkingsvorm waarin de verkoper meer controle over de tijd en kwan-
titeit van afleveringen krijgt in potentie tot vollere vrachtwagens en dus direct tot
kostenbesparingen van de verkoper. Het bepalen van de grootte van deze kos-
tenvoordelen is complex, niet alleen vanwege het probleem van het toewijzen van
transportkosten op een route met afleveringen voor meerdere klanten, maar ook
omdat de verkoper het transport via een derde partij, een third-party logistics pro-
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vider (3PL), zou kunnen organiseren. Deze 3PL kan lagere transporttarieven voor
orders van grootte less-than-a-truckload (LTL) aanbieden, doordat zij verschillende
orders van verschillende aanbieders combineren. Hierdoor wordt een deel van de
kostenvoordelen uit efficiëntere belading van vrachtwagens dat mogelijk is van-
wege coördinatie van beslissingen, door de 3PL gerealiseerd. Als transportkosten
gemodelleerd worden als vaste tarieven in plaats van de lagere, volume afhankelij-
ke, tarieven die de 3PL aanbiedt, dan worden de voordelen die door supply chain
coördinatie bereikt kunnen worden, overschat. We onderzoeken in Hoofdstuk 4
daarom hoe volume afhankelijke transporttarieven waarmee het gebruik van bij-
voorbeeld vrachtwagens gecoördineerd wordt, gemodelleerd kunnen worden.
Een aantal eigenschappen waaraan transporttarieven voldoet komt naar voren
uit de literatuur: het tarief stijgt monotoon bij toenemend volume; de tarieven
zijn zodanig dat de vervoerder de kosten gemiddeld volledig terugverdient; de
transporttarieven zijn subadditief, dit betekent dat het nooit voordelig is om een
bestelling in meerdere kleinere bestellingen te splitsen; en tot slot de kosten per
volume eenheid dalen monotoon bij toenemend volume. We hebben drie vormen
van kostenallocatie als basis voor transporttarieven geanalyseerd. Ten eerste wordt
een marginale kostenallocatie bekeken, waarbij de marginale kosten van een order
berekend worden. Ten tweede wordt kostenallocatie bestudeerd op basis van de
Shapley, een gewogen marginale kostenberekening. In beide gevallen zijn de tarie-
ven niet subadditief. De derde kosten allocatie wijst kosten zodanig toe dat deze
proportioneel in verhouding zijn met het totale volume, waarbij de kosten van een
volledige vrachtwagen als bovengrens gelden. In numerieke simulaties laten we
zien dat deze semi-proportionele allocatie voldoet aan alle gestelde voorwaarden.
De vorm van de tarieffunctie is sterk afhankelijk van de hoeveelheid orders die per
tijdseenheid bij de vervoerder binnen komt. Als er veel orders binnenkomen kan
de vervoerder de vrachtwagens efficiënt vullen en lopen de kosten lineair op in het
volume. Als er weinig orders binnenkomen, dan is de kans om de vrachtwagen
efficiënt te vullen klein en worden de tarieven onafhankelijk van het volume.
We hebben transporttarieven geanalyseerd voor een vervoerder die kosten toe-
wijst alsof dit een interne afdeling van een bedrijf is, en voor een vervoerder die
als onafhankelijke partij de winst probeert te maximaliseren. In dit geval vloeit
slechts een deel van het kostenvoordeel dat de vervoerder realiseert terug naar de
opdrachtgever. We laten door middel van numerieke voorbeelden zien dat dit deel
afhankelijk is van de competitie in de markt, door de kans te modelleren dat een
opdrachtgever met een vervoerder zaken doet, afhankelijk te maken van het tarief
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dat gevraagd wordt.
We concluderen dat de besparingen uit transportefficiëntie door coördinatie van
supply chain beslissingen in samenwerkingsvormen het grootst is als de verkoper
het vervoer in eigen hand regelt. In dit geval vloeien alle verbeteringen in de
gemiddelde vervoersefficiëntie terug naar de verkoper. Als de verkoper het vervoer
via een 3PL organiseert, zijn voordelen van samenwerken nog steeds mogelijk,
maar minder groot.
In Hoofdstuk 5 bestuderen we hoe een eenvoudig financieel compensatiesche-
ma de beslissingen in een supply chain kan coördineren voor het geval van vervoer
per vrachtwagen met beperkte capaciteit. In een VMI samenwerkingsvorm heeft
de verkoper het volledige beheer van de voorraad van de koper. De verkoper zou
in theorie veel meer voorraad bij de koper kunnen neerleggen dan hetgeen voor
de koper optimaal is. Om toch enige zeggenschap te houden, bestuderen we hier
een samenwerkingsvorm waarin de koper bepaalt hoeveel ruimte er is om voor-
raad neer te leggen. Omdat het voor de verkoper gunstig kan zijn om meer ruimte
te hebben, zodat grotere hoeveelheden per keer geleverd kunnen worden, biedt
de verkoper een financiële compensatie aan, afhankelijk van de hoeveelheid ruim-
te die beschikbaar is. We bestuderen de effecten op de coördinatie van supply
chain beslissingen in deze vorm, in een model waarin de vervoerscapaciteit van
een vrachtwagen gelimiteerd is.
We hebben een algoritme ontwikkeld waarmee de optimale supply chain beslis-
singen voor een gegeven maximum voorraad bij de koper bepaald kunnen worden.
Hiermee hebben we de resultaten op de supply chain als functie van de maximum
voorraad bij de koper bepaald. Verhoging van de maximale voorraad kan leiden
tot kostenverlaging, vanwege hogere transportefficiëntie, en heeft dus waarde voor
de verkoper. We beschouwen twee soorten verkopers: een altruïstische, die opti-
maliseert voor het resultaat van de verkoper-koper dyade en een opportunistische
verkoper, die zijn eigen winst maximaliseert.
De altruïstische verkoper biedt de voordelen die gerealiseerd worden volledig
als financiële compensatie aan de koper aan, ter motivatie om voldoende ruimte
voor de voorraad beschikbaar te stellen. We concluderen dat hiermee de supply
chain beslissingen gecoördineerd worden. Gemiddeld zijn de supply chain kosten
minder dan 1.5% hoger dan de optimale supply chain kosten bij centrale aanstu-
ring. Het grootste deel van de besparingen (90 %) komt terecht bij de koper. In de
praktijk is dit alleen een realistisch scenario als de koper machtig is ten opzichte
van de verkoper.
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De opportunistische verkoper, die het zich kan veroorloven een groter deel van
de voordelen te houden, modelleren we door de verkoper slechts een deel van
de gerealiseerde voordelen als compensatie aan de koper te laten geven. Omdat
de verkoper weet wat de kosten van de koper zijn, heeft de verkoper dit deel
geoptimaliseerd om zijn winst te maximaliseren. In dit geval zijn de supply chain
kosten in ons numeriek voorbeeld gemiddeld 6% boven de optimale kosten bij
centrale aansturing. In dit geval wordt het leeuwendeel van de voordelen door de
verkoper gesoupeerd.
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Collaboration between firms in order to coordinate supply chain operations can lead to
both strategic and operational benefits. Many advanced forms of collaboration arran -
gements between firms exist with the aim to coordinate supply chain decisions and to
reap these benefits. This dissertation contributes to the understanding of the conditions
that are necessary for collaboration in such arrangements and the benefits that can be
realized of such collaboration arrangements. This dissertation focuses on the vendor-buyer
dyad in the supply chain. We identify and categorize collaboration arrangements that
exist in practice, based on a review of the literature and combine this with formal analy -
tical models in the literature. An important factor in the benefits of collaboration is the
benefit of reduced costs of transport, by realization of economies of scale in the context of
capacity-constrained trucks. As a contribution to the understanding of the dependence of
transport costs on the volume transported, we demonstrate how transport tariffs for
orders of less-than-a-truckload in size on a single link can be deduced from a basic model.
The success of a collaboration arrangement depends on agreement about the distribution
of decision authority and collaboration-benefits. We study a collaboration arrangement in
which the vendor takes responsibility for managing the buyer's inventory and makes it
economically attractive to the buyer by offering a financial incentive, dependent on the
maximum level the buyer permits to be stocked. This dissertation demonstrates that this
incentive alignment leads to considerable cost savings and near-optimal supply chain
decisions.
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